in March, when word came that Hazmi, too, had had a U.S. visa and a ticket
to Los Angeles.
of the three until January 2001, when the investigation of another bombing,
that of the USS Cole, reignited interest in Khallad.We will return to that story
in chapter 8.
performance.The CIA's leadership was told that while a number of plots had
been disrupted, the millennium might be only the "kick-off " for a period of
extended attacks.
disruption efforts thus far had "not put too much of a dent" in Bin Ladin's net-
work. If the United States wanted to "roll back" the threat, disruption would
have to proceed at "a markedly different tempo." Second,"sleeper cells" and "a
variety of terrorist groups" had turned up at home.
attack.
review the CIA's counterterrorism strategy and come up with a plan for "where
we go from here."
question not of "if " but rather of "when" and "where."
ended up agreeing that the government should take three major steps. First,
more money should go to the CIA to accelerate its efforts to "seriously attrit"
al Qaeda. Second, there should be a crackdown on foreign terrorist organiza-
tions in the United States. Third, immigration law enforcement should be
strengthened, and the INS should tighten controls on the Canadian border
(including stepping up U.S.-Canada cooperation).The principals endorsed the
proposed programs; some, like expanding the number of Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, moved forward, and others, like creating a centralized translation unit
for domestic intelligence intercepts in Arabic and other languages, did not.
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pres-
sure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it,