sibility on him and his associates.
Clarke had prodded the Pentagon to explore possibilities for military action.
On June 2, General Hugh Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
had directed General Zinni at Central Command to develop a plan, which he
had submitted during the first week of July. Zinni's planners surely considered
the two previous times the United States had used force to respond to terror-
ism, the 1986 strike on Libya and the 1993 strike against Iraq.They proposed
firing Tomahawks against eight terrorist camps in Afghanistan, including Bin
Ladin's compound at Tarnak Farms.
Khowst,Afghanistan, to plan future attacks. According to Berger,Tenet said that
several hundred would attend, including Bin Ladin.The CIA described the area
as effectively a military cantonment, away from civilian population centers and
overwhelmingly populated by jihadists. Clarke remembered sitting next to
Tenet in a White House meeting, asking Tenet "You thinking what I'm think-
ing?" and his nodding "yes."
lieutenants.
detailed plans for strikes against the sites in Afghanistan.The Pentagon briefed
President Clinton about these plans on August 12 and 14.Though the princi-
pals hoped that the missiles would hit Bin Ladin, NSC staff recommended the
strike whether or not there was firm evidence that the commanders were at
the facilities.
believed to belong to Bin Ladin.The other was al Shifa, a Khartoum pharma-
ceutical plant, which intelligence reports said was manufacturing a precursor
ingredient for nerve gas with Bin Ladin's financial support.The argument for
hitting the tannery was that it could hurt Bin Ladin financially. The argument
for hitting al Shifa was that it would lessen the chance of Bin Ladin's having
nerve gas for a later attack.
dent Clinton himself had expressed great concern about chemical and biolog-
ical terrorism in the United States. Bin Ladin had reportedly been heard to
speak of wanting a "Hiroshima" and at least 10,000 casualties.The CIA reported