United Nations and had served on the NSC staff with Clarke. He shared
Clarke's obsession with terrorism, and had little hesitation about locking horns
with the regional bureaus. Through every available channel, he repeated the
earlier warning to the Taliban of the possible dire consequences--including
military strikes--if Bin Ladin remained their guest and conducted additional
attacks.Within the department, he argued for designating the Taliban regime a
state sponsor of terrorism. This was technically difficult to do, for calling it a
state would be tantamount to diplomatic recognition, which the United States
had thus far withheld. But Sheehan urged the use of any available weapon
against the Taliban. He told us that he thought he was regarded in the depart-
ment as "a one-note Johnny nutcase."
problem, including Pakistan. It specified both carrots and hard-hitting sticks--
among them, certifying Pakistan as uncooperative on terrorism. Albright said
the original carrots and sticks listed in a decision paper for principals may not
have been used as "described on paper" but added that they were used in other
ways or in varying degrees. But the paper's author, Ambassador Sheehan, was
frustrated and complained to us that the original plan "had been watered down
to the point that nothing was then done with it."
mountainous area of Kashmir. A limited war began between India and Pak-
istan, euphemistically called the "Kargil crisis," as India tried to drive the Pak-
istani forces out. Patience with Pakistan was wearing thin, inside both the State
Department and the NSC. Bruce Riedel, the NSC staff member responsible
for Pakistan, wrote Berger that Islamabad was "behaving as a rogue state in two
areas--backing Taliban/UBL terror and provoking war with India."
Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, was to undertake a major diplomatic effort
to end the Afghan civil war and install a national unity government.The sec-
ond, favored by Sheehan, Clarke, and the CIA, called for labeling the Taliban a
terrorist group and ultimately funneling secret aid to its chief foe, the North-
ern Alliance.This dispute would go back and forth throughout 1999 and ulti-
mately become entangled with debate about enlisting the Northern Alliance
as an ally for covert action.
Washington provided some support for talks among the leaders of exile Afghan
groups, including the ousted Rome-based King Zahir Shah and Hamid
Karzai, about bolstering anti-Taliban forces inside Afghanistan and linking the