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unit went to New York on June 11 to meet with the agents about the Cole case.
"Jane" brought the surveillance pictures. At some point in the meeting she
showed the photographs to the agents and asked whether they recognized
Quso in any of them. The agents asked questions about the photographs--
Why were they taken? Why were these people being followed? Where are the
rest of the photographs?
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The only information "Jane" had about the meeting--other than the pho-
tographs--were the NSA reports that she had found on Intelink. These reports,
however, contained caveats that their contents could not be shared with crim-
inal investigators without the permission of the Justice Department's Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR).Therefore "Jane" concluded that she
could not pass on information from those reports to the agents.This decision
was potentially significant, because the signals intelligence she did not share
linked Mihdhar to a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East.The agents
would have established a link to the suspected facility from their work on the
embassy bombings case. This link would have made them very interested in
learning more about Mihdhar.
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The sad irony is that the agents who found
the source were being kept from obtaining the fruits of their own work.
"Dave," the CIA analyst, knew more about the Kuala Lumpur meeting. He
knew that Mihdhar possessed a U.S. visa, that his visa application indicated that
he intended to travel to New York, that Hazmi had traveled to Los Angeles,
and that a source had put Mihdhar in the company of Khallad. No one at the
meeting asked him what he knew; he did not volunteer anything. He told
investigators that as a CIA analyst, he was not authorized to answer FBI ques-
tions regarding CIA information."Jane" said she assumed that if "Dave" knew
the answers to questions, he would have volunteered them. The New York
agents left the meeting without obtaining information that might have started
them looking for Mihdhar.
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Mihdhar had been a weak link in al Qaeda's operational planning. He had
left the United States in June 2000, a mistake KSM realized could endanger
the entire plan--for to continue with the operation, Mihdhar would have to
travel to the United States again.And unlike other operatives, Mihdhar was not
"clean": he had jihadist connections. It was just such connections that had
brought him to the attention of U.S. officials.
Nevertheless, in this case KSM's fears were not realized. Mihdhar received
a new U.S. visa two days after the CIA-FBI meeting in New York. He flew
to New York City on July 4. No one was looking for him.
August 2001: The Search for Mihdhar and Hazmi Begins and Fails
During the summer of 2001 "John," following a good instinct but not as part
of any formal assignment, asked "Mary," an FBI analyst detailed to the CIA's
Bin Ladin unit, to review all the Kuala Lumpur materials one more time. She
had been at the New York meeting with "Jane" and "Dave" but had not
"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
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