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rorist facilities in Afghanistan, and expulsion of all terrorists from Afghanistan
within 90 days. Noncompliance would mean U.S. "force directed at the Tal-
iban itself " and U.S. efforts to ensure that the Taliban would never defeat the
Northern Alliance. No such ultimatum was issued.
143
Nearly a month later, on December 21, the CIA made another presentation
to the Small Group of principals on the investigative team's findings.The CIA's
briefing slides said that their "preliminary judgment" was that Bin Ladin's al
Qaeda group "supported the attack" on the Cole, based on strong circumstan-
tial evidence tying key perpetrators of the attack to al Qaeda.The CIA listed
the key suspects, including Nashiri. In addition, the CIA detailed the timeline
of the operation, from the mid-1999 preparations, to the failed attack on the
USS The Sullivans on January 3, 2000, through a meeting held by the opera-
tives the day before the attack.
144
The slides said that so far the CIA had "no definitive answer on [the] cru-
cial question of outside direction of the attack--how and by whom."The CIA
noted that the Yemenis claimed that Khallad helped direct the operation from
Afghanistan or Pakistan, possibly as Bin Ladin's intermediary, but that it had
not seen the Yemeni evidence. However, the CIA knew from both human
sources and signals intelligence that Khallad was tied to al Qaeda.The prepared
briefing concluded that while some reporting about al Qaeda's role might have
merit, those reports offered few specifics. Intelligence gave some ambiguous
indicators of al Qaeda direction of the attack.
145
This, President Clinton and Berger told us, was not the conclusion they
needed in order to go to war or deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban threaten-
ing war.The election and change of power was not the issue, President Clin-
ton added.There was enough time. If the agencies had given him a definitive
answer, he said, he would have sought a UN Security Council ultimatum and
given the Taliban one, two, or three days before taking further action against
both al Qaeda and the Taliban. But he did not think it would be responsible
for a president to launch an invasion of another country just based on a "pre-
liminary judgment."
146
Other advisers have echoed this concern. Some of Secretary Albright's
advisers warned her at the time to be sure the evidence conclusively linked Bin
Ladin to the Cole before considering any response, especially a military one,
because such action might inflame the Islamic world and increase support for
the Taliban. Defense Secretary Cohen told us it would not have been prudent
to risk killing civilians based only on an assumption that al Qaeda was respon-
sible. General Shelton added that there was an outstanding question as to who
was responsible and what the targets were.
147
Clarke recalled that while the Pentagon and the State Department had reser-
vations about retaliation, the issue never came to a head because the FBI and
the CIA never reached a firm conclusion. He thought they were "holding
back." He said he did not know why, but his impression was that Tenet and
FROM THREAT TO THREAT
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