Street level of the lobby had been blown out; some large marble tiles had been
dislodged from the walls; one entire elevator bank was destroyed by the fire-
ball. Lights were functioning, however, and the air was clear of smoke.
Lower Manhattan arrived and took over. Both chiefs immediately began speak-
ing with the former fire safety director and other building personnel to learn
whether building systems were working.They were advised that all 99 eleva-
tors in the North Tower appeared to be out, and there were no assurances that
sprinklers or standpipes were working on upper floors. Chiefs also spoke with
Port Authority police personnel and an OEM representative.
ing the impact zone as scouting units and reporting back to the chiefs in the
lobby.The radio channel they used was tactical 1. Following FDNY high-rise
fire protocols, other units did not begin climbing immediately, as the chiefs
worked to formulate a plan before sending them up. Units began mobilizing
in the lobby, lining up and awaiting their marching orders.
in their judgment the impact of the plane into the North Tower made the entire
complex unsafe--not because of concerns about a possible second plane.
up the stairs to report back on conditions, but did not know what the impact
floors were; they did not know if any stairwells into the impact zone were clear;
and they did not know whether water for firefighting would be available on
the upper floors.They also did not know what the fire and impact zone looked
like from the outside.
were so dire that some civilians on upper floors were jumping or falling from
the building.They also knew from building personnel that some civilians were
trapped in elevators and on specific floors. According to Division Chief for
Lower Manhattan Peter Hayden, "We had a very strong sense we would lose
firefighters and that we were in deep trouble, but we had estimates of 25,000
to 50,000 civilians, and we had to try to rescue them."
structural damage to the building, and most likely that the fire suppres-