travelers were being detained in Georgia. He recommended they go to
Afghanistan instead, where they could train for jihad before traveling onward
to Chechnya. Slahi instructed them to obtain Pakistani visas and then return
to him for further directions on how to reach Afghanistan. Although Atta did
not attend the meeting, he joined in the plan with the other three.After obtain-
ing the necessary visas, they received Slahi's final instructions on how to travel
to Karachi and then Quetta, where they were to contact someone named Umar
al Masri at the Taliban office.
same time; Binalshibh, about two weeks later. Binalshibh remembers that when
he arrived at the Taliban office in Quetta, there was no one named Umar al
Masri.The name, apparently, was simply a code; a group of Afghans from the
office promptly escorted him to Kandahar.There Binalshibh rejoined Atta and
Jarrah, who said they already had pledged loyalty to Bin Ladin and urged him
to do the same.They also informed him that Shehhi had pledged as well and
had already left for the United Arab Emirates to prepare for the mission. Binal-
shibh soon met privately with Bin Ladin, accepted the al Qaeda leader's invi-
tation to work under him, and added his own pledge to those of his Hamburg
colleagues. By this time, Binalshibh claims, he assumed he was volunteering for
a martyrdom operation.
instructed the three to return to Germany and enroll in flight training.Atta--
whom Bin Ladin chose to lead the group--met with Bin Ladin several times
to receive additional instructions, including a preliminary list of approved tar-
gets: the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Capitol.
Hazmi) would be part of the operation.
leader--is remarkable.They had not yet met with KSM when all this occurred.
It is clear, then, that Bin Ladin and Atef were very much in charge of the oper-
ation.That these candidates were selected so quickly--before comprehensive
testing in the training camps or in operations--demonstrates that Bin Ladin
and Atef probably already understood the deficiencies of their initial team,
Hazmi and Mihdhar.The new recruits from Germany possessed an ideal com-
bination of technical skill and knowledge that the original 9/11 operatives, vet-
eran fighters though they were, lacked. Bin Ladin and Atef wasted no time in
assigning the Hamburg group to the most ambitious operation yet planned by
al Qaeda.