background image
it, from the vantage point of the driver looking through a muddy windshield
moving forward, not through a clean rearview mirror.
32
Looking for Other Options
The Counterterrorist Center continued to track Bin Ladin and to contemplate
covert action.The most hopeful possibility seemed now to lie in diplomacy--
but not diplomacy managed by the Department of State, which focused pri-
marily on India-Pakistan nuclear tensions during the summer of 1998.The CIA
learned in the spring of 1998 that the Saudi government had quietly disrupted
Bin Ladin cells in its country that were planning to attack U.S. forces with
shoulder-fired missiles. They had arrested scores of individuals, with no pub-
licity.When thanking the Saudis, Director Tenet took advantage of the open-
ing to ask them to help against Bin Ladin. The response was encouraging
enough that President Clinton made Tenet his informal personal representa-
tive to work with the Saudis on terrorism, and Tenet visited Riyadh in May
and again in early June.
33
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who had taken charge from the ailing King
Fahd, promised Tenet an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel
Bin Ladin so that he could be sent to the United States or to another country
for trial.The Kingdom's emissary would be its intelligence chief, Prince Turki
bin Faisal.Vice President Al Gore later added his thanks to those of Tenet, both
making clear that they spoke with President Clinton's blessing.Tenet reported
that it was imperative to get an indictment against Bin Ladin.The New York
grand jury issued its sealed indictment a few days later, on June 10.Tenet also
recommended that no action be taken on other U.S. options, such as the covert
action plan.
34
Prince Turki followed up in meetings during the summer with Mullah
Omar and other Taliban leaders. Apparently employing a mixture of possible
incentives and threats,Turki received a commitment that Bin Ladin would be
expelled, but Mullah Omar did not make good on this promise.
35
On August 5, Clarke chaired a CSG meeting on Bin Ladin. In the discus-
sion of what might be done, the note taker wrote,"there was a dearth of bright
ideas around the table, despite a consensus that the [government] ought to pur-
sue every avenue it can to address the problem."
36
4.2 CRISIS: AUGUST 1998
On August 7, 1998, National Security Advisor Berger woke President Clinton
with a phone call at 5:35
A
.
M
. to tell him of the almost simultaneous bomb-
ings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,Tanzania. Sus-
picion quickly focused on Bin Ladin. Unusually good intelligence, chiefly from
RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS
115
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 115