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by 2001 was cooperating with investigators, recognized Moussaoui as some-
one who had been in the Afghan camps.
106
As mentioned above, before 9/11
the FBI agents in Minneapolis had failed to persuade supervisors at headquar-
ters that there was enough evidence to seek a FISA warrant to search Mous-
saoui's computer hard drive and belongings. Either the British information or
the Ressam identification would have broken the logjam.
A maximum U.S. effort to investigate Moussaoui conceivably could have
unearthed his connections to Binalshibh. Those connections might have
brought investigators to the core of the 9/11 plot.The Binalshibh connection
was recognized shortly after 9/11, though it was not an easy trail to find. Dis-
covering it would have required quick and very substantial cooperation from
the German government, which might well have been difficult to obtain.
However, publicity about Moussaoui's arrest and a possible hijacking threat
might have derailed the plot.
107
With time, the search for Mihdhar and Hazmi
and the investigation of Moussaoui might also have led to a breakthrough that
would have disrupted the plot.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
Another late opportunity was presented by a confluence of information
regarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed received by the intelligence community
in the summer of 2001.The possible links between KSM, Moussaoui, and an
individual only later identified as Ramzi Binalshibh would remain undiscov-
ered, however.
Although we readily equate KSM with al Qaeda today, this was not the case
before 9/11. KSM, who had been indicted in January 1996 for his role in the
Manila air plot, was seen primarily as another freelance terrorist, associated
with Ramzi Yousef. Because the links between KSM and Bin Ladin or al
Qaeda were not recognized at the time, responsibility for KSM remained in
the small Islamic Extremist Branch of the Counterterrorist Center, not in the
Bin Ladin unit.
Moreover, because KSM had already been indicted, he became targeted
for arrest. In 1997, the Counterterrorist Center added a Renditions Branch
to help find wanted fugitives. Responsibility for KSM was transferred to this
branch, which gave the CIA a "man-to-man" focus but was not an analyti-
cal unit.When subsequent information came, more critical for analysis than
for tracking, no unit had the job of following up on what the information
might mean.
108
For example, in September 2000, a source had reported that an individual
named Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was a key lieutenant in al Qaeda. Al-
Ballushi means "from Baluchistan," and KSM is from Baluchistan. Recogniz-
ing the possible significance of this information, the Bin Ladin unit sought
more information.When no information was forthcoming, the Bin Ladin unit
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Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 276