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looked into the issues yet herself. "John" asked her to do the research in her
free time.
73
"Mary" began her work on July 24.That day, she found the cable reporting
that Mihdhar had a visa to the United States.A week later, she found the cable
reporting that Mihdhar's visa application--what was later discovered to be his
first application--listed New York as his destination. On August 21, she
located the March 2000 cable that "noted with interest" that Hazmi had flown
to Los Angeles in January 2000. She immediately grasped the significance of
this information.
74
"Mary" and "Jane" promptly met with an INS representative at FBI head-
quarters. On August 22, the INS told them that Mihdhar had entered the
United States on January 15, 2000, and again on July 4, 2001. "Jane" and
"Mary" also learned that there was no record that Hazmi had left the coun-
try since January 2000, and they assumed he had left with Mihdhar in June
2000. They decided that if Mihdhar was in the United States, he should be
found.
75
They divided up the work."Mary" asked the Bin Ladin unit to draft a cable
requesting that Mihdhar and Hazmi be put on the TIPOFF watchlist. Both
Hazmi and Mihdhar were added to this watchlist on August 24.
76
"Jane" took responsibility for the search effort inside the United States. As
the information indicated that Mihdhar had last arrived in New York, she began
drafting what is known as a lead for the FBI's New York Field Office. A lead
relays information from one part of the FBI to another and requests that a par-
ticular action be taken. She called an agent in New York to give him a "heads-
up" on the matter, but her draft lead was not sent until August 28. Her email
told the New York agent that she wanted him to get started as soon as possi-
ble, but she labeled the lead as "Routine"--a designation that informs the
receiving office that it has 30 days to respond.
77
The agent who received the lead forwarded it to his squad supervisor.That
same day, the supervisor forwarded the lead to an intelligence agent to open
an intelligence case--an agent who thus was behind "the wall" keeping FBI
intelligence information from being shared with criminal prosecutors. He also
sent it to the Cole case agents and an agent who had spent significant time in
Malaysia searching for another Khalid: Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.
78
The suggested goal of the investigation was to locate Mihdhar, determine
his contacts and reasons for being in the United States, and possibly conduct
an interview. Before sending the lead,"Jane" had discussed it with "John," the
CIA official on detail to the FBI. She had also checked with the acting head
of the FBI's Bin Ladin unit. The discussion seems to have been limited to
whether the search should be classified as an intelligence investigation or as a
criminal one. It appears that no one informed higher levels of management in
either the FBI or CIA about the case.
79
There is no evidence that the lead, or
the search for these terrorist suspects, was substantively discussed at any level
270
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 270