background image
few cases--family members probably all played a role in spotting potential
candidates. Several of the muscle hijackers seem to have been recruited
through contacts at local universities and mosques.
93
According to the head of one of the training camps in Afghanistan, some
were chosen by unnamed Saudi sheikhs who had contacts with al Qaeda.
Omari, for example, is believed to have been a student of a radical Saudi cleric
named Sulayman al Alwan. His mosque, which is located in al Qassim
Province, is known among more moderate clerics as a "terrorist factory."The
province is at the very heart of the strict Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia.
Saeed al Ghamdi and Mohand al Shehri also spent time in al Qassim, both
breaking with their families. According to his father, Mohand al Shehri's fre-
quent visits to this area resulted in his failing exams at his university in Riyadh.
Saeed al Ghamdi transferred to a university in al Qassim, but he soon stopped
talking to his family and dropped out of school without informing them.
94
The majority of these Saudi recruits began to break with their families in
late 1999 and early 2000. According to relatives, some recruits began to make
arrangements for extended absences. Others exhibited marked changes in
behavior before disappearing. Salem al Hazmi's father recounted that Salem--
who had had problems with alcohol and petty theft--stopped drinking and
started attending mosque regularly three months before he disappeared.
95
Several family members remembered that their relatives had expressed a
desire to participate in jihad, particularly in Chechnya. None had mentioned
going to Afghanistan.These statements might be true or cover stories.The four
recruits from the al Ghamdi tribe, for example, all told their families that they
were going to Chechnya. Only two--Ahmed al Ghamdi and Saeed al
Ghamdi--had documentation suggesting travel to a Russian republic.
96
Some aspiring Saudi mujahideen, intending to go to Chechnya, encoun-
tered difficulties along the way and diverted to Afghanistan. In 1999, Ibn al
Khattab--the primary commander of Arab nationals in Chechnya--reportedly
had started turning away most foreign mujahideen because of their inexperi-
ence and inability to adjust to the local conditions. KSM states that several of
the 9/11 muscle hijackers faced problems traveling to Chechnya and so went
to Afghanistan, where they were drawn into al Qaeda.
97
Khallad has offered a more detailed story of how such diversions occurred.
According to him, a number of Saudi mujahideen who tried to go to Chech-
nya in 1999 to fight the Russians were stopped at the Turkish-Georgian bor-
der. Upon arriving in Turkey, they received phone calls at guesthouses in places
such as Istanbul and Ankara, informing them that the route to Chechnya via
Georgia had been closed.These Saudis then decided to travel to Afghanistan,
where they could train and wait to make another attempt to enter Chechnya
during the summer of 2000.While training at al Qaeda camps, a dozen of them
heard Bin Ladin's speeches, volunteered to become suicide operatives, and
eventually were selected as muscle hijackers for the planes operation. Khallad
says he met a number of them at the Kandahar airport, where they were help-
THE ATTACK LOOMS
233
Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 233