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FOR RECORD ON WHITE HOUSE MEETING,
AY,2 MAY
tho absence of Mr.epresented CIA al Present were the President, the Vice Preaident,Secretary McNamara, the Attorney General, GeneralHarriman, General Lemnitzer, Secretary Gilpatric, SecretaryBohlen, General Decker, Mr. McGeorge Bandy, Mr. Forrestal,
Mr. Hilaman, and myself. (In this connection, the President subsequently indicated that he did not want the membership at this meeting in any way divulged to anyone, with particular emphasis on the presence of the Attorneyhe attendance at the afternoon meeting was the same with the exception of Mr. Harriman and General Decker, both of whom were absent.
President indicated that he was most upset at thein the New York Times. He asked Mr. Rusk to open the meetingaskedIA briefing. old the group that as of that momentno real developments since yesterday and that our latest^withdrawal of the government troops across the river andto southern Laos for regrouping and re-equipping. point Secretary McNamara, who had Juat returned from Southeastover and brought all of us up to date on what he had seen and whatwere.
McNamara indicated that Nam Tha had been improperly
defended, that twice the force needed for defense was there, but that they were improperly deployed. He stated that the government defeatilitary disaster and that there werehousand of the original six thouaand.in Thailand, that there was no sense of regrouping orand thatforce no longer existed. He said that the two Lao generals had left Nam Tha without even telling the U. S. MAAG advisers, and that relations were very poor between the government generals and the MAAG advisers. He also stated that the situation in the panhandle was very poor militarily. Secretary McNamara stated that he was discouraged with conditions in Thailand, there were no real Thai forces In the Northeast, and that Sarlt was greatly concerned about the situation. Sarit had very poor intelligence and very poor communications. Sarit thinks the Chinese are setting up an independent logistical and communication channel to the
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sea through Southeast Asia. McNamara said the Thais have no civil guard, no defense corps, and they are quite vulnerable to the type of infiltration that Laos has undergone. He said, however, there appeared to be no real indication at this time of such infiltration. As to South Vietnam, McNamara felt much more encouraged. Desertions in the South had been considerably reduced and the troops were more effective. The strategic hamlet program was going very well and there had not yetuccessful effort against the hamlet'. Civil guard and training programs were good and there had been no lost weapons since the program was started. Large-scale Viet Cong attacks have ceased. While we are years from any real security there, we are heading in the right direction. McNamara said we need substantially the same thing in Thailand and Sarit needs continuing bolstering.
McNamara then stated that he saw no need to implement Plan Five at this time, but he felt that ln Thailand we should bring the U. S. battle group up to strength and move it north (he did not know yet where or howoattalion landing team of U. S. Marines, and two U. S. air squadrons. (He was not quite clear as to where these additional forces were to go but they are coveredubsequent message Bent by the Joint Chiefs ofr. McNamara closed by stating that if any U. S. action was contemplated in Laos, we must definitely put forces in South Vietnam to help them against North Vietnam.
There theniscussion by the President and General Decker as to what troops were available where, and how long it would take
to move them Into Southeast Asia. The President asked Secretary McNamararogram of various military steps that might be taken by the U. S. as to troops, deployments, times, etc. He stated that this is an extremely serious situation and that we are not in any way fooling around or messing aroundshow ofhatever we do, we mean business. He asked Secretary Rusk to prepare an estimate of Just how the SEATO nations would react either by our unilateral actions or by our request to them to Join with us. (Mr. Hilsman is doing this in the State Department and assured me subsequently that he would have his people work with our people on it. He stated it wasatter for USIB, that the President had, after the meeting, personally directed him to have it done in the State Department, and that he (Mr. Hilsman) did not think the military need be involved.)
Rusk stated that whatever we do militarily, we must dofirmness and enough force to convince the Soviets that webusiness.
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Mr. Harriman statedumber of people felt that the President's program had been undermined by the CIA and by the military and that the Soviets unquestionably felt this too. He said that several reporters had brought this up to him and that it was Soviet belief that the President's program had been undermined by CIA and the military. Harriman said that Phoumi was definitely provocative and unresponsive to thend that we shouldelegram to Vientiane to encourage^ ferment, and do everything we could to downgrade Phoumi. Harriman said that whether the decision was political or military, we had to avoid indicating any further help to Phoumi.
