ECUTIVE SECRETARY, uSlp
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Tho following infeJ/igence ofganizo/ioni participated in the preparation ot thit eitimatei
Tho Central tnlalllganca Agency ond tho intonirjonce iwgontiotiom of tho Deport-menli of Statu ond Osfenvo, ond the NSA.
Concur ring;
It. Gen. ft E. Cvthman.SMC. the Deputy Direclo* of Control Intelligence
Mr.wohei. the OfOCXxtoitd Itnraidi.of State
Vice Aoei.owronce. for Ihe Director, Dalente bMoHigooco Agercy
It, Gon Monhoil S. Gorier,edc.Sorvrity Agency
hocloi A. Soffimor. to' iho Aiirttonl General Manager. Afomk Eieffly Com.
Aosfalntngi
Mr. William O. Oegor, lor the Atuttont Director, fitdmal Duioau ofouriide of hii iwiidiet-on.
iqp secret
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THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
L SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES DURINC THE PAST TWO YEARS
Space Flight
Soyuz
Zond Cireumlunar
Development
and Planetary
Satellites
Meteorological
Comm .in. itioa. Satellites
SateJhtea
Iteeonnairance
I. Navigational Satellites
J. Undetermined Missions
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE
PROSPECTS
Energy Propeilants
C Launch
SL-11
J-Vctvicfe
Power and
Support Systems .
H. Commarid mid Control
V 6?
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
.
IV. FUTURE.
Lunar Larding
Space Station
Qfcumlunar
Lunar Oibiter
Lunar and Planetary Probes
Lunar
Venus
Other Planets
Satellites
Communications Satellites
Meteorological Satellites
Earth Resources SurveySatellites
Uses of Space
Early Warning Systems
Navigation Satellites
I. Unmanned Earth OrbitalLong Term Prospects
V. INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION ANNEX
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the soviet space program
the problem
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over the next five loears.
CONCLUSIONS
the past two years, the Soviet space program hasits high priority among major national objectives. The(tempted overercent more space launches than in theperiod, and (hey have continued the development ofsystems and the expansion of supporting facilities. Theyspacenmanned rendezvous and docking,and docking involving crew transfer, and theatmospheric data from Venus. Their manned space flighthas not yet regained the momentum lost with the deathKomarov, and they have experienced costly failureslunar and planetary programs.
Soviets almost certainly established the goals and thetimetable for their space program some years ago. Itscould be influencedumber of factors, includingview of its political value, tlie possibility of significanteconomic constraints, and technological successes andSome of these factors will tend to offset one another. It mayto speed up to meet new deadlines, but we consider itthey can, at this late dale, effect any basic changes in theof the program for the next few years.
estimate that expenditures on the Soviet spacerapidlyut thai the rate ol growth has beensince then. This slowdown can be attributed primarily torequirement for heavy outlays for new large launchrelated facilities. We estimate Soviet outlays for space inmilitary programs, to be (he equivalent4 billion. Com-
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for the vital resources required by the Soviet space program, evident since the, has intensified For this reason andthe indications we now have of Soviet space programs, we think it unlikely that Soviet space expenditures will be appreciably higher during the next several years than they are now and we believe that the Soviets will not be able to undertake simultaneously all the projects within their technical capabilities.
Lunar Landing. The judgment in earlier estimatesSoviet manned lunar landing program was not competitiveApollo timetable has been supported by developments of theyears. Flight tests ofaunch vehicle, which webe used to place men on the moon, were expected to beginbut have not yet gotten underway. Furthermore, the Sovietsdifficulties in their tests related to lunar return andWe continue to believe that the Soviets will undertakelunar landing. We now consider il highly unlikely,the Soviets wouldanned lunar landingwill probably not be attemptedlthoughcannot be ruled out. In preparation for the landing attempt,that the Soviets willanned lunar orbitingthe purposes of collecting data and checking equipment; suchwill probably nol be attempted beforet the earliest.
Circumlunar Flight. We now consider it unlikelySoviets willanned circumlunar flight of the typeloop merely around the moon and return to earth. Thethe Apollo program has removed the primary incentive forattemptpectacular. Moreover, this mission would betep preparatoryanned lunar landing.
Space Station. We believeitSoviets couldmall manned space station inrew of threeday period. By theputonsiderably larger station weighing up toA space station of this size would provide considerablyfor men. equipment, and supplies. The length of itsdepend primarily upon the nunilwr in the crew and thefor resupply and rotation.
C. Very Large Space Station. Wc continue to believe that the Soviet space program includes plans toery large space sla-
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tion. It is unlikely ihat il will be undertaken concurrently wilh tlie manned lunar landing program, which we believe will be givenThus an attempt toery large space station will probably not occur before the. At that time withehicIe, the Soviets couldound station in earth orbit; this station, however, would lack the sophist tea lion and the life support system required toarge crew in orbit for long periods of time. We cannot preclude the possibility that the Soviets willery large space station in orbit5 or later which wouldimited life support capability and which would require extensive resupply. Since the requirement for sotation is difficult lo envisage at this time it is possible that the Soviets will wait the availabilityelf-sustaining life support system which we estimate will be available
H. Military Systems. Military support systems have had the highest priority in Soviet military space programs. Of these the reconnaissance satellite program is the largest single item in the military account; it will probably continue at the present high level of activity (about three launching* per month) for at least the near term. The Soviets have also developed or areariety of other support,with both civil and military applications: communications,meteorological, and geodetic satellites. In addition, much of the space technology and hardware currently being tested by the Soviets could be used as the basis for the development of space weapons.'
I. Long Term Prospects. If the Soviet statementsalidof their long-term interests, iheir manned lunar program has from its inception been directed toward goals beyond the manned landing. We believe that the Soviets arc committedollow-on program of manned and immanned lunar exploration, possiblyestablishmentunar base, that will extend well beyond5 time period. We do not believe that the Soviets are planning to accomplish manned planetary exploration within the period of this estimate. But they may have underway developmental programs that could converge0 toignificant capability toward manned interplanetary flight.
' DnrlepoMnl ofby ihe USSh will br discuttod in Uw forthcomincSoviet St..tcgic AttackndSoviet Shulppe DtfllJ."
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DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS* A. Generol
L During the past two years the Soviet space program has retained its high priority among major national objectives. It has placed heavy demand on the economy for scarce resources of the same general type and quality as those required for strategic military programs and investment for economic growth. In the two year period from the beginning of7 through the end of9 therepace launches and launch attempts as comparedn the previous two yearsn the eight years. (See Annex.)
