· imposing tighter controls on student visas;
93
· taking legal action to prevent terrorists from coming into the United
States and to remove those already here, detaining them while await-
ing removal proceedings;
94
· further increasing the number of immigration agents to FBI Joint Ter-
rorism Task Forces to help investigate immigration charges against
individuals suspected of terrorism;
95
· activating a special court to enable the use of classified evidence in
immigration-related national security cases;
96
and
· both implementing new security measures for U.S. passports and
working with the United Nations and foreign governments to raise
global security standards for travel documents.
97
Clarke's working group compiled new proposals as well, such as
· undertaking a Joint Perimeter Defense program with Canada to estab-
lish cooperative intelligence and law enforcement programs, leading
to joint operations based on shared visa and immigration data and
joint border patrols;
· staffing land border crossings 24/7 and equipping them with video
cameras, physical barriers, and means to detect weapons of mass
destruction (WMD); and
· addressing the problem of migrants--possibly including terrorists--
who destroy their travel documents so they cannot be returned to
their countries of origin.
98
These proposals were praiseworthy in principle. In practice, however, they
required action by weak, chronically underfunded executive agencies and pow-
erful congressional committees, which were more responsive to well-organ-
ized interest groups than to executive branch interagency committees. The
changes sought by the principals in March 2000 were only beginning to occur
before 9/11.
"Afghan Eyes"
In early March 2000, when President Clinton received an update on U.S. covert
action efforts against Bin Ladin, he wrote in the memo's margin that the United
States could surely do better. Military officers in the Joint Staff told us that they
shared this sense of frustration. Clarke used the President's comment to push
the CSG to brainstorm new ideas, including aid to the Northern Alliance.
99
Back in December 1999, Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud
had offered to stage a rocket attack against Bin Ladin's Derunta training com-
plex. Officers at the CIA had worried that giving him a green light might cross
the line into violation of the assassination ban. Hence, Massoud was told not
FROM THREAT TO THREAT
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