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The principals considered a cruise missile strike to try to kill Bin Ladin. One
issue they discussed was the potential collateral damage--the number of inno-
cent bystanders who would be killed or wounded. General Zinni predicted a
number well over 200 and was concerned about damage to a nearby mosque.
The senior intelligence officer on the Joint Staff apparently made a different
calculation, estimating half as much collateral damage and not predicting dam-
age to the mosque. By the end of the meeting, the principals decided against
recommending to the President that he order a strike.A few weeks later, in Jan-
uary 1999, Clarke wrote that the principals had thought the intelligence only
half reliable and had worried about killing or injuring perhaps 300 people.
Tenet said he remembered doubts about the reliability of the source and con-
cern about hitting the nearby mosque."Mike" remembered Tenet telling him
that the military was concerned that a few hours had passed since the last sight-
ing of Bin Ladin and that this persuaded everyone that the chance of failure
was too great.
118
Some lower-level officials were angry."Mike" reported to Schroen that he
had been unable to sleep after this decision. "I'm sure we'll regret not acting
last night," he wrote, criticizing the principals for "worrying that some stray
shrapnel might hit the Habash mosque and `offend' Muslims." He commented
that they had not shown comparable sensitivity when deciding to bomb Mus-
lims in Iraq. The principals, he said, were "obsessed" with trying to get oth-
ers--Saudis, Pakistanis,Afghan tribals--to "do what we won't do." Schroen was
disappointed too."We should have done it last night," he wrote."We may well
come to regret the decision not to go ahead."
119
The Joint Staff 's deputy direc-
tor for operations agreed, even though he told us that later intelligence
appeared to show that Bin Ladin had left his quarters before the strike would
have occurred. Missing Bin Ladin, he said, "would have caused us a hell of a
problem, but it was a shot we should have taken, and we would have had to
pay the price."
120
The principals began considering other, more aggressive covert alternatives
using the tribals. CIA officers suggested that the tribals would prefer to try a
raid rather than a roadside ambush because they would have better control, it
would be less dangerous, and it played more to their skills and experience. But
everyone knew that if the tribals were to conduct such a raid, guns would be
blazing.The current Memorandum of Notification instructed the CIA to cap-
ture Bin Ladin and to use lethal force only in self-defense.Work now began on
a new memorandum that would give the tribals more latitude.The intention
was to say that they could use lethal force if the attempted capture seemed
impossible to complete successfully.
121
Early drafts of this highly sensitive document emphasized that it authorized
only a capture operation.The tribals were to be paid only if they captured Bin
Ladin, not if they killed him. Officials throughout the government approved
this draft. But on December 21, the day after principals decided not to launch
RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS
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