Soviets have continued the development and flight test of newDuring the past two years, they have tested two newave extensively tested maneuvcrablc spacecraft, and havein the meteorological, navigational, and reconnaissanceIn addition, launch vehicle development continued with theflights, additional usage of theCBMpacend the completion of one of the two pads oftlaunch facilityew space booster which wc estimate will haveillion pounds. This continuing growth, along withof available hardware, enabled the Soviets to achieve several spacewhich were unmanned rendezvous and docking, manned rendezvouswith subsequent crew transfer, unmanned circumlunar flight withearth recovery, and transmission of data from within the atmosphereplanet Venus.
anned Space Flight
5 month hiatus, the manned space flight program wasin7 with the flight ofhich ended in the deathKoroarov andurtheronth standdown inProgram testing was resumed in7 with the unmannedand docking of two Soyuz spacecraftecondautomatic rendezvous and docking mission was flown inevalidation for manned flight occurred inwith the launching of an unmanned Soyuzannedresumed in8 when two Soyuz were launched to perform a
'8 theItstcd twice in an orbital mode. This system was addressed in. "Soviet Strategic Attacknd will ben the forthcoming-iscussion ot passible defensive space weapon dciclojsrnenB,, "Sovietfenra."
or various Soviet space launcher coiiGguratroro.
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SOVIET SPACE UUNCH VEHICLES AND PAYLOADS
rendezvous urn! docking operation;as unmanned andas manned. The two spacecraft were brought withineters of one another but both manual and automatic attempts at docking failed.
The neat Soyuz nnssaonindere Eown inith one cosmonaut rendezvoused and docked with Soyuzhich carried throe cosmonauts. The docking was achieved with the manual system on Soyuznd two cosmonauts transferred to thepacecraft by ettra vehicular activitye believe that communications and power connections are made upon docking, but that transfer of supplies and cosmonauts can be effected only by EVA. This mission was probably completely successful. We believe that the Soviets arc ready to embark on the manned program thai was originally intended for initiation in8 time period.
The Soyuz spacectalt has several new features enabling it toariety of advanced mannedadar-transponder and autopilot system
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two Soyuz spacecraft to rendezvous,ocldng system locks thespacecrafteparate living compartment in each Soyuz is used tor experiments, observations, and rest periods, and also doubles as anompletely new re-entry moduleift capability allowing some flexibility in landing point selection.olar electric power system and expanded life Support capabilityotential for mission durations up toays.
Zond ChcvmtimaT. Inhe Sovietsajor new man-related project, one objective being topacecraftrajectory to and from the moon. The unmannedissions were major milestones in this program. Although the spacecraft has performed well, the Soviets have experienced chronic difficulties with theaunch vehicle. Of six circumlunar launch attempts, three have ended in second stage failures. The seventh possible atlempt forission occurred onIus mission ended when the fourth stage failed.
The first Soviet attempt to conduct an unmanned circumlunar flight resultedaunch failure onhelight, ineven day unmanned mission whichrofile simulating many of the aspectsircumlunar flight. This mission provided the Soviets with extensive space environmental datallowed them to evaluate flight hardwareand their mission control capability. We believe, however, that the Soviets failed to recover the spacecraft, whichkip-glide re-entryecond launch failure occurred on
Theission, inS, which included biologicalwas the Erst successful unmanned circumlunar mission. The spacecraft landed in the Indian Ocean and was the first Soviet spacecraft to be recovered from the water; the actual landing point probably was not the intended one. During the re-entry, deceleration levels peaked atnd exceeded's forinute; these levels are undesirable but not intolerable for rnanned flight. This flight provided the Soviets with considerable data on the re-entrv
9 Theission was in many ways similar to Zondhe principal difference lay in the technique of atmosplwric re-entry.erformed an aerodynamic skip-glide re-enlry which resultedand recovery within the Soviet Union. The re-entry deceleration levels experienced on this spacecraft would be suitableannedollow-on launch attempt in9 resulted in still anotherailure.
t is not known ii the present version of the Zond spacecraft canrew. However, successful missions have included checkouts of systems applicable to both manned circumlunar flightanned lunar landing. If indeed the Zondrototypeanned lunar spacecraft we believe the lifting re-entry technique will need further testing, particularly ifas meant toifting re-entry profile. Most important, however, theroblems must be solvedubstitute launch system must be developed and man-rated.
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Development Satellites
The launch rale of the small unmanned Cosmos satellites using theas approximately doubled in Ihe past two years, and they are now launched regularly from Plcsetsk as well as Kapustin Yar. Satellites with undetermined missions, most ol which are launched from Plcsctsk, account for the increase; they arc probably relatedpace technology development program. Scientific satellite launching* have continuedonstant rate ofer year during the last two years, indicating thai the program stillow priority. The scientific satellite program conducts research on the space environment and generally produces much less data and of much lower quality than comparable USIn many cases Soviet research isepetition of US investigations. Soviet Instrumentation also lacks the sophistication and miniaturization typical of US equipment.
The Proton program, which had been inactiveesumed in3 with the launch of Proton0 pound payload is the heaviest scientific payload ever placed In earth orbit; the earlier Proton pay-loads which were launched by the two-stageeighed0 pounds.hree-stage version of theaunch vehicle.
and Planetary
The lunar program also resumed activityfter one launch failure,unar orbiter, was successfully launched in Aprilfirst successful mission since the Lunaanding missionnlike previous lunar orbiters there is no evidence that Lunahotographic rnission, although photographic equipment could have been on board and failed to operate. The mission did, however, provide extensive test of the new lunar tracking, command, and data transmission systems used in the Zond program.
The Soviets took advantage of the launch window to Venus in9 to launch two5 and Venushese were reported to be virtually identical with therobe launched int carried instruments to obtain data on the atmosphere of Venus and on magnetic fields, charged particles, and corpuscular radiation near the planet. It was designed also toapsule which would transmit atmospheric data whilearachute descent. Since some of the scientific data fromre ofvalidity, the Soviets evidently decided to repeat the mission withndhich carried improved instrumentation. Dotherein sampling the atmosphere and transmitting the results during the descent.
On9 the Soviets attempted toars probe which was probably intended to land. This was the Erst time (heas usedlanetary mission and tlie vehicle failed during an early portion of the flightecond Mars attempt using theailed shortly after launch. As yet the Soviets have notuccessful Mars attempt since the scries began in
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ith only one exception, the Soviets have attempted to use every "window-avaiUbie for launch lo Man and Venuiey initiated their rstanetary program, and they have bunched badmp spacecraft on almost every mission. Forigh priority program, the Soviets have experienced an unusually high tlegrec of failure. Every Mars attempt has ended in fa.lurc and only Venus,ave achieved some degree of success. Some failures have been attributed to launch hardware, others to unreliability of spacecraft components. Despite the high cost and low return of the efforts, however. Ihe program continues with an evident high priority.
