USSR
MILITARY TKOb'SET: "The Deployment and Forward
Movementombined-Arms Armyorder Military District in the Initial Periody Lieutenant-General S. Andryushchenko
DATE OF INFO: l (Prior to Hay)
A reliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "The Deployment and Forward Movementombined-Anns Armyorder Military District in the Initial Periodritten by Lieutenant-General S. Andryushchenko.
This article appeared in1 Second Issuepecial version ot the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Hysl (Military Thought). This journal Is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets, it is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.
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The Derlcyaect end fco-vrJi-jomblned-Arms Amyorder
KILlU'ry metric* ia tfc* Initial Psrlodar
Lieutenant-Censrol S. Aodryushcbenko
In the event of tbe sudden unleashingar by tbe aggroeaivc imperialistic states, acd tbe absencehreat period, (ugrozbayemyy period) tbearmies of border military districts amy find themselvesifficult situation. Tbe territory on which the troops of an army are dispersed may be subject to enemy nuclear/ missile strikes of various yields, to cbemical/mlsslle strikes, and elac to tbe use of bacteriological agents.
We have set tbe goal of studying theoretically insofar as passible, all aspects of the candltlons af deployment and forward movementombined-arms army ln tbe area of combat operations, and to check cut some of tbe problems In practical troop and command-staff exercises. In addition, we studied tbe combined-artt army made up of four or five divisions (two ar three of them up to strength and tbe rest In cadre form, or at reduced strength)inimum amount of frontal means of reinforcement. The composition of the enemy was taken to correspond with bia actual formation, and the probable methods of conducting combat operations ln concrete operational directions were taken into consideration.
In the conditions -seultingudden attack by the enemy, the nature and scops cf the work of field control of an army and of commanding officers and staffa of large units (units) will seem unique. The basic msasdres of tb* commander and the etafff of an army in this period should be as follows:
- to Evaluate thoroughly and ln the quickest possible time tbe apparently serious and complex radiation, cLoalcal, and bacteriological situation evolving ln the entire ares of army deployment; determine the degree of disruption af controlcomsu-lcatioaa, the condition of tb* troops, their combat effectiveness, security, and losses, tbe condition off materiel reserves, and communications routes;
" to clarify, without delay,scisioc which was made earlierre the troops forward from tbeir permanent disposition points into areas of concentration, taking into consideration the poeaibility that these areas are contaminated; to determine, Ir. compliance with tbe operational aeeigna-nt of the army, tentatively, tbe problems off
constant combat readiness in future operations of large units and units, to utilize all means and methods for the most expeditious method of notifying the troops of tbe decision;
to restore tbe disrupted control of and comcuniestions with the large units, units, and senior ccsxnnder fnacbalnlk);
to reestablish disrupted control and communications with tbe large units, units,"and tbe senior commander;
to take measures to eliminate the results of sn attack by weapons of mass destruction;
to organize evacuation, dispersal, and replenishment of materiel supplies;
to determine tbe order of entrance on duty and processing of those reservists, draftees, and technicians arriving to Join large units In cadre form or at decreased strength, tsklng into consideration tbe fact that the terrain In tbe conscription areas and the routes
of movement may be strongly contaminated by radioactive or poisonous chemical substances and by bacteriological agents;
receiving the operational directives from the district headquarters, to clarify and execute the plan worked out previously to commit tbe army troops In the area of combat operations, or. In the case of an abrupt change of circumstances, to worklan for regrouping the troopsew direction; take measures to conclude quickly the preparation of large units and unitsrolonged march, the reconnoitering of tbe routes of forward movement, reconstruct sections of roads and road structures that were destroyed, organize the commandant's service,combat security, and material-technical aupport; order full mobilization of the large units and units designated for the formation of secondary echelonsimited amount of time, or alter tbe mobilization plans;ecision regarding tbe subsequent forward movement of the mobilized large units and units directly behind the troops of tbe firat echelon;
constant control of tbe troops.
All the above-listed measures must be carried out simultaneously,hort period of time, measured In boura, snd even in minutes, apparently under circumstances during which considerable losses may have taken place In command complements..
