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In addition, we found that the CIA did not notify the FBI of this identifi-
cation. DCI Tenet and Cofer Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into
9/11 that the FBI had access to this identification from the beginning. But
drawing on an extensive record, including documents that were not available
to the CIA personnel who drafted that testimony, we conclude this was not
the case.The FBI's primary Cole investigators had no knowledge that Khallad
had been in Kuala Lumpur with Mihdhar and others until after the Septem-
ber 11 attacks. Because the FBI had not been informed in January 2000 about
Mihdhar's possession of a U.S. visa, it had not then started looking for him in
the United States. Because it did not know of the links between Khallad and
Mihdhar, it did not start looking for him in January 2001.
60
This incident is an example of how day-to-day gaps in information sharing
can emerge even when there is mutual goodwill.The information was from a
joint FBI/CIA source who spoke essentially no English and whose languages
were not understood by the FBI agent on the scene overseas. Issues of travel
and security necessarily kept short the amount of time spent with the source.
As a result, the CIA officer usually did not translate either questions or answers
for his FBI colleague and friend.
61
For interviews without simultaneous translation, the FBI agent on the scene
received copies of the reports that the CIA disseminated to other agencies
regarding the interviews. But he was not given access to the CIA's internal
operational reports, which contained more detail. It was there--in reporting
to which FBI investigators did not have access--that information regarding the
January 2001 identification of Khallad appeared.The CIA officer does not recall
this particular identification and thus cannot say why it was not shared with
his FBI colleague. He might not have understood the possible significance of
the new identification.
62
In June 2000, Mihdhar left California and returned to Yemen. It is possible
that if, in January 2001, the CIA had resumed its search for him, placed him
on the State Department's TIPOFF watchlist, or provided the FBI with the
information, he might have been found--either before or at the time he
applied for a new visa in June 2001, or when he returned to the United States
on July 4.
Spring 2001: Looking Again at Kuala Lumpur
By mid-May 2001, as the threat reports were surging, a CIA official detailed
to the International Terrorism Operations Section at the FBI wondered where
the attacks might occur.We will call him "John." Recalling the episode about
the Kuala Lumpur travel of Mihdhar and his associates, "John" searched the
CIA's databases for information regarding the travel. On May 15, he and an
official at the CIA reexamined many of the old cables from early 2000, includ-
ing the information that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa, and that Hazmi had come
to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000.
63
The CIA official who reviewed the cables took no action regarding them.
"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
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