E. Applied Satellites
rfee^ci/ogsOoi Satellites. In7 the Soviets announced that anmcteorologicsil satellite system, designatedad beenThe useful lifetimes of these satellites have been consistently less than one yearinimum ofonths. The system originated with. During the early portion of the program the Sovietsperating satellites functioning untiloth failed inn9 the first satellite in what may be anmeteorological series was launched. It. like the system, was designated "Meteor" and was the first tohotographic datarequency assigned by the international communications agreement.
IS. The Meteor syslem probably will be the basis lot the first Soviet opera-tional meteorological system. The satellites orbited to dateelevision systemesolution ofile per scan line, which is comparable to the resolution of the US Nimbus television system. The infrared cloud picture resolution is about nine nm. Meteor satcjtite weather information has beenwith the US in accordance with2 bilateral agreement, but the Soviets have never met the timeliness criteria set by the agreensent; theirhas been intermittent and the quality of much ol the data has been poor.
ommunicationshe Molniya communications satellite system has undergone improvements and changes in operational use in theears. The typical useful payload lifetime now isear,aximumlifetime of aboutonths. Four Molnlya-type satellites were lauttched7 and throe
TCurrerrtly Use primary use of the Molniya system is the relay of military and civilun communications although It is also used for television distribution to the network of aboutOrbrta" receiving stations throughout the USSH.
F. Maneuverable Satellites
7 the maneuverable satellite program has accelerated and become more complex. In the program two classes of satellites have emerged: one heavy
weight0 poundnvolving two satellites, demonstrated tlie capability to perform orbital maneuvers (or periods up torbits; theighter weight0 poundnvolving five satellites,maneuvers during the first two or three orbits.
ne phase of the maneuver*blc satellite program appears to be directed towardapability to passing or passive target. On IB8 the Soviets launchedhich appears In have servedarget for two subsequent launches of mancuvorable satellites,. Onctober,as placed in orbit and on the second orbit maneuvered so that itly-by withiniles ofn the third orbit following the fly-by.as observed tumbling ot spinning and was accompanied by several fragments. No change was detected in the status of. Twelve days lateras launched and on the second orbit maneuvered toimilar fly-by which passed within about one mile of. Unlike the previous operation, in this instance bothere accompanied by fragments after the operation; our calculations indicate that this fragmentation occurred at about the time of the fly-by. Several orbits later, both vehicles were observed rumbling or spinning. In both operations, the fly-bys involved high speed closure0 feet perhortly after thely-by the Soviets announced thatoperation was complete; our evidence tends to confirm this.
we cannot determine the missions of the various satellitesmaneuverable satellite program could be intended toumber ofmilitary and non-military. We are not yet able to determine the mostthat will evolve. Some flights, could be directed solely towardsultiple-purpose orbital propulsion capability, the techniquescouldariety of intercept or rendezvousosehigh relative velocity wouldequirement for one form ofose fly-by. but at lower relative velocity, couldintent to rendezvous or fulfill an inspection mission. We believe,,peration is more applicable to anthan any other mission objective.
G. Photoreconnaissance Satdlrtes
he reconnaivvancc program continued at anof two launches per month. Since Ijst June, however, Ihe average rosethree per month. Tills increase Is due almost exclusively to additionalmissions, probably in response to the crisis in Czechoslovakia andSino-Sovietiring period* of crisis, the Soviets havecapability lo launch five satellitesingle month.'
'SovietciqMiditier will tie dimmed in the forthcomingoviet Situ leu to Defense!."
" Seen pagnrv!n Annoi.
A .I. T*
Soviel Pholo-ReconnaLssance Satellite launches
JAN FB kP3 NAT JUI JUT AB6 SIP OCT OK
JUL SIP K
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Lo* aid High Rcltr lo Ptsolitios si Ciatr* Siilm
e believe that (he objectives of the reconnaissance program have been:
precisely target US nuclear slrike forces, especially ICBM sites,check their status.
map areas of general military interest, especially those bordering
monitor the development and testing of military systems, in thein Communist China.
il To monitor large scale militaryaval activitj
1
8 the Sovietsatellite reconnaissancevehicles which stayed in orbitays in contrast to themission. Some of the satellites involved in this program carry highpayloads and arc modified by th* addition of an engine system fororbital period. The most probable use of (ho engine Is to incicascby controlling the earth trace and area coverage; future usesdrag compensation for very long missions or very low perigees.payloads performed normal low/medium resolutionThese satellites alsopiggyback" scientific payload.
high priority and the use of tone-tested hardware, have madeeffort the most successful of all Soviet unmannedThe operational program involves two basic types ofBoth weigh0 pounds. The low resolutionprobablyround resolution on the order ofoeetconditionswath width ofiles. The highermission probably achieves ground resolution on the orderounder average conditions5 toile swath width. Underthe resolution of both systemsomewhat better.
H. Electronic Reconnaissance
uring the past two years the Soviets have continued to include Elsnt collection instrumentation on all low revolution reconnaissance missions, which continue toflown at the rate of about one a
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Satellites
ie Soviets have beenavigational satelliteappears to be intended primarily to provide accurate positional datavessels. The system does not appear to In; operational at this time.have discussed plans for widespread civil use of navigationalimplies that when the system goes operational it will be wellSoviets could use the US navigational satellite system, but we have nothat they da
J. Undetermined Missions
groups of satellites with as yet undetermined missions haveunder the Cosmos scries designation. One gioup consists. Recent information released by the Soviets describes afor registering primary cosmos radiation which was tested onWe believe, however, tint the primary mission of these vehicles ismilitary applicancnif"*
A second group ofwhow missions are not understood is cvsmprisecTof.. L_
[These four satellites were placed Intom. neur-cireular orbits ategrees inclination from Plesetsk.
AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTUREGeneral
Very early in its ballistic missile program, the USSR developed rugged boosters which permitted tho orbiting of heavy payloads in space. This payktad capability allowed the Soviets toumber of "firsts" and because of this capability they have not been compelled to develop lighter, miniaturizedThis engineering philosophy which was the strength of the carry program appears now to haveoint of diminishing returns and is fasttumbling block to successful competition with current US technology. The Soviets have not developed compact, lightweight, sophisticated spacecraft. This docs not imply that they will lie unable to accomplish their mission objectives, but it does mean that they will probably choose diBrreoj approaches than the US would use (or the same problems.
