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sensitive relations with Pakistan in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests by
both Pakistan and India. Secretary Albright rejected the recommendation on
August 5, 1998, just two days before the embassy bombings.
72
She told us that,
in general, putting the Pakistanis on the terrorist list would eliminate any influ-
ence the United States had over them.
73
In October, an NSC counterterror-
ism official noted that Pakistan's pro-Taliban military intelligence service had
been training Kashmiri jihadists in one of the camps hit by U.S. missiles, lead-
ing to the death of Pakistanis.
74
After flying to Nairobi and bringing home the coffins of the American dead,
Secretary Albright increased the department's focus on counterterrorism.
According to Ambassador Milam, the bombings were a "wake-up call," and he
soon found himself spending 45 to 50 percent of his time working the Tal-
iban­Bin Ladin portfolio.
75
But Pakistan's military intelligence service, known
as the ISID (Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate), was the Taliban's primary
patron, which made progress difficult.
Additional pressure on the Pakistanis--beyond demands to press the Taliban
on Bin Ladin--seemed unattractive to most officials of the State Department.
Congressional sanctions punishing Pakistan for possessing nuclear arms pre-
vented the administration from offering incentives to Islamabad.
76
In the words
of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott,Washington's Pakistan policy was
"stick-heavy."Talbott felt that the only remaining sticks were additional sanc-
tions that would have bankrupted the Pakistanis, a dangerous move that could
have brought "total chaos" to a nuclear-armed country with a significant num-
ber of Islamic radicals.
77
The Saudi government, which had a long and close relationship with Pak-
istan and provided it oil on generous terms, was already pressing Sharif with
regard to the Taliban and Bin Ladin. A senior State Department official con-
cluded that Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah put "a tremendous amount of
heat" on the Pakistani prime minister during the prince's October 1998 visit
to Pakistan.
78
The State Department urged President Clinton to engage the Pakistanis.
Accepting this advice, President Clinton invited Sharif to Washington, where
they talked mostly about India but also discussed Bin Ladin.After Sharif went
home, the President called him and raised the Bin Ladin subject again. This
effort elicited from Sharif a promise to talk with the Taliban.
79
Mullah Omar's position showed no sign of softening. One intelligence
report passed to Berger by the NSC staff quoted Bin Ladin as saying that Mul-
lah Omar had given him a completely free hand to act in any country, though
asking that he not claim responsibility for attacks in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.
Bin Ladin was described as grabbing his beard and saying emotionally, "By
Allah, by God, the Americans will still be amazed.The so-called United States
will suffer the same fate as the Russians.Their state will collapse, too."
80
Debate in the State Department intensified after December 1998, when
Michael Sheehan became counterterrorism coordinator. A onetime special
RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS
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