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hijacking concern and the antiaircraft missile threat. To address the hijack-
ing warning, the group agreed that New York airports should go to maxi-
mum security starting that weekend.They agreed to boost security at other
East coast airports. The CIA agreed to distribute versions of the report to
the FBI and FAA to pass to the New York Police Department and the air-
lines. The FAA issued a security directive on December 8, with specific
requirements for more intensive air carrier screening of passengers and more
oversight of the screening process, at all three New York City area airports.
112
The intelligence community could learn little about the source of the infor-
mation. Later in December and again in early January 1999, more information
arrived from the same source, reporting that the planned hijacking had been
stalled because two of the operatives, who were sketchily described, had been
arrested near Washington, D.C. or New York.After investigation, the FBI could
find no information to support the hijack threat; nor could it verify any arrests
like those described in the report.The FAA alert at the New York area airports
ended on January 31, 1999.
113
On December 17, the day after the United States and Britain began their
Desert Fox bombing campaign against Iraq, the Small Group convened to dis-
cuss intelligence suggesting imminent Bin Ladin attacks on the U.S. embassies
in Qatar and Ethiopia.The next day, Director Tenet sent a memo to the Pres-
ident, the cabinet, and senior officials throughout the government describing
reports that Bin Ladin planned to attack U.S. targets very soon, possibly over
the next few days, before Ramadan celebrations began. Tenet said he was
"greatly concerned."
114
With alarms sounding, members of the Small Group considered ideas about
how to respond to or prevent such attacks. Generals Shelton and Zinni came
up with military options. Special Operations Forces were later told that they
might be ordered to attempt very high-risk in-and-out raids either in Khar-
toum, to capture a senior Bin Ladin operative known as Abu Hafs the Mauri-
tanian--who appeared to be engineering some of the plots--or in Kandahar,
to capture Bin Ladin himself. Shelton told us that such operations are not risk
free, invoking the memory of the 1993 "Black Hawk down" fiasco in
Mogadishu.
115
The CIA reported on December 18 that Bin Ladin might be traveling to
Kandahar and could be targeted there with cruise missiles. Vessels with Tom-
ahawk cruise missiles were on station in the Arabian Sea, and could fire within
a few hours of receiving target data.
116
On December 20, intelligence indicated Bin Ladin would be spending the
night at the Haji Habash house, part of the governor's residence in Kanda-
har.The chief of the Bin Ladin unit,"Mike," told us that he promptly briefed
Tenet and his deputy, John Gordon. From the field, the CIA's Gary Schroen
advised:"Hit him tonight--we may not get another chance."An urgent tele-
conference of principals was arranged.
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