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now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its
activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through
donations.
111
For many years, the United States thought Bin Ladin financed al Qaeda's
expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Ladin purportedly inherited
approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had
access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to
secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government
discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through 1994, Bin Ladin
received about $1 million per year--a significant sum, to be sure, but not a
$300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad.
112
Then, as part of a
Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Ladin family was
forced to find a buyer for Usama's share of the family company in 1994.The
Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale.This action had
the effect of divesting Bin Ladin of what otherwise might indeed have been a
large fortune.
113
Nor were Bin Ladin's assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda.When
Bin Ladin lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses
and other assets. These could not have provided significant income, as most
were small or not economically viable.When Bin Ladin left in 1996, it appears
that the Sudanese government expropriated all his assets: he left Sudan with
practically nothing. When Bin Ladin arrived in Afghanistan, he relied on the
Taliban until he was able to reinvigorate his fund-raising efforts by drawing on
ties to wealthy Saudi individuals that he had established during the Afghan war
in the 1980s.
114
Al Qaeda appears to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators
who raised money from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers, primarily
in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia.
115
Some individual
donors surely knew, and others did not, the ultimate destination of their dona-
tions. Al Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam's strong calls for char-
itable giving, zakat.These financial facilitators also appeared to rely heavily on
certain imams at mosques who were willing to divert zakat donations to al
Qaeda's cause.
116
Al Qaeda also collected money from employees of corrupt charities.
117
It
took two approaches to using charities for fund-raising. One was to rely on al
Qaeda sympathizers in specific foreign branch offices of large, international
charities--particularly those with lax external oversight and ineffective inter-
nal controls, such as the Saudi-based al Haramain Islamic Foundation.
118
Smaller charities in various parts of the globe were funded by these large Gulf
charities and had employees who would siphon the money to al Qaeda.
119
In addition, entire charities, such as the al Wafa organization, may have wit-
tingly participated in funneling money to al Qaeda. In those cases, al Qaeda
operatives controlled the entire organization, including access to bank
170
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