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to take any such action without explicit U.S. authorization.
100
In the spring of
2000, after the CIA had sent out officers to explore possible closer relation-
ships with both the Uzbeks and the Northern Alliance, discussions took place
in Washington between U.S. officials and delegates sent by Massoud.
101
The Americans agreed that Massoud should get some modest technical help
so he could work on U.S. priorities--collecting intelligence on and possibly
acting against al Qaeda. But Massoud wanted the United States both to become
his ally in trying to overthrow the Taliban and to recognize that they were fight-
ing common enemies. Clarke and Cofer Black, the head of the Counterter-
rorist Center, wanted to take this next step. Proposals to help the Northern
Alliance had been debated in the U.S. government since 1999 and, as we men-
tioned in chapter 4, the U.S. government as a whole had been wary of endors-
ing them, largely because of the Northern Alliance's checkered history, its
limited base of popular support in Afghanistan, and Pakistan's objections.
102
CIA officials also began pressing proposals to use their ties with the
Northern Alliance to get American agents on the ground in Afghanistan for
an extended period, setting up their own base for covert intelligence col-
lection and activity in the Panjshir Valley and lessening reliance on foreign
proxies. "There's no substitute for face-to-face," one officer told us.
103
But
the CIA's institutional capacity for such direct action was weak, especially if
it was not working jointly with the U.S. military. The idea was turned down
as too risky.
104
In the meantime, the CIA continued to work with its tribal assets in south-
ern Afghanistan. In early August, the tribals reported an attempt to ambush Bin
Ladin's convoy as he traveled on the road between Kabul and Kandahar city--
their first such reported interdiction attempt in more than a year and a half.
But it was not a success. According to the tribals' own account, when they
approached one of the vehicles, they quickly determined that women and chil-
dren were inside and called off the ambush. Conveying this information to the
NSC staff, the CIA noted that they had no independent corroboration for this
incident, but that the tribals had acted within the terms of the CIA's authori-
ties in Afghanistan.
105
In 2000, plans continued to be developed for potential military operations
in Afghanistan. Navy vessels that could launch missiles into Afghanistan were
still on call in the north Arabian Sea.
106
In the summer, the military refined its
list of strikes and Special Operations possibilities to a set of 13 options within
the Operation Infinite Resolve plan.
107
Yet planning efforts continued to be
limited by the same operational and policy concerns encountered in 1998 and
1999. Although the intelligence community sometimes knew where Bin Ladin
was, it had been unable to provide intelligence considered sufficiently reliable
to launch a strike.Above all, the United States did not have American eyes on
the target.As one military officer put it, we had our hand on the door, but we
couldn't open the door and walk in.
108
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THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
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