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Upon coapletlon of the first of the Indicated measures -evaluation of the radioactive, cecal cal, and bacteriologicale Immediately come uperies of difficulties; it Is impossible to overcome these difficulties with the forces and equipment at the disposal of the army, and even of the front. In case the opponent uses weapons of mass destruction first, it Is of primary importance to evaluate the situation not only in the areas subjected to the strikes, but-to foresee with sufficient clarity tbe possible contamination of tbe entire disposition erea of the army troops, due to the spread of radioactive and poisonous substances in tbe direction of tbe wind. In order to arriveractical decision regarding the regrouping and subsequent troop operations, tbe army casmnder must quickly receive precise data regarding the number of enemy nuclear strikes, the coordinates of their centers (groundbe type snd yield of tbe explosion, and tbe direction and velocity of tbe wind at various altitudes In tbe area of army troop disposition, and in tbe adjacent areas. Without this data It Is Impossible to evaluate the radiation situation, even by tbe analytical-computer method (raachetno-acalitlcheskly meted). The Instruments for detection of radiation end chemical contamination which are available to tbe troops are not capable of forecasting radioactive fallout by tracking the various radioactive clouds, aad do not permit the determinationrop in tbe level of radiation in the contaminated areas. Thisery important problem, as well as one that Is very difficult to solve under present conditions.
As we see it, its solution must be realizedation-wide scale if we consider that the above-mentioned data will be essential not only far tbe ground troops, and the armed forceshole, but also for enterprises of the national economy and tbe civilian population.
Apparently it is necessary to set up automatic Intersection points (avtomaticheaklye punity zasechkl) for locating nuclear burets, capable cf determining tbe parameter of the burst, and determine all, or most cf tbe above-mentioned data. These points should be united by apalytlcal-ccccutcr centers, where tbe incoming data are processed, collated, and relayed to the analytical-computer groups of formations, large units, and the command pointc of PVO of the Country and of civil defense.
In our opinion It is necessary to create snalytical-computer groups in the army and in the military district in peacetime, primarily to process and transmit to the troops tbe data coming in from tbe
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analytical-computer centers, end also to determine drops In the levels of radiation after certain periods of time, and transmitting them to the troops. In addition, during forward movement and front end army troop operations in enemy territory, they will naturally need their own organic analytical-computer groupa, capable of quick and accurate forecasting, and determination of, the radiation situation, at least within the boundaries of tbe offensive zone of tbe front and the army, and the nearest adjacent territory. These very groups, in the event that they are relieved, or leave the apeelflc area, have to transmit in written form (dokumentalno) the latest data about all sectore contaminated by radioactivity to tbe other large unitsn tbe same way ae'all information on mine-fields was transmittedorm (fcormulyar) during the last war. The make-up and equipment of tbe analytical-computer groups still require some thought. However, it le already quite clear that tbey must have the most modern detection Instruments (prlbary razvedki) and special machines for reproducing radiation situation maps for the troops. In our opinion, these groups, which consist of operations officers (ofitserhemists, IntelUgenee officers (razvedchik),and topographers, should be headed by the chief of the chemical troops of the front and tbe army.
The creation of automatic intersection points for locating nuclear bursts and the analytic-computer centers will apparently fall, of necessity, to the system of PVO of the Country, Inasmuch as it embraces tbe entire territory of tbe country, and the additional introduction of the Indicated points and centers will requireartial Improvement on Its part. Corresponding analytic-computer groups should be formed under the operational formations. We are convinced that carelessness ln tbe setting of these posts and centers can lead to excessive human losses.
In addition to evaluating the situation ln terms of radiation and chemical contamination, it is also necessary to evaluate the bacteriological aspect. The army bag no such capability. It Is known that almost all bacterial agents have an incubation periodew hours to tens of days. In this light the great danger that tbe troops will be subjected to becomes quite evident if the contaminated areas are not Identified Immediately and excluded from occupation by large units and unite. This problem, in our opinion, should also be resolvedation wide scale, by creating special antlepldemic detachments under hospitals, clinics, and medical establishments, by bringing In civilian medical cadres and the local population. The personnel mustords mleaing.Jrtraining, and the detachments should be supplied with instruments, equipment.
