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that a phone call to a U.S. embassy had warned that Bin Ladin supporters were
planning an attack in the United States using "high explosives." On May 17,
based on the previous day's report, the first item on the CSG's agenda was
"UBL: Operation Planned in U.S."
9
The anonymous caller's tip could not be
corroborated.
Late May brought reports of a possible hostage plot against Americans abroad
to force the release of prisoners, including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the
"Blind Sheikh," who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 plot to
blow up sites in New York City. The reporting noted that operatives might opt
to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. This report led to a Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) information circular to airlines noting the potential
for "an airline hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the United States."
Other reporting mentioned that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack, possi-
bly against Israel, and expected to carry out several more if things went well.
On May 24 alone, counterterrorism officials grappled with reports alleging plots
in Yemen and Italy, as well as a report about a cell in Canada that an anonymous
caller had claimed might be planning an attack against the United States.
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Reports similar to many of these were made available to President Bush in
morning intelligence briefings with DCI Tenet, usually attended by Vice Pres-
ident Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice.While these briefings
discussed general threats to attack America and American interests, the specific
threats mentioned in these briefings were all overseas.
On May 29, Clarke suggested that Rice ask DCI Tenet what more the
United States could do to stop Abu Zubaydah from launching "a series of major
terrorist attacks," probably on Israeli targets, but possibly on U.S. facilities.
Clarke wrote to Rice and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, "When these attacks
occur, as they likely will, we will wonder what more we could have done to
stop them." In May, CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) Chief Cofer Black
told Rice that the current threat level was a 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, as com-
pared to an 8 during the millennium.
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High Probability of Near-Term "Spectacular" Attacks
Threat reports surged in June and July, reaching an even higher peak of urgency.
The summer threats seemed to be focused on Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Yemen, and possibly Rome, but the danger could be anywhere--
including a possible attack on the G-8 summit in Genoa.A June 12 CIA report
passing along biographical background information on several terrorists men-
tioned, in commenting on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that he was recruiting
people to travel to the United States to meet with colleagues already there so
that they might conduct terrorist attacks on Bin Ladin's behalf. On June 22,
the CIA notified all its station chiefs about intelligence suggesting a possible
al Qaeda suicide attack on a U.S. target over the next few days. DCI Tenet asked
that all U.S. ambassadors be briefed.
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