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An innovation of Donovan's, whose legacy remains part of U.S. intelligence
today, was the establishment of a Research and Analysis Branch. There large
numbers of scholars from U.S. universities pored over accounts from spies, com-
munications intercepted by the armed forces, transcripts of radio broadcasts,
and publications of all types, and prepared reports on economic, political, and
social conditions in foreign theaters of operation.
At the end of World War II, to Donovan's disappointment, President Harry
Truman dissolved the Office of Strategic Services. Four months later, the Pres-
ident directed that "all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, devel-
oped and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the
intelligence mission related to the national security," under a National Intelli-
gence Authority consisting of the secretaries of State,War, and the Navy, and a
personal representative of the president.This body was to be assisted by a Cen-
tral Intelligence Group, made up of persons detailed from the departments of
each of the members and headed by a Director of Central Intelligence.
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Subsequently, President Truman agreed to the National Security Act of
1947, which, among other things, established the Central Intelligence Agency,
under the Director of Central Intelligence. Lobbying by the FBI, combined
with fears of creating a U.S. Gestapo,
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led to the FBI's being assigned respon-
sibility for internal security functions and counterespionage. The CIA was
specifically accorded "no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or
internal security functions."
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This structure built in tensions between the CIA
and the Defense Department's intelligence agencies, and between the CIA and
the FBI.
Clandestine and Covert Action.
With this history, the CIA brought to the
era of 9/11 many attributes of an elite organization, viewing itself as serving on
the nation's front lines to engage America's enemies. Officers in its Clandestine
Service, under what became the Directorate of Operations, fanned out into sta-
tions abroad. Each chief of station was a very important person in the organi-
zation, given the additional title of the DCI's representative in that country. He
(occasionally she) was governed by an operating directive that listed operational
priorities issued by the relevant regional division of the Directorate, constrained
by centrally determined allocations of resources.
Because the conduct of espionage was a high-risk activity, decisions on the
clandestine targeting, recruitment, handling, and termination of secret sources
and the dissemination of collected information required Washington's approval
and action. But in this decentralized system, analogous in some ways to the cul-
ture of the FBI field offices in the United States, everyone in the Directorate
of Operations presumed that it was the job of headquarters to support the field,
rather than manage field activities.
In the 1960s, the CIA suffered exposure of its botched effort to land Cuban
exiles at the Bay of Pigs.The Vietnam War brought on more criticism.A promi-
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