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mally referred to as the "Blue Sky" memo; it was sent to Clarke on December
29.The memo proposed
· A major effort to support the Northern Alliance through intelligence
sharing and increased funding so that it could stave off the Taliban
army and tie down al Qaeda fighters.This effort was not intended to
remove the Taliban from power, a goal that was judged impractical and
too expensive for the CIA alone to attain.
· Increased support to the Uzbeks to strengthen their ability to fight
terrorism and assist the United States in doing so.
· Assistance to anti-Taliban groups and proxies who might be encour-
aged to passively resist the Taliban.
The CIA memo noted that there was "no single `silver bullet' available to
deal with the growing problems in Afghanistan."A multifaceted strategy would
be needed to produce change.
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No action was taken on these ideas in the few remaining weeks of the Clin-
ton administration. Berger did not recall seeing or being briefed on the Blue
Sky memo. Nor was the memo discussed during the transition with incoming
top Bush administration officials.Tenet and his deputy told us they pressed these
ideas as options after the new team took office.
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As the Clinton administration drew to a close, Clarke and his staff devel-
oped a policy paper of their own, the first such comprehensive effort since the
Delenda plan of 1998.The resulting paper, entitled "Strategy for Eliminating
the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects,"
reviewed the threat and the record to date, incorporated the CIA's new ideas
from the Blue Sky memo, and posed several near-term policy options.
Clarke and his staff proposed a goal to "roll back" al Qaeda over a period
of three to five years. Over time, the policy should try to weaken and elimi-
nate the network's infrastructure in order to reduce it to a "rump group" like
other formerly feared but now largely defunct terrorist organizations of the
1980s. "Continued anti-al Qida operations at the current level will prevent
some attacks," Clarke's office wrote, "but will not seriously attrit their ability
to plan and conduct attacks." The paper backed covert aid to the Northern
Alliance, covert aid to Uzbekistan, and renewed Predator flights in March
2001. A sentence called for military action to destroy al Qaeda command-and-
control targets and infrastructure and Taliban military and command assets.The
paper also expressed concern about the presence of al Qaeda operatives in the
United States.
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