inoperable. . . .We knew that at the height of the day there were as many
as 50,000 people in this building.We had a large volume of fire on the
upper floors. Each floor was approximately an acre in size. Several floors
of fire would have been beyond the fire-extinguishing capability of the
forces that we had on hand. So we determined, very early on, that this
was going to be strictly a rescue mission. We were going to vacate the
building, get everybody out, and then we were going to get out.
received advice from senior FDNY chiefs that while the building might even-
tually suffer a partial collapse on upper floors, such structural failure was not
imminent. No one anticipated the possibility of a total collapse.
lobby to respond to specific casualty reports. In addition, many ambulance para-
medics from private hospitals were rushing to the WTC complex.
Numerous NYPD officers saw the plane strike the North Tower and immedi-
ately reported it to NYPD communications dispatchers.
22 lieutenants, 100 sergeants, and 800 police officers from all over the city. The
Chief of Department arrived at Church and Vesey at 9:00.
higher-level mobilization. These officers would be stationed around the
perimeter of the complex to direct the evacuation of civilians. Many were
diverted on the way to the scene by intervening emergencies related to the
attack.
of special rescue operations. En route, the two helicopters communicated with
air traffic controllers at the area's three major airports and informed them of
the commercial airplane crash at the World Trade Center.The air traffic con-
trollers had been unaware of the incident.
Tower roof, a helicopter pilot advised the ESU team that they could not land
on the roof, because "it is too engulfed in flames and heavy smoke condition."