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Five more--Wail al Shehri,Waleed al Shehri,Abdul Aziz al Omari, Mohand
al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami--came from Asir Province, a poor region in
southwestern Saudi Arabia that borders Yemen; this weakly policed area is
sometimes called "the wild frontier."Wail and Waleed al Shehri were brothers.
All five in this group had begun university studies. Omari had graduated with
honors from high school, had attained a degree from the Imam Muhammad
Ibn Saud Islamic University, was married, and had a daughter.
87
The three remaining muscle hijackers from Saudi Arabia were Satam al
Suqami, Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi. Suqami came from Riyadh.
Moqed hailed from a small town called Annakhil, west of Medina. Suqami had
very little education, and Moqed had dropped out of university. Neither
Suqami nor Moqed appears to have had ties to the other, or to any of the other
operatives, before getting involved with extremists, probably by 1999.
88
Salem al Hazmi, a younger brother of Nawaf, was born in Mecca. Salem's
family recalled him as a quarrelsome teenager. His brother Nawaf probably rec-
ommended him for recruitment into al Qaeda. One al Qaeda member who
knew them says that Nawaf pleaded with Bin Ladin to allow Salem to partic-
ipate in the 9/11 operation.
89
Detainees have offered varying reasons for the use of so many Saudi oper-
atives. Binalshibh argues that al Qaeda wanted to send a message to the gov-
ernment of Saudi Arabia about its relationship with the United States. Several
other al Qaeda figures, however, have stated that ethnicity generally was not a
factor in the selection of operatives unless it was important for security or oper-
ational reasons.
90
KSM, for instance, denies that Saudis were chosen for the 9/11 plot to drive
a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and stresses practical rea-
sons for considering ethnic background when selecting operatives. He says that
so many were Saudi because Saudis comprised the largest portion of the pool
of recruits in the al Qaeda training camps. KSM estimates that in any given
camp, 70 percent of the mujahideen were Saudi, 20 percent were Yemeni, and
10 percent were from elsewhere. Although Saudi and Yemeni trainees were
most often willing to volunteer for suicide operations, prior to 9/11 it was eas-
ier for Saudi operatives to get into the United States.
91
Most of the Saudi muscle hijackers developed their ties to extremists two
or three years before the attacks. Their families often did not consider these
young men religious zealots. Some were perceived as devout, others as lacking
in faith. For instance, although Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Saeed
al Ghamdi attended prayer services regularly and Omari often served as an
imam at his mosque in Saudi Arabia, Suqami and Salem al Hazmi appeared
unconcerned with religion and, contrary to Islamic law, were known to drink
alcohol.
92
Like many other al Qaeda operatives, the Saudis who eventually became
the muscle hijackers were targeted for recruitment outside Afghanistan--
probably in Saudi Arabia itself. Al Qaeda recruiters, certain clerics, and--in a
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