Page 158

hit. Second, the administration, and the CIA in particular, was in the midst of
intense scrutiny and criticism in May 1999 because faulty intelligence had just
led the United States to mistakenly bomb the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
during the NATO war against Serbia. This episode may have made officials
more cautious than might otherwise have been the case.

178

From May 1999 until September 2001, policymakers did not again actively

consider a missile strike against Bin Ladin.

179

The principals did give some fur-

ther consideration in 1999 to more general strikes, reviving Clarke's "Delenda"
notion of hitting camps and infrastructure to disrupt al Qaeda's organization.
In the first months of 1999, the Joint Staff had developed broader target lists to
undertake a "focused campaign" against the infrastructure of Bin Ladin's net-
work and to hit Taliban government sites as well. General Shelton told us that
the Taliban targets were "easier" to hit and more substantial.

180

Part of the context for considering broader strikes in the summer of 1999

was renewed worry about Bin Ladin's ambitions to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. In May and June, the U.S. government received a flurry of omi-
nous reports, including more information about chemical weapons training or
development at the Derunta camp and possible attempts to amass nuclear mate-
rial at Herat.

181

By late June, U.S. and other intelligence services had concluded that al

Qaeda was in pre-attack mode, perhaps again involving Abu Hafs the Mauri-
tanian. On June 25, at Clarke's request, Berger convened the Small Group in
his office to discuss the alert, Bin Ladin's WMD programs, and his location.
"Should we pre-empt by attacking UBL facilities?" Clarke urged Berger to ask
his colleagues.

182

In his handwritten notes on the meeting paper, Berger jotted down the pres-

ence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 6065
casualties. Berger noted the possible "slight impact" on Bin Ladin and added,
"if he responds, we're blamed."

183

The NSC staff raised the option of waiting

until after a terrorist attack, and then retaliating, including possible strikes on
the Taliban. But Clarke observed that Bin Ladin would probably empty his
camps after an attack.

184

The military route seemed to have reached a dead end. In December 1999,

Clarke urged Berger to ask the principals to ask themselves: "Why have there
been no real options lately for direct US military action?"

185

There are no notes

recording whether the question was discussed or, if it was, how it was answered.

Reports of possible attacks by Bin Ladin kept coming in throughout 1999.

They included a threat to blow up the FBI building in Washington, D.C. In
September, the CSG reviewed a possible threat to a flight out of Los Angeles
or New York.

186

These warnings came amid dozens of others that flooded in.

With military and diplomatic options practically exhausted by the sum-

mer of 1999, the U.S. government seemed to be back where it had been in
the summer of 1998--relying on the CIA to find some other option. That

RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS

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