site, allowing the incident commander to assess the situation at all times.
no first responder was injured.
along by the FBI.This was the first of three evacuations caused by reports of
incoming aircraft, and the evacuation order was well communicated and well
coordinated.
it was not 1,000 feet above ground. The incident site was relatively easy to
secure and contain, and there were no other buildings in the immediate area.
There was no collateral damage beyond the Pentagon.
there were significant problems with both self-dispatching and communica-
tions: "Organizations, response units, and individuals proceeding on their own
initiative directly to an incident site, without the knowledge and permission
of the host jurisdiction and the Incident Commander, complicate the exer-
cise of command, increase the risks faced by bonafide responders, and exac-
erbate the challenge of accountability."With respect to communications, the
report concludes: "Almost all aspects of communications continue to be prob-
lematic, from initial notification to tactical operations. Cellular telephones
were of little value. . . . Radio channels were initially oversaturated. . . . Pagers
seemed to be the most reliable means of notification when available and used,
but most firefighters are not issued pagers."
tions that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar
scale. The task looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a
coordinated manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situation.
response to the attacks on 9/11 was necessarily improvised. In New York, the
FDNY, NYPD, the Port Authority, WTC employees, and the building occu-
pants themselves did their best to cope with the effects of an unimaginable
catastrophe--unfolding furiously over a mere 102 minutes--for which they
were unprepared in terms of both training and mindset. As a result of the