Page 225

tary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in July. Though the new officials were
briefed about terrorism and some of the earlier planning, including that for
Operation Infinite Resolve, they were focused, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us,
on creating a twenty-first-century military.

220

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton did not recall much interest by

the new administration in military options against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He
could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary. Brian
Sheridan--the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and
low-intensity conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in the
Pentagon--never briefed Rumsfeld. He departed on January 20; he had not
been replaced by 9/11.

221

Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism, which came up often

in his regular meetings with Tenet. He thought that the Defense Department,
before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats
like terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place
and working on the foundation documents of a new defense policy, the quad-
rennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and the existing contin-
gency plans. He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that
engaged his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Preda-
tor unmanned aircraft system.

222

The commander of Central Command, General Franks, told us that he did

not regard the existing plans as serious.To him a real military plan to address
al Qaeda would need to go all the way, following through the details of a full
campaign (including the political-military issues of where operations would be
based) and securing the rights to fly over neighboring countries.

223

The draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 began its discussion

of the military by reiterating the Defense Department's lead role in protecting
its forces abroad.The draft included a section directing Secretary Rumsfeld to
"develop contingency plans" to attack both al Qaeda and Taliban targets in
Afghanistan.The new section did not specifically order planning for the use of
ground troops, or clarify how this guidance differed from the existing Infinite
Resolve plans.

224

Hadley told us that by circulating this section, a draft Annex B to the direc-

tive, the White House was putting the Pentagon on notice that it would need
to produce new military plans to address this problem.

225

"The military

didn't particularly want this mission," Rice told us.

226

With this directive still awaiting President Bush's signature, Secretary

Rumsfeld did not order his subordinates to begin preparing any new military
plans against either al Qaeda or the Taliban before 9/11.

President Bush told us that before 9/11, he had not seen good options for

special military operations against Bin Ladin. Suitable bases in neighboring
countries were not available and, even if the U.S. forces were sent in, it was
not clear where they would go to find Bin Ladin.

227

208

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 208