background image
effect. On January 12, 1999, Clarke wrote Berger that the CIA's confidence in
the tribals' reporting had increased. It was now higher than it had been on
December 20.
133
In February 1999,Allen proposed flying a U-2 mission over Afghanistan to
build a baseline of intelligence outside the areas where the tribals had cover-
age. Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that
Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible. He wrote Deputy National
Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin's
having met with Iraqi officials, who "may have offered him asylum." Other
intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar,
had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote
Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein's service, and it would be "vir-
tually impossible" to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke
declared.
134
Berger suggested sending one U-2 flight, but Clarke opposed even
this. It would require Pakistani approval, he wrote; and "Pak[istan's]
intel[ligence service] is in bed with" Bin Ladin and would warn him that the
United States was getting ready for a bombing campaign: "Armed with that
knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad."
135
Though told also
by Bruce Riedel of the NSC staff that Saddam Hussein wanted Bin Ladin in
Baghdad, Berger conditionally authorized a single U-2 flight.Allen meanwhile
had found other ways of getting the information he wanted. So the U-2 flight
never occurred.
136
4.5 SEARCHING FOR FRESH OPTIONS
"Boots on the Ground?"
Starting on the day the August 1998 strikes were launched, General Shelton
had issued a planning order to prepare follow-on strikes and think beyond just
using cruise missiles.
137
The initial strikes had been called Operation Infinite
Reach. The follow-on plans were given the code name Operation Infinite
Resolve.
At the time, any actual military action in Afghanistan would have been car-
ried out by General Zinni's Central Command.This command was therefore
the locus for most military planning. Zinni was even less enthusiastic than
Cohen and Shelton about follow-on cruise missile strikes. He knew that the
Tomahawks did not always hit their targets. After the August 20 strikes, Presi-
dent Clinton had had to call Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to apologize for
a wayward missile that had killed several people in a Pakistani village. Sharif
had been understanding, while commenting on American "overkill."
138
Zinni feared that Bin Ladin would in the future locate himself in cities,
where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pak-
istani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India,
134
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 134