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months in Afghanistan. By 1998, Hambali would assume responsibility for the
Malaysia/Singapore region within Sungkar's newly formed terrorist organiza-
tion, the JI.
20
Also by 1998, Sungkar and JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir had accepted
Bin Ladin's offer to ally JI with al Qaeda in waging war against Christians and
Jews.
21
Hambali met with KSM in Karachi to arrange for JI members to receive
training in Afghanistan at al Qaeda's camps. In addition to his close working
relationship with KSM, Hambali soon began dealing with Atef as well. Al
Qaeda began funding JI's increasingly ambitious terrorist plans, which Atef and
KSM sought to expand. Under this arrangement, JI would perform the nec-
essary casing activities and locate bomb-making materials and other supplies.
Al Qaeda would underwrite operations, provide bomb-making expertise, and
deliver suicide operatives.
22
The al Qaeda­JI partnership yielded a number of proposals that would marry
al Qaeda's financial and technical strengths with JI's access to materials and local
operatives. Here, Hambali played the critical role of coordinator, as he distrib-
uted al Qaeda funds earmarked for the joint operations. In one especially notable
example,Atef turned to Hambali when al Qaeda needed a scientist to take over
its biological weapons program. Hambali obliged by introducing a U.S.-
educated JI member,Yazid Sufaat, to Ayman al Zawahiri in Kandahar. In 2001,
Sufaat would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for al Qaeda
in a laboratory he helped set up near the Kandahar airport.
23
Hambali did not originally orient JI's operations toward attacking the
United States, but his involvement with al Qaeda appears to have inspired him
to pursue American targets. KSM, in his post-capture interrogations, has taken
credit for this shift, claiming to have urged the JI operations chief to concen-
trate on attacks designed to hurt the U.S. economy.
24
Hambali's newfound
interest in striking against the United States manifested itself in a spate of ter-
rorist plans. Fortunately, none came to fruition.
In addition to staging actual terrorist attacks in partnership with
al Qaeda, Hambali and JI assisted al Qaeda operatives passing through Kuala
Lumpur. One important occasion was in December 1999­January 2000. Ham-
bali accommodated KSM's requests to help several veterans whom KSM had
just finished training in Karachi.They included Tawfiq bin Attash, also known
as Khallad, who later would help bomb the USS Cole, and future 9/11 hijack-
ers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. Hambali arranged lodging for them
and helped them purchase airline tickets for their onward travel. Later that year,
Hambali and his crew would provide accommodations and other assistance
(including information on flight schools and help in acquiring ammonium
nitrate) for Zacarias Moussaoui, an al Qaeda operative sent to Malaysia by Atef
and KSM.
25
Hambali used Bin Ladin's Afghan facilities as a training ground for JI
recruits.Though he had a close relationship with Atef and KSM, he maintained
JI's institutional independence from al Qaeda. Hambali insists that he did not
AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND
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