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cousin's ensuing effort to persuade Jarrah to depart from "the path he was tak-
ing" proved unavailing.
101
Yet Jarrah clearly differed from the other hijackers
in that he maintained much closer contact with his family and continued his
intimate relationship with Senguen. These ties may well have caused him to
harbor some doubts about going through with the plot, even as late as the sum-
mer of 2001, as discussed in chapter 7.
After leaving Afghanistan, the four began researching flight schools and avi-
ation training. In early January 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali--a nephew of KSM
living in the UAE who would become an important facilitator in the plot--
used Shehhi's credit card to order a Boeing 747-400 flight simulator program
and a Boeing 767 flight deck video, together with attendant literature;Ali had
all these items shipped to his employer's address. Jarrah soon decided that the
schools in Germany were not acceptable and that he would have to learn to
fly in the United States. Binalshibh also researched flight schools in Europe,
and in the Netherlands he met a flight school director who recommended
flight schools in the United States because they were less expensive and
required shorter training periods.
102
In March 2000, Atta emailed 31 different U.S. flight schools on behalf of a
small group of men from various Arab countries studying in Germany who,
while lacking prior training, were interested in learning to fly in the United
States. Atta requested information about the cost of the training, potential
financing, and accommodations.
103
Before seeking visas to enter the United States, Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah
obtained new passports, each claiming that his old passport had been lost. Pre-
sumably they were concerned that the Pakistani visas in their old passports
would raise suspicions about possible travel to Afghanistan. Shehhi obtained his
visa on January 18, 2000; Atta, on May 18; and Jarrah, on May 25.
104
Binal-
shibh's visa request was rejected, however, as were his three subsequent appli-
cations.
105
Binalshibh proved unable to obtain a visa, a victim of the
generalized suspicion that visa applicants from Yemen--especially young men
applying in another country (Binalshibh first applied in Berlin)--might join
the ranks of undocumented aliens seeking work in the United States. Before
9/11, security concerns were not a major factor in visa issuance unless the
applicant already was on a terrorist watchlist, and none of these four men was.
Concerns that Binalshibh intended to immigrate to the United States doomed
his chances to participate firsthand in the 9/11 attacks. Although Binalshibh
had to remain behind, he would provide critical assistance from abroad to his
co-conspirators.
Once again, the need for travel documents dictated al Qaeda's plans.
Travel
It should by now be apparent how significant travel was in the planning under-
taken by a terrorist organization as far-flung as al Qaeda.The story of the plot
includes references to dozens of international trips. Operations required travel,
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