When we consider very sophisticated miirlons such as the accomplishmentanned lunar landing, the implications of this technological weakness bc-
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apparent II tho USSH continues on its demonstrated course ol heavyspacecraft design, multiple launches and orbital assembly will be required (or some missions. This choice of approach may be one reason for the apparent lack of Soviet interest in the lunarhange in Sovietdesign philosophy which would result in lighter, more sophisticated vehicles would require yrara of development before reliable hardware would lie available.
Energy Propellonts
Soviets continue to study and develop high energy propulsionlaunch vehicles.nost work on liquid hydrogen engines hasbeen conducted at the Zagorsk Rocket Engine Test Facility. Evidencethat static testing began earlyespite the evidence of workenergy fuels over the years, we are confident that Ihe Soviet programyet reached the flight test stage, which will probably not begin
Vehicles
SI-he Soviets haveew flexible and reliable space launch system, theated on tieCBM, ifwo stage vehicle which uses storable propellants. and can be bunched from either soft sites or silos. Il is used in thend the inaneuverable satellite programs.
Tlies capable ofounds into low earth orbit, but with an appropriate upper stage it could duplicate or eiceed capabilities of any of the current launch systems which use theooster. For example,ew storable propellant third stage it could0 pound payload in low earth orbit. If the Soviets were willing to sacrifice the desirable military characteristics of storable propellants andhird stage with cryogenic fuel, low earth orbital payloads of up0 pounds would be possible, because of Its operational flexibility, reliability, and performance characteristics, theay be the predominant launch system in. Theould also be usefulariety of military applications whichuick reaction capabibty.
heour-stage launch vehicle using conventionalandiftoff thrust of approximatelyillion pounds. This vehicle can place into earthounds,0 poundsunar trajectoryoundsrajectory to Mars or Venus. Theas initially launched innd has exhibited an extremely poor reliability record, havingut ofimes when flown in this con-figyration. In the planetary program it was used twice in0 in attempts to send probes to the planet Mars but both resulted in early in-flight failures. Inhree stage version of theas been used successfully on one occasion to launch Protonhe poor reliability record of (liehe Soviet's largest operational space launch vehicle, undoubtedly is cause for concern and has probably delayed the accomplishmentumber of Soviet space goals.
vrrbud photography during the past year has supported our earliero the characteristics ofooster. We continue to believe that conventional propeilants will be used in all stages in early launches of tho system. We believe that its first stage thrust isillion pounds which givesapability to placeounds in earth orbit and to eject0 poundsunar trajectory. High energy (liquid hydrogen/ liquid oxygen) upper stages, which could be used in later versions, would allowehicle to orbit payloads en the orderounds, about double its initial capability. This also means that it could placeoundsartian trajectory.
several occasions sincevehicle has beenon the pad while on other occasions the pad has Iscen empty,the Soviets are testing the erection and checkout facilities of thevehicle has not been flown but there ts no evidence that the programmajor technical difficulties. We do not know if static testingbeen accomplished. All facilities at aiea "J" that bio needed to supportol the new launch vehicle and payload appear to be complete. Thetest of the launch vehicle could take place at any time unlessreveals the need for significant design changes or other unforeseendevelop.
Systems
tracking and data acquisition capabilities from near earth orbitlite vicinity of the moon have been enhanced by several new spacecraftsystems. The mostasewtracking, command, and data acquisition system. The system isserve all of these functions out to lunar distancesingle UHFcombination on the spaced
^The system wasthe Zond missions
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Soviets haveimpn* and reliable automaticdocking system which was tested on the Soyut spacecraft. Thethat the vehicles to be doeied mi-.st previously be maneuveredcommand into coplanar orbits und broughtiles ofbefore the rendezvous is initialed, the target must be equippedand docking hardware, and must orient itself toward theterms of fuel consumption, the procedure is inefficient, but it is simpleIt docs not require an oo-board computer. To date all rendezvousand all but one docking operation have been successful.
TOT
There ere several likely near lerm applications of the aulomatic rendezvous ami clocking system. Whenocked, the Sovlels claimed that they had fulfilled the rendezvous techniques thai would be used to assemble space stations in earth orbit; they would also be used for resuppty of such stations and crew rotation. Moreover, the Soviets have indicated that rendezvous and docking would be used to assemble lunar and planetary spaceships in earth orbit.
The needooperating target limits ihe use of the automatic rendezvous ami docking technique In many applications such as rescue and In-orbit repair and maintenance. However, the Soyuz automatic rendezvous and docking system equipped with suitable sensors could be usedaneuver able satellite for passive targets.
the Soyuz and Zond programs the Soviets employed aerodynamictechniques similar to those used in the Cemini and Apollo missions.vehicle is designed torepiogrammed deceleration profile,calculated to reduce re-entry "g" loadings during re-entry and to provideover the point of landing. The Zond re-entry is more complicated.normally re-enters over the Indian Ocean, and Its lifting capabilityto move the landing point some five thousand miles north into theThe lifting re-entry techniquesesire to recover mannedin the Soviet Union rather than to rely regularlyaterThe ocean recovery capability is probably provided mainlyackup.
he prime electric power source for the Soyuz and the Zond is solar energy. Solar power, however, is inadequate for some in'-rplanetary missions and orbital missions having high continuous power requircinents in excess ofilowatts; nuclear powered systems will be required for such flights. The Soviets are actively engagedn various nuclear electricystems. By thes they coulduclear auxiliary power systemew kilowatts.
Soviets have made significant strides in improving the reliabilityplanetary spacecraft They are using an improved thermal controlalso are equlppiug spacecraft with redundant component subsystemsin the event of failure. In their discussions of the Venushethe first time mentioned the usepace simulator to cheek out thespacecraft before launch. Theseio:is should improveinsure better success in the future.
F. Nuclear Powor and Propulsion
Soviets appear to be developing nuclear powered electricalfor interplanetary flights, these systems could become operational. As yet. we have been unable to identify facilities completelynuclear rocket testing. There is very limited evidence that the Sovietsthe feasibilityas-core nuclear rocket engine. Theof technology required byystem will preclude itstin* period of this estimate.
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G. Life Support Systems
The Soviets have shown considerable interest in all the known approaches to spaceflight life .support, including open-cycle systems which utilize chemical storage of oxygen, partially regenerative systems for recovery of water and oxygen, and closed-cycle systems for recovery of oxygen, water, and food. An open-cycle system using chemicals as an oxygen source has been usedin all Soviet manned orbital flights to date, and probably will continue to be the major approach to life support in their manned spacecraft at leasthis systemikely choice for small Soviet space stations, early versions of larger stations, orbital ferry and supply missions, circumlunar flight, and early lunar landing and return missions. Capacity for storage of supplies in the Soyuz vehicle permit this spacecraft to maintain three men for one month.
