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not transmit. He was also apparently unable to hear another chief who was
attempting to communicate with him from a portable radio, either because of
a technical problem or because the volume was turned down on the console
(the normal setting when the system was not in use). Because the repeater
channel seemed inoperable--the master handset appeared unable to transmit
or receive communications--the chiefs in the North Tower lobby decided not
to use it.The repeater system was working at least partially, however, on portable
FDNY radios, and firefighters subsequently used repeater channel 7 in the
South Tower.
105
FDNY North Tower Operations.
Command and control decisions were
affected by the lack of knowledge of what was happening 30, 60, 90, and 100
floors above. According to one of the chiefs in the lobby, "One of the most
critical things in a major operation like this is to have information.We didn't
have a lot of information coming in.We didn't receive any reports of what was
seen from the [NYPD] helicopters. It was impossible to know how much dam-
age was done on the upper floors, whether the stairwells were intact or not."
106
According to another chief present, "People watching on TV certainly had
more knowledge of what was happening a hundred floors above us than we
did in the lobby. . . . [W]ithout critical information coming in . . . it's very dif-
ficult to make informed, critical decisions[.]"
107
As a result, chiefs in the lobby disagreed over whether anyone at or above
the impact zone possibly could be rescued, or whether there should be even
limited firefighting for the purpose of cutting exit routes through fire zones.
108
Many units were simply instructed to ascend toward the impact zone and
report back to the lobby via radio. Some units were directed to assist specific
groups of individuals trapped in elevators or in offices well below the impact
zone. One FDNY company successfully rescued some civilians who were
trapped on the 22nd floor as a result of damage caused by the initial fireball.
109
An attempt was made to track responding units' assignments on a magnetic
board, but the number of units and individual firefighters arriving in the lobby
made this an overwhelming task.As the fire companies were not advised to the
contrary, they followed protocol and kept their radios on tactical channel 1,
which would be monitored by the chiefs in the lobby.Those battalion chiefs
who would climb would operate on a separate command channel, which also
would be monitored by the chiefs in the lobby.
110
Fire companies began to ascend stairwell B at approximately 9:07, laden
with about 100 pounds of heavy protective clothing, self-contained breathing
apparatuses, and other equipment (including hoses for engine companies and
heavy tools for ladder companies).
111
Firefighters found the stairways they entered intact, lit, and clear of smoke.
Unbeknownst to the lobby command post, one battalion chief in the North
Tower found a working elevator, which he took to the 16th floor before begin-
ning to climb.
112
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THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
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