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devoted to counterterrorism, plus the briefings by its terrorist working group.
The Senate and House intelligence panels did not raise public and congressional
attention on Bin Ladin and al Qaeda prior to the joint inquiry into the attacks
of September 11, perhaps in part because of the classified nature of their work.
Yet in the context of committees that each hold scores of hearings every year
on issues in their jurisdiction, this list is not impressive. Terrorism was a sec-
ond- or third-order priority within the committees of Congress responsible
for national security.
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In fact, Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging
national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider.
Congress asked outside commissions to do the work that arguably was at the
heart of its own oversight responsibilities.
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Beginning in 1999, the reports of
these commissions made scores of recommendations to address terrorism and
homeland security but drew little attention from Congress. Most of their
impact came after 9/11.
COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES
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