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At some point during this period, President Clinton expressed his frustra-
tion with the lack of military options to take out Bin Ladin and the al Qaeda
leadership, remarking to General Hugh Shelton,"You know, it would scare the
shit out of al-Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of heli-
copters into the middle of their camp."
109
Although Shelton told the Commis-
sion he did not remember the statement, President Clinton recalled this remark
as "one of the many things I said." The President added, however, that he real-
ized nothing would be accomplished if he lashed out in anger. Secretary of
Defense William Cohen thought that the President might have been making
a hypothetical statement. Regardless, he said, the question remained how to get
the "ninjas" into and out of the theater of operations.
110
As discussed in chap-
ter 4, plans of this kind were never carried out before 9/11.
In late 1999 or early 2000, the Joint Staff 's director of operations,Vice Admi-
ral Scott Fry, directed his chief information operations officer, Brigadier Gen-
eral Scott Gration, to develop innovative ways to get better intelligence on Bin
Ladin's whereabouts. Gration and his team worked on a number of different
ideas aimed at getting reliable American eyes on Bin Ladin in a way that would
reduce the lag time between sighting and striking.
111
One option was to use a small, unmanned U.S. Air Force drone called the
Predator, which could survey the territory below and send back video footage.
Another option--eventually dismissed as impractical--was to place a power-
ful long-range telescope on a mountain within range of one of Bin Ladin's
training camps. Both proposals were discussed with General Shelton, the chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then briefed to Clarke's office at the White
House as the CSG was searching for new ideas. In the spring of 2000, Clarke
brought in the CIA's assistant director for collection, Charles Allen, to work
together with Fry on a joint CIA-Pentagon effort that Clarke dubbed "Afghan
Eyes."
112
After much argument between the CIA and the Defense Department
about who should pay for the program, the White House eventually imposed
a cost-sharing agreement.The CIA agreed to pay for Predator operations as a
60-day "proof of concept" trial run.
113
The Small Group backed Afghan Eyes at the end of June 2000. By mid-July,
testing was completed and the equipment was ready, but legal issues were still
being ironed out.
114
By August 11, the principals had agreed to deploy the
Predator.
115
The NSC staff considered how to use the information the drones
would be relaying from Afghanistan. Clarke's deputy, Roger Cressey, wrote to
Berger that emergency CSG and Principals Committee meetings might be
needed to act on video coming in from the Predator if it proved able to lock
in Bin Ladin's location. In the memo's margin, Berger wrote that before con-
sidering action,"I will want more than verified location: we will need, at least,
data on pattern of movements to provide some assurance he will remain in
place." President Clinton was kept up to date.
116
On September 7, the Predator flew for the first time over Afghanistan.When
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