less than 15 percent.
Operations Command and found enthusiasm on the working level but reluc-
tance at higher levels. CIA saw a 95 percent chance of Special Operations
Command forces capturing Bin Ladin if deployed--but less than a 5 percent
chance of such a deployment. Sending CIA officers into Afghanistan was to be
considered "if the gain clearly outweighs the risk"--but at this time no such
gains presented themselves to warrant the risk.
of the CIA's own officers, would have required a major policy initiative (prob-
ably combined with efforts to secure the support of at least one or two neigh-
boring countries) to make a long-term commitment, establish a durable
presence on the ground, and be prepared to accept the associated risks and
costs. Such a military plan was never developed for interagency consideration
before 9/11.As 1999 came to a close, the CIA had a new strategic plan in place
for capturing Bin Ladin, but no option was rated as having more than a 15 per-
cent chance of achieving that objective.