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and transportation
It' is equally Important to secure froo destruction, primarily by radiation and poisonous substances, tbe personnel and equipment which is being mobilised and is arriving from tbe national economy, especially from industrial centers which have been subjected to strikes. It would seem that tbe ideal situation would be one where the personnel and equipment are directed to the reception centers of the fully mobilizing large units and units along routes which were ascertained by prior reconnaissance to be uncontaalnated. However, tbe terrain will often be so contaminated that it will be difficult to establish such routes. In these circumstances the personnel and equipment will have to proceed, without the means of radiation reconnaissance and antichemical protection, from areas witi very high levels of radiation (concentration of poisonous substances-OV) or cross these sectors en route. Saturally the personnel will Join the units unfit far combat, or will have received large doses of radiation (contamination). In addltloo, tbe lack*of recording devices might result In the Inability to determine tbe degree of radiation received.
Tbe way out ofituation, as we see it. Isertain part of tbe antichemical protection equipment should not remain In tbe warehouses of the large units and units, but should be handed over to institutions, enterprieea, and kolkhozes, so that tbe latter could then Issue the equipment to the reservists aubject to call at the timehreat situation or in case of necessity. The reasoning behind tbe advance transfer of these means Is also justified by the principle of de concentration of materiel supplies.
from our point of view it Is necessary to deconcentrate not only tbe antichemical protection resources and part of tbe radiation and chemical detection equipment, but also clothing, by having tbe institutions, enterprises, and kolkhozes Issue the latter directly to those subject to military call-up, with tbe stipulation that the uniforms be kept in special bags at tbe place of residence.
There need be no apprehension regarding loss or premoture use of part of tbe clothing. Experience shows that storing such supplies In warehouseshich in turn require the maintenancearge staff and expenditures for upkeep of the building, costs tbe government sizeable amounts, even if we rule out tbe possibility of spoilage. Issuing this equipment to persons subject to call-up, and holding them responsible for It, willreet deal less. Tbe management personnel of the enterprises (institutions) and the millta
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ccsamissariotiwill periodically check the issued equipment.
The system of hospitalizing Irradiated military personnel also warrants attention. It is known that the army does not have adequate hospital facilities for accepting and taking care of Irradiated personnel, as will be required for elimination of tbe consequencesudden enemy attack. Apparently It win be necessary to send tbe casualties to civilian medical establishments. However, the mass of tbe clvilian'populatlon that received combinedill also be going there, and there might not be any vacancies. This question must be carefully thought out by specialists, and the necessary decision should be made.
In our opinion. It is essential to examine such matters as the maintenance, even In peacetime, of fully staffed chemical protection sub-units in large units of reduced strength. As is known, during fullivision must set up six or seven reception centers for personnel and equipment, and in each one of these, posts for medical and special treatment. Besides, the division, as it is presently staffed, does not have at its disposal the appropriate sub-units, nor are there any under the subordination of the army commander. Practicallyivision is not capable of conducting radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance of its own concentration area, and the army commander cannot carry out these measures in the Interests of the field command, army units, and in tbe interests cf the armyhole. There are no means for setting up dosimetric examination of the arriving personnel and equipment that was mobilized from the national economy. We consider It expedient to propose the following:
hemical protection company, tbe divisions at constant readiness shouldpecial treatment company that would be equipped with all the necessary materiel and equipment as one of the motorized rifle companies; the combat readiness of theot be decreased by this.end thus, even In peacetime, the cadres will be ready that will subsequently be the backbone in tbe formation of special anticbemlcal protection sub-units;
in divisions of decreasedhemical protection company should be maintained, composedlatoon of radiation and chemical reconnaissance and two special treatment platoons, each of the latter settingpecial treatment post; regiments should maintain radiation and chemical reconnaissance platoons comparable in composition to similar platoons In regiments at full strength;
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- In peacetime tbe army shouldull-strength separateand chemical reconnaissance company and an army chemical-protection battalion, composed of three special treatment companies.
combined-arms armyorder military district, deployedistance0 km from tbe probable area of military operations during tbe initial period of war, can make up tbe second echelon of the front, since the main blow of the enemy ground forces will be absorbed by tbe troops located In the some near the front. Consequently tbe army will receive simultaneously the tasks of fully mobilizing the large units at decreased strength, and at the same time, have the large units at constant readinessorced march to the area of combat operations, with subsequent immediate engagement from the move (from the march).