Based on evidence acquired over the past year, we believe that the Soviets are capable of using current life support technology suitablepace stationounds and mannedrewor periods uponths.tation could be maintainedear with suitable rcsupply.
Within theears, the Soviets will probably develop advanced physical-chemical life support systems, particularly systems for regeneration of cabin environment and reclamation of human waste products. An operational system which will reclaim water from the cabin atmosphere and urine could be readyecause of the power requirements and other developmentalully integrated flight-qualified regenerative system for water and atmosphere recovery probably will not be availablerimary life support systemioregencrative systems, including food regeneration,will not he available0 at the earliest.
In the biosciences, the Soviets are still concerned about radiation hazards, buthave more confidence in their ability to cope with the natural radiation environment. However, problems arising from high energy solar flare events still exist. Soviet radiation safety standards for manned spaceflight have become less stringent in comparison with previous years, and permit increased radiation dosage levels for cosmonauts. At present the best spaceflight radiation protection is physical absorption shielding. This technique, however,evere weight penalty. Ihe Soviets can presently equip spacecraft with sufficient shielding for brief lunar missions without any severe solar flare activity. We do not know how the Soviets plan to cope with radiation hazards on long duration missions.
Stress adaptation to acceleration, weightlessness, vibration, psychological stress and vestibular disorientation have been the focus of an extensive research program. Longer Bights arc needed for further study of the problem especially in view of their expressed goal of extended earth orbital missions and deep space exploration. Although an element of risk exists, there is no known biomedical barrier that would prevent Soviet orbital flights up toays with present technology.
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Commend ond Control
he Sovieuncsr earth command and control network has improvedthe past ytar[_
onstruction at tne various tracking stationsontinuingof capability. All stations have had new antennas or bidldings completed during the last two years. Fadlities have been added to roost stations associated wilh the Soyuz program. What appear to be optical tracking facilities were added to the prime stations in the network and at Leningrad.
large scale investment has been made to upgrade the electronicssupport for lunararge parabolic antenna has beenis operating at Colenki in tlie Soviet Far East to supplement theafforded by the three new large antennas at Yevpatoriya in theantennas are believed to support the lunar spacecraft data andA major new electronics installation at Tyuratamargea very large control building under construction. This facility couldmission control center for the manned lunar landing program.
near earth and lunar mission support capabilities areby the Soviet space event support ship, the Cosmonaut
The Komarov has been stationed at Havana for circumlunar flights^ ^
makinghour coverageunar mission. This was first acHievS during theission.
Four other ships, converted timber carriers, were added to the Soviet space event support fleetheyew antenna system not previously seen on space support ships other than the Komarov. This system is widely deployed at groundalso have arrays which mayassive tracking function.
roup of support vessels was deployed in the Indian Ocean for space vehicle water recovery. One of them successfully recovered theapsule after its circumlunar flighthese ships, with electronicsfrom the new Soviel space event support ships, give theorkable water recovery capability.
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS A. General
Soviets showed an early recognition of the importance ofhave supported the space programavish scale. We believe (hatspace developments will depend npon resource allocations andlimitations. The limiting factor on tlie number and types of space ven-
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twres thai the Soviets will undertake in the near term will more likelyatter of authorized priorities than technical constraint.
Competition for vital resources, long evident in Soviet pob'tics. hassince the, when the marked slowdown in Soviet economic growth rate began. Despite the difficulties experienced by the Brezhnev and Kosygin regime in the establishment of workable national economic priorities, the industrial investment inas continued to grow. This of course is an indicator of the high priority awarded to the military and civilian space program.
The Soviets almost certainly established the goals and the approximate timetable for their space program some years ago. In doing so. theywished to maximize their imageeader in space aud their prestigeorld power. They probably continue to be politically motivated in thisand they may feel that during the next few years they must take steps to regain some of the prestige that they have lostesult of the highlyApollo program. Conversely, they may feci that some temporaryis in order and they may seek to effect economies. It maypeed up to meet new deadlines, but we consider it unlikely that they can, at this late date, effect any basic changes in the overall nature of the program for the next few years.
rganization
Secretary D. F. Ustinov, Candidate Member of the Politburo isfigure in the planning and allocation of resources for the Soviet spaceHe coordinates the program working through governmentaladvisory groups, and most importantly the Military-Industrialwhich is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. The centralfor the design production and performance of space hardware Isof General Machine Buildinghich presumably alsoefforts of other contributing industrial ministries. These ministries appearno responsibilities for policy formulation and decision-making, buta role similar to that of contractors responding to requirements of theMinistry of Defense, Academy of Sciences, Ministry ofand the Chief Directorate of Hydrometcorological Services.
C. Economics
estimate that expenditures on lite Soviet space programut that the growth rate has been declining since then.reached4 billion markose to5 billion84 billion in equivalent US program costs.in expenditure growth rates5 can be attributedthe reduced requirement for heavy outlays for new large launch vehiclesfacilities. This trend is expected to continueew generation of
ECRET
"FOP GCCRCT
boosters is needed, posnbly in. We are unable loearion between military and cml space rjpmdiimn
Any projection ot* the level of Soviet eapeoditurea (orubjectairly wide range of lancertainty. Space programs require many of the same type of high quality resources as are required for strategic military programs and for economic growth. Considering the other demands for such resources, and tho indications we now have of Soviet space programs, it Is unlikely that Soviet space expenditures will be appreciably higher during the next few years than they now arc
The current successes of the US in space will probably motivate the Soviets to continue to commit large sums to space even if there is no direct racethe two countries for specific accomplishments. 'Hie vigorous pace of activity8 and to far9 suggests that the high priority of the spacehas not been reduced. Consequently, annual spending3 wiD probably not faD below the present estimated level8 billion
IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS
Our near term projections are based where possible on the extension of current trends in the Soviet space progiam. Some projections can be forecast based on the characteristics of flight hardware now under development Other projects are indicated by the construction of new launch sites and elcctroriics
The Soviets In their many txEcial and unofficial statements about their space program have given no indication of the order of priorities in their space program. In arriving at likely dates for specific millions, we haveigh level of successriorities structure projected from past efforts. Delays and failures, of course, can occur at any lime, especially when new hardware is tested and first becomes operational. Failures of this type could ddayear or two.
