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Evacuation orders did not follow the protocol for giving instructions when
a building's collapse may be imminent--a protocol that includes constantly
repeating "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday"--during the 29 minutes between the fall
of the South Tower and that of the North Tower. In addition, most of the evac-
uation instructions did not mention that the South Tower had collapsed. How-
ever, at least three firefighters heard evacuation instructions which stated that
the North Tower was in danger of "imminent collapse."
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FDNY Personnel above the Ground Floors of the North Tower.
Within
minutes, some firefighters began to hear evacuation orders over tactical 1. At
least one chief also gave the evacuation instruction on the command channel
used only by chiefs in the North Tower, which was much less crowded.
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At least two battalion chiefs on upper floors of the North Tower--one on
the 23rd floor and one on the 35th floor--heard the evacuation instruction on
the command channel and repeated it to everyone they came across.The chief
on the 23rd floor apparently aggressively took charge to ensure that all fire-
fighters on the floors in the immediate area were evacuating. The chief on the
35th floor also heard a separate radio communication stating that the South
Tower had collapsed (which the chief on the 23rd floor may have heard as well).
He subsequently acted with a sense of urgency, and some firefighters heard the
evacuation order for the first time when he repeated it on tactical 1.This chief
also had a bullhorn and traveled to each of the stairwells and shouted the evac-
uation order:"All FDNY, get the fuck out!"As a result of his efforts, many fire-
fighters who had not been in the process of evacuating began to do so.
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Other firefighters did not receive the evacuation transmissions, for one of
four reasons: First, some FDNY radios did not pick up the transmission because
of the difficulties of radio communications in high-rises. Second, the numbers
trying to use tactical 1 after the South Tower collapsed may have drowned out
some evacuation instructions. According to one FDNY lieutenant who was
on the 31st floor of the North Tower at the time, "[Tactical] channel 1 just
might have been so bogged down that it may have been impossible to get that
order through."
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Third, some firefighters in the North Tower were off-duty
and did not have radios. Fourth, some firefighters in the North Tower had been
dispatched to the South Tower and likely were on the different tactical chan-
nel assigned to that tower.
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FDNY personnel in the North Tower who received the evacuation orders
did not respond uniformly. Some units--including one whose officer knew
that the South Tower had collapsed--either delayed or stopped their evacua-
tion in order to assist nonambulatory civilians. Some units whose members had
become separated during the climb attempted to regroup so they could
descend together. Some units began to evacuate but, according to eyewitnesses,
did not hurry. At least several firefighters who survived believed that they and
others would have evacuated more urgently had they known of the South
Tower's complete collapse. Other firefighters continued to sit and rest on floors
HEROISM AND HORROR
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