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Investigating the Attack
Teams from the FBI, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the CIA
were immediately sent to Yemen to investigate the attack.With difficulty, Bar-
bara Bodine, the U.S. ambassador to Yemen, tried to persuade the Yemeni gov-
ernment to accept these visitors and allow them to carry arms, though the
Yemenis balked at letting Americans openly carry long guns (rifles, shotguns,
automatic weapons). Meanwhile, Bodine and the leader of the FBI team, John
O'Neill, clashed repeatedly--to the point that after O'Neill had been rotated
out of Yemen but wanted to return, Bodine refused the request. Despite the
initial tension, the Yemeni and American investigations proceeded.Within a few
weeks, the outline of the story began to emerge.
128
On the day of the Cole attack, a list of suspects was assembled that included
al Qaeda's affiliate Egyptian Islamic Jihad. U.S. counterterrorism officials told
us they immediately assumed that al Qaeda was responsible. But as Deputy DCI
John McLaughlin explained to us, it was not enough for the attack to smell,
look, and taste like an al Qaeda operation.To make a case, the CIA needed not
just a guess but a link to someone known to be an al Qaeda operative.
129
Within the first weeks after the attack, the Yemenis found and arrested both
Badawi and Quso, but did not let the FBI team participate in the interroga-
tions. The CIA described initial Yemeni support after the Cole as "slow and
inadequate." President Clinton, Secretary Albright, and DCI Tenet all inter-
vened to help. Because the information was secondhand, the U.S. team could
not make its own assessment of its reliability.
130
On November 11, the Yemenis provided the FBI with new information
from the interrogations of Badawi and Quso, including descriptions of indi-
viduals from whom the detainees had received operational direction. One of
them was Khallad, who was described as having lost his leg. The detainees
said that Khallad helped direct the Cole operation from Afghanistan or Pak-
istan.The Yemenis (correctly) judged that the man described as Khallad was
Tawfiq bin Attash.
131
An FBI special agent recognized the name Khallad and connected this news
with information from an important al Qaeda source who had been meeting
regularly with CIA and FBI officers.The source had called Khallad Bin Ladin's
"run boy," and described him as having lost one leg in an explosives accident
at a training camp a few years earlier. To confirm the identification, the FBI
agent asked the Yemenis for their photo of Khallad.The Yemenis provided the
photo on November 22, reaffirming their view that Khallad had been an inter-
mediary between the plotters and Bin Ladin. (In a meeting with U.S. officials
a few weeks later, on December 16, the source identified Khallad from the
Yemeni photograph.)
132
U.S. intelligence agencies had already connected Khallad to al Qaeda terror-
ist operations, including the 1998 embassy bombings. By this time the Yeme-
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THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
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