Because of the possibility that large railroad centers may be put cut of commission, and also because of tbe difficulty In effecting transport, caused by the difference In the gauge of Soviet and West European railroads. It is Impossible to depend oo railroads alone for the transport of the troops at constant readiness. The executionombined march can be accomplished only under more favorable conditions. There isossibility of shifting separate large units, especially from the second echelon, after they are broughtto full strength, by air, using military air transport. It le most probable that,ule, the army will have to carryarch0 km on its own.
In our opinion, it would be expedient to assign to theone no lessm wide for executing the march. Inone it would be possible to use up to six to eight routes (two for each division) for troop movement, and two routes for tbe field command of the army and large units and units, and also to carryaneuver during an abrupt change in the direction of movement or ia case of destruction of communications bridges and roads.
Tbe march formation of the first echelon of the army may vary according to tbe number of divisions and routes in tbe zone of movement. In tbe beginning of tbe march (during the first march periods) it is expedient to have columns made up of similar vehicles. Tanks and artillery drawn by tracked vehicles must travel byroutes. At the end of tha march, possibly during the last day's march, depending upon circumstances, the BBrch columns should be formed Inay that the troops would be ready for Instant deployment and commitment to battle. In our opinion, the missile
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units should follow the forward regiments; they should he moved to the front during the last day's march with suitable protection, and should then follow the advance guard of tbe forward regiments.
esult of experience gained from training, weeries of prescribed norms la subject to review appropriate to tbe demands of the initial phase of tbe war. arch0 km, using our existing vehicles, equipped with additional fuel capacity, can be executed in four march periods: the firstm, the secondm, the third upm, the fourth upm. It would be expedient to execute the last march period at night.
In the situation under review, we feel that it would be expedient to call halts as follows: short (up to one hourfterours of movement, long (notoursoours of movement. During the last march period (at night) there shouldhort haltours1 duration. Personnel shouldest period after each march periodoours.
In order to maintain minimum vulnerability to destruction by nuclear weapons, to Insure maximum speed of movement and execution of maneuvers when bypassing contaminated sectors and various obstacles, it is expedient toistance of. betweenm. between battalions,m between regiments. Distances between companies (batteries) should be the same as between
vehicles, because the prescribed distance Increases the total depth of tbe column, anduleot maintained in
actual troop movements.
Traffic control lines should be set upours ofo nave no more than two In each day's march. Settingreater number of control lines is not advantageous, because this limits, upoint, tbe Initiative of the commanders of large units and units, and eliminates the possibility of moving the column at Increased rates of speed ln sectors where the roads are of better quality, even If the routes of march are made available to the army for definite periods of time.
The commandant's service has the leading role In ensuring organized and timely transfer of troops. Careful study shows that during long marches the organization of the ccemmndant'e service presents certain difficulties, and tbe recommendations contained In the Manual of Commandant's Service, published backoes not completely fulfil modern requirements. The situationIs made worse
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la responsible forarch by tbe troops In tbe Initial atages of war, far exceed those in the above-mentioned Manual.
We fully share the viewpoint of Marshal of tbe Soviet. Zakharov, expressed by him In the article "Tbe Traffic Control Support of Modernorozhnom obcspccbenil sovremennyxh operataiy) for the organization of traffic control areas, their problems, and the forces and equipment that can be brought in.
However, we consider that it is possible to examine this matter in greater detail, under conditions of the executionong march by the army immediatelyudden attack by the enemy. In cur opinion, tbe commandant's service la confronted by the following problems in these circumstances: to maintain the established order during tbe movement of troops, to protect them from enemy air attack, to prepare bypasses and alternate routes for carrying out tbe maneuver, to assist ln tbe elimination of tbe effects of an enemy nuclear or chemical attack (evacuation and deactivation of equipment and weapons; special treatment of personnel; repair damaged sections of roads nnd road structures)and to ensure troop control.