President said that the Soviets would find it hard to believe that we could not control our own man, Phoumi. Bohlen agreed and felt that the Russians would just hold back and watch what went on without making any commitment to intervene.
Hilsman stated that we must not do anything to vindicate Phoumi. We must make unprovocative military moves and must disavow Phoumi hard by all U. S. elements both here and abroad. We could then follow this disavowal by military moves which could not be connected to support
of Phoumi.
Lcmnitzer said if not Phoumi, who then? He stated that the bulk of the Lao forces are in the South and still intact and still under Phoumi's command. Mr. McNamara interjected that Phoumi is already pretty well discredited in Laos.
Rusk said we should start by making our military moves in Thailand and South Vietnam and certainly not in Laos.
The President, referring to the Frankel story again, said, "What do we say to the press? What message axe we trying to get to whom, and for whatusk volunteered to workress approach for the afternoon meeting on the basis that we were takingmoves. The President Indicated that whatever we do, we must touch base with the House leadership of both parties. The morning meeting broke up with instructions to reconvene At thia point, Mr. Hilsman gave the President, "Thia is the study on Formosa we discussed yesterday, Mr.fter the morning meeting, Mr. Harriman asked me to
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a message out to our people to do whatever we could toby working through the head of Phoumi'a Secret Intelligence.not catch the name but ithort name beginning
General Lemnitzeroth cornered Mr. Harriman and tookhis remarks about CIA and the military. General Lemnitzermooked likewise. Mr. Harriman reiterated thatmerely passing on matters that had been discussed with him bythat thla would be the Soviet view but not his. He had no intentionanything else. He could not be pinned down as to whathe did state categorically that at no time did he personally think orof any undercutting of the President's program by the militaryCIA. He did stategiven exceptional support to Phoumi
which perhaps had the effect of undermining the President'she admitted that supporting Phoumi
EETING
At the afternoon meeting Secretary McNamaraessage of instructions to CINCPAC, calling for the additional deployment of U. S. forces to Southeast Asia, and establishing the command of all these forces under General Harkins. id notopy of this message but it isif required.ave asked the Watch Officer to try toopy sent to your quarters direct. State Department (Hilsman) questioned why we had to bringhange in command. After considerable discussion, it was decided to try to play this fact in low key but unquestionably the news would get it.
Rusk indicated that he was most anxious to get the New Zealanders and the Australians in the act and would see what they could do about this. Hilsmanopy of comments which would be made for press guidance. After some changes and further guidance by the President, this was also approved. The guidance given was substantially in accordance with the story in this morning's Washington Post. id notopy of this either but it can be made available if required.
Finally, the President asked for the Intelligence Estimate he had previously requested on SEATO countries by Monday. He further wanted an Intelligence Estimate on the current posture of military forces in Laos, to Include their effectiveness after losses, their leadership, theiretc. He also wanted more information on what actually happened at
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Nam Tha. The President also asked Hilsman how he was coming on that "White Paper on Laos" and Hilsman said it was in the typewriter and would probably be available Monday.
In subsequent discussion with Hilsman, he was adamant to me and in fact said that the President had personally told him after the meeting that the Estimate on SEATO countries was to be prepared by Stateand wasSIB matter. ad touched base with Bundy who said itSIBilsman said he would have his people coordinate the paper with our National Estimates people. ave no knowledge of any "White Paper on Laos" and would certainly think that this should be thoroughly coordinated with our Agency and with the Department of Defense, in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ave our Estimates people working on the rnilitary situation in Laos and told them to go as far afield as they felt desirable and not be restricted by the termhey shouldaper readySIB meeting tomorrow morning, Monday,, and we may get advanced copies tonight about dinner time.
nvite your most urgent attention and consideration to the State Department cable dispatched to the Embassy inast night and to my handwritten note attached thereto. articularly invite your attentionto this message.
IlilISI
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Original document.
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