Lunar landing
judgment In earlier estimates that the Soviet manned lunarwas not competitive with tlie US Apollo schedule has beendevelopments of the last two yens. We liad assumed that flight testsarea J" space booster would begin immediately after completion offacilities inut the first Eight has not yet taken place.setbacks in thelight program have delayed the developrneotcapabilities. For these reasons, we believe thata high risklanding attempt0 can be ruled out.
lie Memorandum to Holders of. "The Soviet Spaceatedgresented the reasons for believing that the Soviet rnanned LfQfA. tut
f <J1 1
landing mission would itemize two launches fromollowed by rendezvous in earth or lunar orbit. Wo believe that tho most likely mode of Soviet manned lunar landing will involve Ihe rendezvous and docking of two "J" launched payloads in earth orbit followed by election of the lunar package toward the moon.
the complicated configuration ofehicle and theprocess probably involved in its production, we believe that thenow have two vehicles completed and that they will be able toa maximum production rate of four per year over the next few years.of activities at area "J" does not suggest any degree of urgency.all these factors, we estimateanned lunar landing is notoccur2 although1 cannot be ruled oat
C. Manned Space Station
Open sources in the USSR continue to emphasize the MtabUshrncat of manned orbital space stations toariety of functions. Statedinclude biomedical and geoaatrophysical research studies, communications services, development of bases to service satellite systems, and establishment of staging platforms for assembly and launch of lunar and interplanetaryThe Soviets stated aim is to eventuallyermanent. mu'Hptjrposc orbital base, but prior to that, the Soviets apparently plan to orbit manned or-bital laboratories with highly specialized tasks, including an astionomlcal
In theirxperiments, the Soviets have demonstrated the basic techniques forpace station in orbit They could build on this capability topace station that would consistoyuz dockedpacecraft similaroyuz but designed primarily for support.evelopment would require modification to the Soyuz to pennit direct passage from one craft to the other. Byevelopment the Soviets couldan space station for up toays. We believe0 would be the earliest that this mission could be attempted.
Using thelie Soviets couldonsiderably larger spec station;tation could weigh up0 pounds. One choice would be to launch the vehicle unmanned aod use the Soyuz crafterry vehicle to in hi the station. Ihe length cf the missionlu WMbm of MS in thepace station of thisould provide considerably more space for men. equipment, and supplies Another less likely alternative would be to launch the space station with the crew aboard, lit either case the Soyuzcould be used lo resuppry the space station and to exchange the crew so ai to extend the mission duration. We estimate either of thesecould be flown by the.
We continue to believe that the Soviet space program includes plans toery largo manned space slation to carryariety ol activities over extended periods. Wo do not believe thatpare station program will be attrnipted concurrently with the manned lunar landing program, and we be-
I OP liifWr
lieve thai the lunar program wflj be given priority. Thus, an attempt toery large Jpace station will probably not occur before the. At that time withunch vehicle Ihey couldound station in earth
orbit.
is the possibility that in one of the early tests ofehiclewillarge vehicle in orbit and cbim tliat itpacethe state of the art however,tation would lack tlieand lit* life support system required toarge crow inlong periods of time. It is conceivable, but we think it highly unlikelywould launchtationpeetacubr.aunchtepore sophisticated space station. An additionalbe for tlie Soviets loery large vehicle which could usesystems for water and oxygen but which would still require extensiveferry vehicles if any significant number of personnel were to remain inextended periods. We estimate thatpace station could not beorbit5 or bter. Since the retirement for totationlimited capabilitki Is difficult to envisage at this tlrne it Is possibleSoviets will await the availabilityully closed water, air, and foodlife support system which we estimate will be avaibble
Circumlunar
previous estimates we judged it likely that the Soviets wouldsimple manned circumlunar. one which would loop aroundand return directly lo earth. The success of the Apollo P'opam,removed the piimary incentive for such an attemptpectacular.appears lo be little reason for attemptingission lo collectto the manned lunar landing mission; there would be little towhat the Soviets already know about the problems involved. Forwe now think il unlikely that the Soviets willannedmillion of the type described above.
lunar Obiter
is much that the Soviets could gainanned lunarthat would be applicable to their manned lunar landing program;things they could test the restart capability of their engines andprecisely select tlie desired landing site for the lunar landing mission.that they will undertakeission but, since2unar orbital mission, they will have to wait until theready. We Itelieve thatould be tlie earliest that such anbo made.
tunor and Planetary Probes
The next phase of the unmanned lunar program will verythe resumption of lunar soft Undings taxing thehean deliver
a packageounds to the vicinity of the moon, which could land several hundred pounds of useful payload on the surface of the moon. The main purpose of theoft landiog program will probably be to test soft landing techniques suitable for mannedystem for landing anypayload.anned one, must control not only vertical velocity but also horizontal velocity and attitude to order to ensure that the payload remains upright after touchdown. This is almost certain toystem of legs and shock absorbers in addition to throttlcable engines, three axis attitudeand radar sensors to measure horizontal as well as vertical velocity. No Soviet soft landers have exhibited these capabilities. Most of these subsystems are new to the Soviet lunar program and will require thorough testing before being qualified for manned flight.
French-Soviet cooperation has indicated the existenceew lunar soft-landing project. Itew spacecraft, reportedly larger and heavier thanrnd willonger active lifetime. Any spacecraft significantly larger thanould have to be launched by therench-Soviet talks have included two classes of experiments which could be involved in the lander program. One involves experiments to investigate any traces of diffuse lunar atmosphere, and the other involves laser optical tracking of lunar payloads equipped with reflectors. The earliest launch date implied by the negotiations would he late
Several missions would be possibleoftapsule containing samples of the lunar surface could be sent back toarge package of scientific instruments could be operated on the moon's surface for an extendedheeled or tracked vehicle could be deployed to explore the vicinity of the landing site. There could be as many as two or three soft landing missions within the next year.
Venus. The Soviets are also planning an advanced Venus project inwith French scientists. The plan is to release multiple capsules which willalloon toensor package in the atmosphere of Venus. The mission willaunch vehicle. The project could beas earlyut developmental problems with therench contribution, could delay ithe Soviets are probably alsoapsule that can better withstand the environment on the surface of Venus; it could be available inin time for the next launch window, when the Soviets will probably attempt the next launch to Venus.
Mars. With theaunch vehicle Ihe Soviets could softlandounds on the surface of Mars. The first landing wouldcientiGc spectacular of considerable impact and for this reason the mission is likely to have relatively high priority. We believe that the Soviets will attempt an unmanned Mars landingc next launch windosvc do not anticipate furtherars Gy-by attempts, although they are easily within Soviet capabilities.
Planets. The Sovietsapability tot relatively low cost by using the SiL-fienusould be used for direct flightsutission wouldto have relatively low priority compared to Venus. Mars, and lunarWe believe that during the neat decade the Soviet planetarybe expanded to include Jupiter as well as Mercury.
