alarming reports, briefed to the President and top officials, became part of the
context in which the new administration weighed its options for policy on
al Qaeda.
action inside the United States--although the CSG continued to be con-
cerned about the domestic threat. The mosaic of threat intelligence came
from the Counterterrorist Center, which collected only abroad. Its reports
were not supplemented by reports from the FBI. Clarke had expressed con-
cern about an al Qaeda presence in the United States, and he worried about
an attack on the White House by "Hizbollah, Hamas, al Qida and other ter-
rorist organizations."
weapons of mass destruction and at more general problems of national pre-
paredness.The next few months were mainly spent organizing the effort and
bringing an admiral from the Sixth Fleet back to Washington to manage it.The
Vice President's task force was just getting under way when the 9/11 attack
occurred.
CTC chief Cofer Black, and "Richard," a group chief with authority over the
Bin Ladin unit. Rice asked about "taking the offensive" and whether any
approach could be made to influence Bin Ladin or the Taliban. Clarke and
Black replied that the CIA's ongoing disruption activities were "taking the
offensive" and that Bin Ladin could not be deterred. A wide-ranging discus-
sion then ensued about "breaking the back" of Bin Ladin's organization.
gram in March, CIA officials had pointed out that the spending level envisioned
for these plans was larger than the CIA's entire current budget for counterter-
rorism covert action. It would be a multiyear program, requiring such levels of
spending for about five years.
to us that the policy process did not follow through quickly enough.
organization, from the least to most ambitious.
admittedly ambitious" program for confronting al Qaeda.