to 1996 and essentially flat budgets from fiscal years 1996 to 2000 (except for
the so-called Gingrich supplemental to the FY1999 budget and two later,
smaller supplementals).These cuts compounded the difficulties of the intelli-
gence agencies. Policymakers were asking them to move into the digitized
future to fight against computer-to-computer communications and modern
communication systems, while maintaining capability against older systems,
such as high-frequency radios and ultra-high- and very-high-frequency (line
of sight) systems that work like old-style television antennas.Also, demand for
imagery increased dramatically following the success of the 1991 Gulf War.
Both these developments, in turn, placed a premium on planning the next gen-
eration of satellite systems, the cost of which put great pressure on the rest of
the intelligence budget. As a result, intelligence agencies experienced staff
reductions, affecting both operators and analysts.
extraordinarily motivated people but institutionally averse to risk, with its
capacity for covert action atrophied, predisposed to restrict the distribution of
information, having difficulty assimilating new types of personnel, and accus-
tomed to presenting descriptive reportage of the latest intelligence.The CIA,
to put it another way, needed significant change in order to get maximum effect
in counterterrorism. President Clinton appointed George Tenet as DCI in
1997, and by all accounts terrorism was a priority for him. But Tenet's own
assessment, when questioned by the Commission, was that in 2004, the CIA's
clandestine service was still at least five years away from being fully ready to
play its counterterrorism role.
tion of who really was in charge of the entire U.S. intelligence effort.
The Commission asked Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in 2004
why the State Department had so long pursued what seemed, and ultimately
proved, to be a hopeless effort to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
to deport Bin Ladin. Armitage replied: "We do what the State Department
does, we don't go out and fly bombers, we don't do things like that[;] . . . we
do our part in these things."
the department dominated the processes of advising the president and Con-