G. Applied Satellites
Satellites. We believe that the Soviets will continuethehour orbit with an upgraded Molniya satellite into theat least. They will probably change to higher frequencies whichchannel capacity, allow simultaneous use for television andimprove the satellite's efficiency. The satellite will also probably bea multiple access capability.
Another step in the Molniya system improvement program will be the additionransrnittujg capability for the Orbita terminals. This step will probably be undertaken gradually starting with terminals serving critical civilian and military communications needs. Assuming the Molniya isultiple access capability, Orbita terminals will then be able to handle two-way telephone and telegraph traffic in addition to television and facsimile reception.
In the near future Molniya satellites will probably be used to disseminate data in teletype form via the Orbita stations. They will also probably transmit weather maps and other pictorial data by photofacsimile. facsimile tests have already begun. Eventually, as the Molniya system is upgraded, high-data-rate digital systems may be included.
There is evidence that the Soviets are planning to launch an equatorial synchronous communications satellite to be stationed over the Indian Ocean. We believe that the launching, which woulds planned forime period. The satellite could be made useable by all present Intelsat members without ground station equipment modifications if there were agreement to doynchronous satellilc would be valuable to the Sovietshour service across the southern half of the USSR and for other specialized communications such as space support in the Indian Ocean.
The Soviets are not likely to begin tests of broadcast television systems which do not require ground relay stations in the near future. Test satellite launchings would requireehicles or larger. If the Soviets were interested, they could begin such tests inime period.
McteoTolo&cal Satellites. The Soviets will probablyew meteor-ological satellite system within the next two years lo replace the present Meteor system. We anticipate that this new system will use two to three satellites in highircular orbits and that these vehicles will be launchedate of four per year. The Soviets will probably develop more sophisticated instrumentation to conduct additional observations such as ice rerjonnaissance.
top mcw
satellites will probably irxhrde radar for detecting preesmtatjoa and at-rnosphcrica detectors for locating tbor-lerrtorrn activity.
arth Resources Surveyew agency rimortedly has been established to study the use of satellites for terrestrial research. The types of experiments being considered by the Soviets appear to parallel those which have been suggested for the US earth resources satellites. Photography (black and wldte. color and multispeelrul) would be used for hydrologlcal, glado-logical, oceanographic. geological, and agricultural surveys. In addition,is being considered for mineraiogical and botanical Investigations. Radar has been considered for terrain and geological studios. Some of these sensors are available to fly any time, others will require considerableand may not be ready0 at the earnest
eodetic Satellites. Although Soviet officials occasionally have alluded to the existenceeodetic satellite program, it has not been possible to confirm that any of their launches to date have Itad geodesyrimary mission. Ono of the uses ofystem would be to improve targeting accuracy. The Soviets have not launched any passive geodetic satellites such as the US Echo and Pageos balloon satellites.]
3
H. Military Uses of Space *
econnaissance Systems. Reconnaissance systems currently In use will probably continue to be operated at about the present rate of about three per month for the next year or so. In view of the apparent limited capabilities of existing Flint systems, we believe the Soviets will develop more advancedreconnaissance satellites There is evidence that modification! to the present photographic system have been introduced to more closely central the orbital period of these vehicles and to extend their lifetime. No completely newsystems arc expected in Ihe next lew years, but some reconnaissance both visual and electronic will probably be carried out from manned platforms after large space stations become operational.
arly Warning Systems, If the Soviets intended topaccbome ballistic missile early warning system,ystem could be operational in the. Necessary infrared background measurements and the development of advanced Infrared sensors are continuing under the meteorological satellite program and could be appliedissile early warning system.
Much of the (pace lecfocfagyhardware cuneMh- bemg toted by uW Soma* llW baia fee (heJi
uture ipaeeaibililr will It doomed in, 'Soviel Strategic Attacknd NIEiratcaxlnuMubrf later tiiu
TOPCT
75
Satellites. Wc believe that (he Soviets will deploy >satellite system to support their naval and merchant fleets and ingrowing ballistic missile submarine force. It will probably consist ofsatellites deployed at high inclination in near circular orbits In much the
same way as the US Navy's navigation satellites. Wc estimate that it will become operational.
I. Unmanned Earth Orbital Exploration
anticipate little change In the unmanned, earth orbital scientificEnvironmental satellites will probably continue to be launched atrate of six per year, and specialized satellites such as the Protonrate of about one per year. Wc believeignificant portion ofscience program will be performed on manned satellites,space stations become operational. Future studies of ionosphericand near-earth optical radiation will continue to have aof important applications which fall principally into threecommunication, and missile launch detection and tracking. Manyobjectives have been and will continue to be carried out by theand Plesetsk <mvironn.cntal Cosmos program. Additional satellites mayfrom Tyuratam to collect scientific data at great distances from earth.
J. Long Term Prospects
If the Soviet statementsalid indicator of their long-term interests their manned lunar program lias from its inception been directed at goals beyond the manned landing. We feci the Soviets are committedollow-on program ot manned and unmanned lunar exploration extending well beyond5 timeajor goal of this program could be tounar base, which if not manned continuously, would function automatically between visits and thusermanent Soviet presence on the moon.
The high energyehicJc will probably be availableo. It would be capable of performing single launch, direct flight, manned lunar landing missions. Thus some ofehicle production would be freed for other applications.50ehfcles could be high energy and support the lunar program, and others could be convenrionaUy fueled and support earth orbit missions. Missions for the "very large" space station could include qualification of hardware and development of technologies to support manned planetary programs.
9S. None of the piejerrtly available launch vehicles, includingaunch vehicle, is capable of sending probes to jupitcr without major .rwdilkation. Croat improvement in spacecraft systems, and their reliability will have io be achieved if the Soviets intend torobe to Jupiter or toGrandission, windows for which occurnd not again
uanor. Include fiyby ot fuplte.nd Neptune.
9
yours. While wc believe that (he Soviets desire lo By such missions, we have no evidence Indicating Soviet plans or scheduling. In any event wc do notJupiter mi toons any rax her than thes.
Wc do not believe that the Soviets are planning to accomplish manned planetary exploration during the time frame of (his estimate. However, Soviet development during the neatears could contributeapability to launch manned vehicles from an orbital space station bunch platform and eventually lead to manned exploration of the planets. The Soviets may have underwayprograms that could converge0 toignificant capability toward manned interplanetary flight. Because of their proximity to earth, missions lo Mars and Venus would be the least difficult, and because its environment is less hostile lo man, we think that Mars would be theof the first manned planetary missions.