The composition of the army comoandant'a areas and tbe division commandant sectors should Include motorized-rifle unite and sub-units, antiaircraft defense, engineering, chemical, communications, special treatment and medical sub-units, and means for evacuating equipment.
The establishing of army commandant's areas and sectors eliminates tbe dispersal of forces and equipment along the entire route, and permits their concentration ln sectors of special importance, depending on the presence of natural barriers. It would be expedient to set up individual, radio-equipped commandant's posts along tbe remaining aectora of the routes.
It la best to set up army commandant'a areas In tbe more dangerous and difficult sections of the routes, where naturalblock the entire forward movement zone of the army. The area commandant must beide range of authority. All the ccacunders,
ollection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryemainder
of footnoteeadquarters Comment: This journal is notwith the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
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staffs, and troops passing through the ccamwindflnt'e area must execute the cceaaandont's orders implicitly, and he, in turn, has fullfor tbe successful passage of the troopsiven sector of the route. In connection with this, one of tbe army deputy commanders should be appointed ccenmandant of the array area, and the commandant of the division sectors should be one of the deputy division ccmosnders.
The organizationervicecanmandant's sectorivision requires varying amounts of forces and equipment in each case. Generally speaking, for tbe movement routeotal of up to three motorized-rifle battalions can be activated; these will be reinforced by the necessary engineering, chemical, and other sub-units, which are relieved of commandant's service duties when tbe division approaches tbe area of combat operations, or when they are replaced by forces and equipment of the front.
Briefly, on tbe organization of control and communications during the march. In our opinion, in order to ensure troop controlombat alert, it is necesssry to set up. In theorward ccessand postommand post (KPj,eserve command postbe second echelon of tbe field command, it ia not advisable to setear area control point (TPU) before themend und comanni cat ions units are set up according to the. Tbe officers of the rear services are located at the command post and the reserve command post. In the divisions at constantforward command posts, command posts, and rear area control points are set up; only command posts and rear area control points are set up In divisions that need further mobilization.
The forward command post, with the chief of the operations department Id charge, must begin an immediate forward movement to tbe army departure line (into the area where tbe division at constant readiness is deployed),where he will control troop eocnitocnt. Tbe command post and tbe reserve command post remain in the concentration areas where they were at the time of the alert. During the period when tbe forward command post moves forward, coaaunications with the troops and tbe district staff are carried oo from tbe command post. The army commander,roup of generals and officers from the forward command post staff (four or fiveemains at tbe command post in order to make decisions and assign tasks to the troops, but by the time that tbe troops of tbe first echelon begin to march he must be at the forward command post. Tbe command post begins the forward movement fron tbe concentration area during an alert only after the troops have been assigned their tasks. The reserve command poet supervises mobilization and formation of new units from it*
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concentration area at the alert.
En route the forward command post moves along with the main forces of the division, deploys and sett, up ccemninlcations with thahe post, and the headquarters of the front during halts and in rest areas. The command post of the army moves by bounds and da-ploys ln spots that ensure tbe use of permanent lines of communications with the headquarters of the front, tbe forward command post, and the troop*. The duration of the halt* will be determined in each case by tbe time necessary toituation repeat from tberansmitting orders to the latter, and reporting to tbe higher headquarters. Shifting the command post of the army In this manner may result ln ite lagging as muchm behind tbe troop* and tho forward command post. In order to avoid thisarch made in separate sectors, tbe command pant and the forward command post must bo on the move simultaneously, but for periods not toours, due to the necessity of maintaining constant communications with tbe higher headquarters and the troops. After each march period tho control points are placed ln the area of dlspoeltlon of the troopa.
Itlso expedient toorward command poet andcommand post within divisions oa tbe march. Tbey must move along separate routes andistance which ensures stable comeunlcatloos with each other.
Certain difficulties are encountered in ensuring coccuntcations during long marches. In order to conceal tbe troop movements, tbe radio nets of the marching troops cannot be used, and the permanent communications lines, even those on tho territory of the Socialist Camp countries, may not be entirely familiar to the comnunlcotioo unite of too army. These circumstances compel tbe use of commandant's service redlocommunlcations and mobile means, above all, helicopters. Radio stations of tbe commandant's service network are set up alocg specific lines. These stations operate by means ofr relay of radio signals- As each unitre-arranged signal is transmitted over the radio, which Is duplicated by all tbe other stations and is received simultaneously by tbe control point* of tbe division and army. Tbe signal* must be ofone-way type, without coll letters or coded service phrases. During theour smrcb, radio ccosunlcatlons of tbe commandant's aervlce ore organised using shortwave stations, during tbe second aod third, ultra-short wove is used, and for the last day's march, communications are carried on with the aaslstance of radio-relay stations.
carryingong march it must also be taken iotothat the troops may suffer losses from the enemy weapons of mass destruction, and in some cases entire sub-units and even units may be put out of action. This is particularly pertinent In cases when the personnel receive large doses of radiation. In thesea new problemeplacement of personnel losses right during the march. Tbe equipment not affected by tbe Shockwave which belongs to the radiation-contaminated sub-units and units, can be used after decontamination. It would seem that In peacetime plans, provisions should be made to provide for tbe formation of sub-units and units (of the march company and battalion type) at tbe district level that could be shifted by air to the formations carrying out the march, and which could be used later as replacements for losses sustained during combat conditions.
The conditions underrceWnc^-arcs-arrryorder military district that is moviog forward from the depth Is cemitted to combat, will always be determined by tbe nature of the combat operations carried out by the first-echelon troops of the front during the first days of tbe war, and it is rather difficult to predetermine them in advance. It is most probable that tbe army will be committed to combat directly from the march, and this Is always attended by great difficultieseries of peculiarities which require detailed study.
First of all, about the work of commanders and staffs in these conditions. It is apparent that the commander and the staff of the army will get the order from tbe front to commit the army to combat while moving (marching)istancem, or more, from the front line-. Therefore the clarification of the mission, evaluation of the situation, making of tbe decision, planning, and Informing the large units of the tasks will all be doneery limited period of time, en route, without halting. Otherwise the commanders and tbe staffs may straggle behind the troops and lose control.
The situation is aggravated by tbe fact that at the present time the ataff field equipment does not ensure operation oo tbe march. Evenf the commander of an army does not have an equipped mobile control point capable of ensuring operation and control of troopsovementong distance. The creation from tbe forces and equipment of tbe troops of Improvised mobile commend posts, and tbe equipping of buses andehicles for operating In field conditions has Indeed helped considerably in cutting down the amount
cumbersome equipment at the control points,has made them more mobile, but it Involves great expenditures, and does not basically solve tbe problem. Tbe means of radio communication remain tbe same, and tbe cross-country ability of tbe automobile chassis doea not conform to modern requirements.
While planning tbe commitment of tbe army to combat, and the carrying out of offensive operations in tbe entire depth, coDSssndere and staffs must simultaneously define In detail tbe rensicing segment of tbe march, taking Into consideration tbe commitment of Large units into combat and tbe conduct by them of an offensive, to Inform tbe troops of tbe change in tbe plan of march, to control tbe troops continuously, to organize and maintain constantly coordination with the large unite operating ahead, ensure replenishment of msteriel supplies and fuel expended In tbe march, and to carry outof the enemy.
According to experience gained from tbe war games carried out in our army, it would be expedient to organize the work of the comoandera and staffs in similar situations in tbe following manner:
Beforehand, when the army commander receives tbe dlatrict operational directive to march, be sends out an operational group to one of the headquarters operating shesd of the troops In tbe direction that tbe army Is moving forward; their mission is to constantly provide infornstion about the situation in tbe area of combat operations. Tbe group should consist of five or six persons (officer-operator. Intelligence officer, artilleryman, ccsmnunications officer, chemical officer) andquad of radiation and chemical reconnaissance. It follows /one line missing/ of operationa and methods of .transmitting information must be planned beforehand, In peacetime.
