ney General Reno, among others), that directive contained an exception that
permitted the CSG to report directly to the principals if Berger so elected.
In practice, the CSG often reported not even to the full Principals Commit-
tee but instead to the so-called Small Group formed by Berger, consisting
only of those principals cleared to know about the most sensitive issues con-
nected with counterterrorism activities concerning Bin Ladin or the Kho-
bar Towers investigation.
evoked the famous Roman vow to destroy its rival, Carthage.The overall goal
of Clarke's paper was to "immediately eliminate any significant threat to Amer-
icans" from the "Bin Ladin network."
to capture Bin Ladin and his deputies and bring them to trial; efforts to dry up
Bin Ladin's money supply; and preparation for follow-on military action.The
status of the document was and remained uncertain. It was never formally
adopted by the principals, and participants in the Small Group now have little
or no recollection of it. It did, however, guide Clarke's efforts.
in Afghanistan or elsewhere, whenever target information was ripe. Acknowl-
edging that individual targets might not have much value, he cautioned Berger
not to expect ever again to have an assembly of terrorist leaders in his sights.
But he argued that rolling attacks might persuade the Taliban to hand over Bin
Ladin and, in any case, would show that the action in August was not a "one-
off " event. It would show that the United States was committed to a relentless
effort to take down Bin Ladin's network.
ing camps were primitive, built with "rope ladders"; General Shelton called
them "jungle gym" camps. Neither thought them worthwhile targets for very
expensive missiles. President Clinton and Berger also worried about the Econ-
omist's point--that attacks that missed Bin Ladin could enhance his stature and
win him new recruits. After the United States launched air attacks against Iraq
at the end of 1998 and against Serbia in 1999, in each case provoking world-
wide criticism, Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg added the
argument that attacks in Afghanistan offered "little benefit, lots of blowback
against [a] bomb-happy U.S."
launch further strikes sooner rather than later. On August 27, Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe advised Secretary Cohen that the avail-