No doubt economic issues are limiting the amount of effort that can be expended in planetary programs, andanned planetary program conductedrash basts wouldery restrictive cost which could be prohibitive.ong-term program aimed at the planets could be stretched out to involve little increase over current annuut funding,rogram could also be justified because hardware developed would he applicable to many other earth orbital and lunar missions. This couldart ofyear program of scientific research announced by lite Soviets
V. INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION
the past, cooperation in space endeavors between the Sovietsnations has been very limited largely because of the Sovietsecurity. The few space agreements which the Soviets have enteredpaid off well by providing useful data that they could not otherwisebecause of technical or geographic limitations. In the agreement withto exchange satellite weather data, for example, the Soviets receivethan thoy give. Much useful geophysical information has beenthe French under the Franco-Soviet program for joint balloon androcket launchers from Sogra and the Kcrguelen Islands. Since JanuaryFrench have also been providing data on solar disturbances under anto exchange information between thenstitute of Terrestrialand France's Meudon Observatory.
The Soviets have tried to establish both optical and electronic facilities throughout the world and recovery facilitiesariety of locations in theOcean. So far they have had little success They have established optical facilities in Egypt, Somalia, Cuba, and piobably tho Antarctic. They have not established any ground band electronic tracking outside of tho Soviet Union.
There are three factors which would tend to limit the extent of Soviet cooperation with the US In space. First, the prestige of being the first nation to accomplish various space missions continues to be important to the USSR. Site-
-for GCCRcr-
ond, the prospective gain in cooperating Ixn/ond the exchange o( idenliGe and technical data would have to be very enticing as long as major international political issues between the two powers remain unresolved. Third, the close association of military and civilian tpace programs in the USSR would restrict the areas of cooperation which the Soviets would be willing to consider. If the advantages to be gained are persuasive, the Soviets may agree to some joint ventures suchommunications systemarge portion of the globeorldwide meteorological system. We consider it unlikely, however, that within the period of this estimate the Soviets will be wiUing to ceoperate to the extent ol exchanging space hardware.
t Is possible that the Soviets will become more cooperative as time goes by and as various space programs progress. They might agree, for example,ivision of some exploratory venture) between the US and the USSR- The Soviet decision to attend the Intelsat conference in'J suggests that they may be interested in some form of cooperation in internationaleffort. This may be indicative of expanding cooperative efforts in other fields in the future. As the cost of space ventures increase, especially those to distant planets, tho Soviets may be willing to participate in an international space exploration program sponsoredroup of nations, eg, one under the aegis of the UN.
ioi' SEcro-
SOVIET CHRONOLOCICAL SPACE LOG FOR THE PERIOD7 THROUGH9
Sorter
Datt
r.1TO*
Jan
Jan
Feb
Soyui
Feb
Feb
Feb
Reconnaissance
Feb
raoi
Feb
Success
Mar
Mar
Vehicle Test
Mar
Mar
Mm
Mar
nee
Mar
Mar
Mar
Apr
Apr
mo*
Vehicle Test
Apr
Issancc
Apr
I
Satellite
during
Apr
156
May
157
May
158
May
May
160
May
161
nee
May
1/5
June
June
163
June
June
4
to Veuus
June
165
June
166
June
to Venus
June
ci viun ce
July
July
July
July
mas
Auj-
171
Aug
172
Aug
Aug
174
area Hons
Sept
Sept
Sept
176
32
CoMtMiei)
Sovot
OAir.
Sept
177
Sepl
178
Sepi
179
180
Oct
1/6
ii li illi.iii
Oct
181
Mm i
Oct
n.
mam
Oct
182
Oct
183
Oct
1/7
Oel
164
0c(
185
Oct
186
Capsule (used In
I'ndnvou* and doelinr)
Oct
157
Oct
168
Capsule (used in irnkmvi utd dot&SW)
Oct
!8S
No*
Nov
191
Nov
IVohe
Nov
192
Nov
193
Dec
1W
Do,
193
Dee
Dec
!S7
Dec
198
*TiXitmt
Jan
199
Jan
203
Feb
201
Feb
rrultr
Pch
302
203
Mar
4
Simulation
Success
Mar
204
.. 11
Succeu
Mar
103
Mar
Mm
SOS
Mar
207
Mar
203
Mar
209
Mar
Scientific
Apr
210
usance
Apr
14
Oibtlrr
Apr
gnu
Apr
212
Sovux
ADol uu*appeared wmJd core* fr-cnOy/rrro^TY
s,r- t
CoiMifiued)
not.
An.
113
Sojvi. Docked
Coimci tH
Apr
214
Apr
215
Apr
216
Apr
1/8
Apr
Apr
217
table
Success
Apr
218
Apr
219
May
220
May
221
May
222
Jusir
223
June
224
usance
June
225
leiUlfk
226
J.ne
Vmknow* Paykaad
jw
227
Jul-
-
22S
Jun*
229
Jurr
230
July
1/9
Jul,
231
*
July
232
July
233
July
234
l*iu nee
Auk
23S
All|
236
nknown Payload
Aug
237
Auk
238
Soyur.
Sep!
239
nam ante
Sept
240
Sept
5
Sept
241
242
1*1
Sept
243
Oct
>>s
244
Oct
245
Oct
On
246
in. usance
Oct
247
Oct
248
able
Oct
240
Oct
2
Capsule
Oct
3
unci Cu|miMi
Succes.
Oct
250
Unknown Payload
Oct
251
able Reconnaissance
Nuv
252
able
Nov
6
Nov
253
c
34
TAKLE Iontinued)
Nov 8
i
Nov 8
234
1 -1 1
Nov 8
255
Nov 8
238
Dec 8
237
IV, 8
238
ounce
Dec 8
159
Dec 8
200
Soccea*
Dec 8
28)
Dec 8
262
Jan 9
5
I jmler
Jan 9
0
Lander
Jau 9
283
si anre
Jan 9
4
Capsule
fan 9
S
Capsule; Docked
Soyua 4
Jan 9
Jan 0
284
Jan 9
Feb 9
Feb 9
203
oca
Feb 9
208
iisi nee
Feb 9
list nee
Mai 9
288
Mar 9
2M
Unknown Payload
Mar 9
270
Mar 9
271
stance
Mar 9
272
Mar 9
173
Mai 9
274
Mar 9
Mai 9
Probe
Mar 9
27S
Reooe
Apr 9
Pioba
Apr 9
270
STI
Apr 9
t78
nee
Apr 9
ions
Apr 9
279
i
Apr 9
280
Recoaiaauace.
May9
281
9
282
icons
May0
283
9
28*
n sanee
June9
285
June9
Probe
June9
288
Achieved obit but no wuriunlcattoiB.
TOP flCCHCT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG
79
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