Inasmuch as the army does not have an air transport capability for distances ofO0 km, the operational group must move In motor vehicles, and tbe letter must movepeed of up tom per hour. Moving twice as fast as the army troops, the operational group will transmit tbe first Information about tbe situation from tbe area of combat operations, at the time when the troops moving forward will be halfway to the concentration area, or the line of deployment. Moving along one of tbe basic routes, the operational group win be able to determine tbe condition of tbe route, and after arriving at tbean fully recoonolter tbe area of command post disposition, and deteralne the presence ofand poisonous subatances and bacteriological agents. Tbe
organization of communications with the operational group aniat he thought out in detail, utilizing Intermediate radio atatione, communications of the front, of the cceeendsnt's service, and, with the approach of the troops, mobile equipment.
When he receives directives, to commit the army to combat, the army comaander will make bis decision by consulting the map. Tbe army command post, beaded by the chief of staff, must transmit the missions to the large units and control tbe forward movement of the troops, end with tbe forward command post the commander and the commanders of the large unite move forward to the line of commitment to battle, in order to clarify the situation, organize coordination with the troops operating ahead, resolve tbe questions of support of commitment to battle, and possibly to change the original decision, lue forward command post of the army must plan the operation quickly, resolve the questions of coordination and supply, and together with the forward command posts of the large unita, aasume control of the arriving troops. In connection with this, the forward command post must be very efficient, small in number, highly mobile, and must have adequate numberi of means of communications with the troops, the headquarters of the front,and of adjacent units.
The scope of work of the commanders and staffs under similar conditions requires detailed study,nified method of supervision and control must be worked out. Many ara of the opinion that all these problematical questions should be formalized by the General Staff in official instructions oranual. We areifferent opinion. It is impossible to foresee all cases and possible variants under which the army may be committed to combat from the second echelonront, and to incorporate operating procedures in one official manual. It would be more beneficial to study similar problems constantly, check then out as much as possible during training exercises, and publish them as discussions. This method develops deep thinking and increases the general military outlook of the coamonders and staffs.
It la another matter to reeolveentralized manner questions regardingateriel base for command, ccamninicatloas, and technical support of commandere, staffs, and troops, with modem means of control. For instance, the critical need arises for the commanders of armies and large units to have mobile control points equipped with the newest, smoll^long-range radio atatione, ensuring secure conversations without resorting to numerous conversation and signal codes. In the operations department of the army there shouldomputer capable of quickly producing the data needed for the
evaluation of the situation (above all tbe radiation situation) and arriveecision. quadron of helicopters should boart of the army field, to Implement troop control, for conducting radiation, chemical, and engineer reconnaissance, and for fulfillng other Important tasks.
Another problem which needs to be solved Is the method of recording the degree of radioactive contamination of tbe personnel. The coaaonding officerub-unit cannotritten record for each soldier, especially during tbe frequent transfer of personnel from one sub-unit to another, and especially after It is apparently necessary to Issue to personnel, individual, miniaturized devices of the "pencil" type, with coded Indies tors; this will exclude the possibility of independent reading of tbe radiation dosage received by tbe personnel themselves, but will permit the commanding officers to determine tbe true meaning of these doses with the sldorresponding decoding device (oneompany).
It is known that modem conditions forattle and an operatloo demand exceptional speed and maneuverability by conaaandeTS and staffs. Therefore it is necessary, even now, to change radically their style of work. Up to this time the staffs are producing many combat documents. Even though In tbo past few years they have eliminated some of the written documents, these same documents are now being worked out on saps, and often duplicate each other; this takes even more of tbe staff officers' time than before. Frequently the worktaff is Judged by tbe number of documents produced. This explains the fact that in allarge number of additional officers is taken from tbe troops for work In tbe staff. As yet the troops do not have staff field service instructions which fulfil modern requirements. This also appears to be one of the reasonseries of shortcomings In staff work.
Tbe questions that we have raised call for thorough study during command-staff exercises, war games, and during tbo buildup of large units to wartime strength.
Original document.
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