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to evacuate injured or disoriented civilians. Numerous other NYPD officers
were stationed throughout the concourse, assisting burned, injured, and disori-
ented civilians, as well as directing all civilians to exit to the north and east.
NYPD officers were also in the South Tower lobby to assist in civilian evacu-
ation. NYPD officers stationed on Vesey Street between West Street and
Church Street urged civilians not to remain in the area and instead to keep
walking north.
147
At 9:06, the NYPD Chief of Department instructed that no units were to
land on the roof of either tower. At about 9:30, one of the helicopters present
advised that a rooftop evacuation still would not be possible. One NYPD hel-
icopter pilot believed one portion of the North Tower roof to be free enough
of smoke that a hoist could be lowered in order to rescue people, but there was
no one on the roof. This pilot's helicopter never attempted to hover directly
over the tower. Another helicopter did attempt to do so, and its pilot stated
that the severity of the heat from the jet fuel­laden fire in the North Tower
would have made it impossible to hover low enough for a rescue, because the
high temperature would have destabilized the helicopter.
148
At 9:51, an aviation unit warned units of large pieces of debris hanging from
the building. Prior to 9:59, no NYPD helicopter pilot predicted that either
tower would collapse.
149
Interaction of 911 Calls and NYPD Operations.
At 9:37, a civilian on
the 106th floor of the South Tower reported to a 911 operator that a lower
floor--the "90-something floor"--was collapsing. This information was
conveyed inaccurately by the 911 operator to an NYPD dispatcher.The dis-
patcher further confused the substance of the 911 call by telling NYPD offi-
cers at the WTC complex that "the 106th floor is crumbling" at 9:52, 15
minutes after the 911 call was placed. The NYPD dispatcher conveyed this
message on the radio frequency used in precincts in the vicinity of the WTC
and subsequently on the Special Operations Division channel, but not on
City Wide channel 1.
150
PAPD Response
Initial responders from outside PAPD commands proceeded to the police desk
in 5 WTC or to the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. Some officers
were then assigned to assist in stairwell evacuations; others were assigned to
expedite evacuation in the plaza, concourse, and PATH station.As information
was received of civilians trapped above ground-level floors of the North Tower,
other PAPD officers were instructed to climb to those floors for rescue efforts.
Still others began climbing toward the impact zone.
151
At 9:11, the PAPD Superintendent and an inspector began walking up stair-
well B of the North Tower to assess damage near and in the impact zone.The
PAPD Chief and several other PAPD officers began ascending a stairwell in
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