ing the language to allow the tribals to be paid whether Bin Ladin was cap-
tured or killed. Berger and Tenet then worked together to take this line of
thought even further.
killing of Bin Ladin if the CIA and the tribals judged that capture was not fea-
sible (a judgment it already seemed clear they had reached). The Justice
Department lawyer who worked on the draft told us that what was envisioned
was a group of tribals assaulting a location, leading to a shoot-out. Bin Ladin
and others would be captured if possible, but probably would be killed. The
administration's position was that under the law of armed conflict, killing a
person who posed an imminent threat to the United States would be an act
of self-defense, not an assassination. On Christmas Eve 1998, Berger sent a final
draft to President Clinton, with an explanatory memo. The President
approved the document.
arranged for the NSC's legal adviser to inform Albright, Cohen, Shelton, and
Reno. None was allowed to keep a copy. Congressional leaders were briefed, as
required by law. Attorney General Reno had sent a letter to the President
expressing her concern: she warned of possible retaliation, including the tar-
geting of U.S. officials. She did not pose any legal objection. A copy of the final
document, along with the carefully crafted instructions that were to be sent to
the tribals, was given to Tenet.
preferred that Bin Ladin and his lieutenants be captured, but if a successful cap-
ture operation was not feasible, the tribals were permitted to kill them. The
instructions added that the tribals must avoid killing others unnecessarily and
must not kill or abuse Bin Ladin or his lieutenants if they surrendered. Finally,
the tribals would not be paid if this set of requirements was not met.
to the average man in the street, we want him [Bin Ladin] stopped." If the trib-
als captured Bin Ladin, the officer assured them that he would receive a fair
trial under U.S. law and be treated humanely. The CIA officer reported that
the tribals said they "fully understand the contents, implications and the spirit
of the message" and that that their response was,"We will try our best to cap-
ture Bin Ladin alive and will have no intention of killing or harming him on
purpose."The tribals explained that they wanted to prove that their standards
of behavior were more civilized than those of Bin Ladin and his band of ter-
rorists. In an additional note addressed to Schroen, the tribals noted that if they
were to adopt Bin Ladin's ethics,"we would have finished the job long before,"