INDONESIAN FIRST DEPUTY PREMIER SUBAKDRIO
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Current Intelligence
- fine/tier _
i nnnmrv .ten- nfn y
OCI No.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence5
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Indonesian First Deputy Premier_Subandrio
At the time of the abortive insurrectionctober First Deputy Premier and ForeignSubandrio was probably the second mostman in Indonesia. His scarcely disguised drive for power had raised him to great heights within the Indonesian state, but his tacit alliance with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the past few years had won him the enmity of the army, and he isajor target of the army leadership. Intensely ambitious, highly agile, shrewd, and capable, Subandrio has been for the past two years Sukarno's political heir in all but name. Hisand force of character, coupledigh degree of unscrupulousness, make himan to be reckoned with.
Subandrio hasomewhat checkered career, which has been spent almost en tirely within the Indonesian bureaucracy. Trainedoc tor, he was educated in Java, where he was bornnd evidently had no chance to travel abroad during hisyears. tudent during tho few years hemedicine he engaged in nationalist activities against both the Dutch and theassociating himself with the anti-Japanese movement led by Sultan Sjahrir. 5 he optedolitical career,
joined Sjahrir's Socialist Partyndember of the newly-formed republican government. He was made Secretary General of the Ministry of Informationerved as the Indonesianin Londonnd was appointed ambassador to Britain0 when Indonesiafully sovereign. 4 he was madeto the USSR, and6 he returned toas secretary general of the Foreign Ministry. He was made Foreign Minister the following year andember of Sukarno's "inner cabinet" His rise has continued to be rapid since then.
has, however, no politicalhis own. He was abroad when the PSI splitand did not formally rejoin theunder Sjahrir, which wasfter becoming implicated in Subandrio remainedhen it was revealed that
he had joined the Indonesian Nationalisthich was then close to President Sukarno. He has, however, played little or no part in PNI affairs, and probably cannot be considered to haveNI member for the past few years. Subandrio owes his position entirely to the patronage of President Sukarno, who appointed himeries of important governmental posts with responsibilities in several fields, and made him first deputytwo
is useful to Sukarno in aways. Heetentive mind andaster
sset that is especially helpful to
President,!
Subandrio islexible and extremely ableperhaps the best in Asia. He isand forceful but has never opposed Sukarnomajor issue. { "
acted to implement Sukarno's policies rather than to initiate his own and has been most acute inand perhaps anticipating the direction in which the President's thoughts are running. Inhe has served as Sukarno's faithful satrap, but the relationship between the two men is probably
-2-
fnnssEit/HACKcnouffl) use only
JUliMO'.rUiT OtfLY
more complicated than simply one of master and servant, for Subandrio has probably helped toand strengthen Sukarno's convictions and
the time ofariety of posts of greatthe government in addition to hisportfolio. As first deputy premier he had
a major executive voice in the Indonesian As head of the government-owned newshe was able to publicize widely bis own He controlled thehich he operated as hisand which had penetrated virtually everyof Indonesian life as well as all Through his direction of the SupremeRetooling the State Apparatusein selecting and removing governmentand in channeling the activities ofserai-official organizations. In thetrbandrio gained control also over Indonesianwhich not only madeajor factor insector of the economy but probablyto increase his ownuseful assetis often usedolitical
tool.
wasowerfulfigure in the educational field, for theof higher and basic education owedto him. Through bribery he was able to
exert control over the powerful and extremely politically-mined radical student movement. He also offered to become the patron of the Moslem Student Association and established contact with other Moslem youth and labor groups in an effort to become the protector of those elements within these bodies that would beto follow his lead in order to save theirfrom being banned. In addition Subandrio maintained close working relations with tbe left-leaning head of the air force, Omar Dani, and attempted tothe head of the navy by supporting the leadershort-lived mutiny last year.
-3-
-SECRET -
^-
ao vwsinron qhly
Above all, in tbe past two years Subandrio bad formed an alliance of convenience with the PKI. Sukarno was clearly favoring the party, andapparently felt his best Interests lay inwith the Communists. Thisurely opportunistic move on his part and was certainly not the result of ideological conviction. believed the PKI represented the wave of the future in Indonesia and hoped to ride that wave to obtain power in his own right. He used his various posts to promote and protect PKI adherents, givingarticularly free rein in ANTATA and in spreading Communist propagandaoctrination sessions. He alsolose alliance with crypto-Communists in the Indonesian cabinet. esult he expectedbacking in any bid by him for the Indonesian presidency following Sukarno's demise; and indeed untileptember PKI members were claiming that he was the logical successor to Sukarno. Thedoubtless saw in him an admirable front manKI-dominated state.
The one major power factor that Subandrio had not brought into line by last autumn was tbe army. The extent of his complicity inctober Insurrection, which if successful would havethe army from the Indonesian political equation, is still not clear. He undoubtedly had some advance knowledge of the plot and was probably aware at least of the main outlines of the coup plan. He was a
key member of the Revolutionary Council that Colonel Untung hoped to set up and has been implicated in the confessions of both Untung and PKI Centralmember Mjono. His first reaction to the eventsctober was to minimize the wholeand to attempt to restore the status quo ante. This also was Sukarno's approach to the problem. However deeply involved he was in the insurrection, there is no doubt that Subandrio would have greatly benefited from the elimination of the army as an effective political force.
1 October affair has proved notserious miscalculation on the part ofody blow to Subandrio's ownarmy, which has distrusted him for years, is
na am maonM/DAQKonouiro ugb ohum
convinced that herime mover In theand now hates and fears him more than over. Using anti-Communist Moslem groups as itsthe army isajor campaign tohim from office. Subandrio's hold on the BPI bas been weakened and his influence in AXTARAeliminated. KOTRAR has been largely bypassed and is now generally inactive. An antl-Subandrio cabal appears to be developing within the Foreign Ministry. Subandrio no longeroice on the operational level of the Supreme Operations Commandhich appears to be emerging under army directionind of "supernd his tentative alliance with tho left-leaning Moslem groups has completely dissolved. The navy has allied Itself strongly with the army. Tho air force hasore equivocal position, although the new air force commander, Herlambang, evidently still consults frequently with Subandrio.
power position hasgreatly weakened, but he still holds postsnominal authority,everse swing ofpendulum could quickly restore much ofpower. He is now in the Drocess ofpolitical coloring in the hope of makingmore palatable to anti-Communistin Indonesia. Recontly he has not onlyattacked the PKIbetrayer" of therevolution but bas also accusedof interfering in Indonesian internalhe has said he expects the PKI to beand he apparently views this development He has also remarked privately that
he was naive in attempting to work with the Communist adding that he no longer trusts the PKI or its allies
new facade is not surprising,is in essence an opportunist, and theno longer help him. With the PKI out ofhe must rely on Sukarno alone tosupport bin. The President nay prove aon which to lean. He has already givenof willingness to use Subandrio as adirect criticism for the present imbrogliohimself. ecent confrontation withNasution Sukarno accusedthe
foreign minister'sspreading slanders about the army. If Sukarno,olitical opportunist, thought it expedient, he would jettison Subandrio tomorrow.
12. In this sense Subandrioarometer of the President's relations with the army. If Sukarno feels that he is not strong enough to resist army pressure, Subandrio is likely to be removed frompolitical life. If he continues to survive in office, this mayign that the President feels that he can out-wait and out-maneuver the army In any event, Subandrio's chances ofsucceeding Sukarno in the presidency have been greatly reduced. But so long as he remains in office he will, given his intelligence, agility and uuscrupulous-ness, continue as an important and sinister factor in Indonesian politics.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: