DCI
of
Central
Intelligence
! i
National Intelligence Estimate
Iraqi Military Capabilities9
This National Intelligence Estimateviews of the Director of Centralthe advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
Iraqi Military Capabilities9 V
Prepared under Ihe auspices ofMG John Landry, USAational Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. Inquiries may be directed to General LandryV-
Key Judgments
Iraqi Military Capabilities9
Despite an impressive military rcconstitulion effort under difficult circumstances since Desert Storm, Iraq's armed forces retain critical weaknesses. Baghdad will be unwilling and probably unable to engage in significant mililary operations outside the country as long as UN sanctions remain in place and working; Iraq's leadershipa strong US military capability and commitment to maintaining regional stability; and Iraqi forces are occupied wjih internal securitycountering the Kurds, suppressing the Shia, and pro-
tecting
Nevertlwless. Iraq willource of immediate concernotential long-term threat. strategic interests in the Persian Gulf for the rest of this decade.for that matter, any likelyhold to ihe objectives of reasserting Baghdad'sover all of Iraq, regaining domination of Kuwait, and achieving regionaltrong military is critical to all these goals.
Hie Current Situation
The Iraqi military today comprises fewer units, personnel,and has generally older and more badly worn weaponsthant also is less able to sustain itself and isin its ability to redeploy large numbers of divisionsIraq's military continues io suffer from shortfalls inleadership, doctrine, flexibility, and command and
These shortfalls reduce but do not eliminate Iraq's potentialegional threat. The current force is capable of overwhelming internal opposition, and it can effectively repel any potential regionalIraq probably could alsoivision-sized forcehort-duration, limited-objective raid to destroy or damage oil and water
Working Premises
Iraq will remain united and led by Saddamike-mindedIraq's leaders/up will not alter its basic policy goals.
Iran will remain united and stable. Iran and Iraq will remainrivals and an overall mditary parity will exist betweenhey will not engage in another major war with each other. Iran will not assist Iraq during any regional conflict.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will remain stable. In the event of ah Iraqi attack on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will remain committedoalition to thwart Iraqi aggression, and accepting of US operations in the region.
World oil prices will remain relatively stable.
facilities in Kuwait. Moreover, without significant and timelyfrom Western forces, Iraq's military could overwhelm Kuwaitorps-level assault] )
If Iraq were able to secure Kuwait, it couldivision-sized punitive raid into northeastern Saudi Arabia. Overall, however, we judge Iraqi ground forces to be incapable loday, even if opposed only by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces, of quickly extending corps-level operations far enough into Saudi Arabia to threaten most Saudi oil facilities.| )
Iraq's FutureVariables
Relaxing UN Trade Sanctions. The minimum requirement for real improvement in Iraqi military capability for (lie rest of this decade is the modification or removal of the ban on Iraqi imports andparticularly exports of oil. If these trade sanctions were lifted. Iraqi defense spending would increase, and force readiness and sustainmcnt would improve. However, as long as the arms embargo remained in place. Baghdad's offensive capabilities would only marginally increase. From Iraq's perspective, this would probably represent aforce development scenario. Despite some improvement. Iraq's armed forces would continue to suffer from systemic wcak-
Circumventing the UN Arms Embargo. The removal of tradewould be the first step toward de facto elimination of the UN arms embargo. Once trade suctions were lifted, tlic arms embargo probably would unravel gradually and would likely becomeconventionallater1
If Iraq were able to circumvent existing arms sanctions early enough, it could substantially modernize iu conventional weaponsn this relatively unconstrained force development scenario, Baghdad's acquisitionorder ofwould be: ground-based air defenses, ground forces armor and fire support, modern aircraft, and naval antiship capabilities. Actualwould depend on Iraq's economic status, and the availability of
A modernized Iraqi military would be able to seize and hold Kuwait and wouldair chance of extending an attack to critical oil and water facilities in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, if opposed only by tbe GCC. However, even this improved force would not be as large and is not likely to be as capable overall as the forces that took
1 HomtvCT. tvtn ia ihii KtMnO.iidy ihu the UN monMomig and inipcviioii o/
Kuwailoreover, i! would continue to suffer from criticalair warfare, leadership, doctrine, flexibility, and command and controlwould limit its effectiveness against Western forces. I
The Bottom Line
Although Saddam is looking for opportunities to exact revenge on Kuwait and principal members of the Desert Storm coalition, he is unlikely toesert Storm scenarioorce much less capable than the one that took Kuwaithe dynamics thatwould consider beforeuture invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would include:
The size and visibility of US military forces in the region. Baghdad would evaluate the size of US forces in the region before attacking any GCC states, but more important would be its perception of the US commitment to move additional forces quickly to the area to protect the Gulf states]-
The status of the UN sanctions and arms embargo. Saddam is unlikely to embark on any external military campaigns as long as he isonciliatory campaign to get UN restrictions lifted. If sanctions were lifted or Saddam gave up hope that sanctions would be lined, chances of new military initiatives would increase.
Resolution of Ihe Kurdish situation. Almost two-thirds of the Iraqi military is now deployed in the north. Baghdad could deploy most of these forces to its southern border if the Kurdish provinces were returned to its control or if it changed its strategy in the north to only protecting northern Iraqi cities.
Tlte status of Iraq's military forces. Receipt of newer generation equipment would increase Iraq's military capability, but its current military shortfalls are not likely to be fully overcome. For the rest of the decade. Iraq's overall military capability is likely to remain well below prc-Desert Storm levels.
Discussion
years
Iraq:ut Still Dangerous
Gulf war. Saddam
anef me
ilusscin remains besieged and vulnerable, bul retains considerable capacity to withstand the pressures confronting his regime. He isby internal intrigue and insurgency,impoverished and isolated, and stripped of an ability to significantly reconsu-lute his military bj rite ana) of UN sanctions (seee appears, however, to haveresources and skill to survive the next year, and his prospects for staying in power for much longer would increase if sanctions were
Iraq remains un immediate source of concernong-term threat to US strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Saddam is implacably opposed to US influence in the region, and determined to avenge the Gulf war defeat, to restore his authority over all of Iraq, to restore Iraq's domination over Kuwait, andto achieve regional supremacy!
Even if Suddam is ousted, the successor regime, which probably wouldroduct of the same broad political culture, would likely pursue similar policies. Over the longerore moderate Iraqi leadership could emerge seeking rapprochement with the Araband the United Stales. However, thereood chance thai through Ihc period of ihis
Set NIEraiprdsja/ Iraq: Saddam aad HtyaadO,. lordetailed diwinslon of Saddam'i political proqicct* und Iraq's economic mi internal iccurily
n.ri.T. '
Estimate, Iraq will remain openly hostile and confrontational toward the United States, besei with internal problems, isolated, and bent on rearmament, f"
Near-Term Objectives and Policies
Saddam's capabilities to pursue his objectives arc constrained at present by UN sanctions, continuing domesticrippled economy, an enormous debt, and theof operational constraints such as the no-fly zones, 'nius. Iraq's most immediate goals arc to obtain relief from economicas few residual conditions asto reassert complete control over Iraqi territory. Saddam's strategy to achieve these objectives has been persistent and direct including:
Offering inducements to several slates to gain their support for casing, lifting, orsanctions.
Establishing the means lo rapidly importund military goods once economic and urms sanctions are lifted.
Reconstituting key elements of Iraq'sbase.
Isolating and grinding down the insurgents.
Portraying Iraq as an essential counterweight to Ihc growing strength of Iran and of militant Islam lo win sympathy for casingsanctions. i
Selected UN Resolutions on Iraq
UN sanctions and monitoring efforts that most constrain Iraqi military reconstitutum are set out in UN, and
3ontains three basican on the import ofand products from Iraq (includingan on the sale or supply to Iraq of convnodities or products;an on the transfer of arms und related material to Iraq.also stipulates that before any of these restrictions are lifted, the UNCouncil must agree that Iraq has accepted the destruction, removal, or renderingof all:
Nuclear, chemical, and biologicaland stocks of agents.
Rehited research, development, support, manufacturing, production, or repair
Ballistic missilesange greater than
equires Iraq to: biological weapons and ballistic missile programs and related facilities.
Allow UN inspectors unconditional andaccess to till areas, facilities, equipment, records and means ofthat they may wish to'i^^uMi^
Cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of. anyor equipment relating to these
r
Hall all nuclear activities of any kind,the use of isotopes for medical, af cultural, or industrial purposesl
equires Iraq to accept obligations imder the UN plan for ihe ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with. Monitoring and verification it to lie accomplished through inspections, aerial overflights, imd the provision of information by Iraq. The UN plan calls for the creationechanism by which Iraq and its trade partners would provide advance notice of the sale or supply of dual-use items to Iraq]
Provide full, final, andcomplete disclosure of all aspects of its nuclear, chemical, and
ability to pursue his aimstrong mililary. For that reason, he has given priority to rebuilding both the armed forces and tlte defense industrial basc.l
Rebuilding the Iraqi Mililary
Iraq's initial military rcconstitution effortson redistributing equipment andmilitary units to suppress widespread
uprisings, including some rebellions in regular Army units. Only after these internal conflicts had been contained, in1 andould Saddam begin an orderly program of miliury rtconstituliOQ-|
FirstReliable Force. Saddam's immediate step after the war was tooyal military that would help protect his regime, while remaining firmly under hisHe shuffled critical ministers, mostofficers, and many midgradc officers. Reliance on the Republican Guard wasand Guard cadres were dispatched to those regular Army units thai needed shoring up. Finally. Saddam deactivated the independent Kurdish National Defense Brigades,because of their uncertain loyally, and reduced the Ba'th Party militia.
Despite these moves. Saddam has nolotally reliable and loyal force.
lreport that recurrent coup attempts, some involving Special Republican Guard and regular Army officers, have been foiled in the past two years. Moreover, while morale isin elite units, most of Saddam's regular forces suffer low moraleesertionBecause regime survival remains hisgoal, wc expect Saddam to continue to emphasize personal loyalty over military competence
Weapons of MassOperations. UN inspections have seriously damaged Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. However, Baghdad hassome key equipment and retains much of lhc technology infrastructure to continue the development of these programs.!-
Iraq lias been required to surrender equipment and materials associated with its two most advanced uranium enrichment programs and
has giveney facility that was to benuclear weapons development andUN inspectors have destroyedchemical munitions andmillion liters ofCW agents andsurrendered by Iraq. They havedismantled the main CW facilityUN inspectors also havedestruction ofcud ormissiles and have dismantled key partssolid-propellant missile program. Inonly Iraq's BW programserious damage, j
These setbacks notwithstanding, Saddam is determined to rebuild at least portions of Iraq's special weapons programs. Wc estimate thai, during, Iraq spent billions of dollars on WMD programs. Iraq's extended-range Scuds and chemical munitions served it well in its war with Iran. Despite improved cooperation with UN inspectors recently.]
|rcport that Saddam is ignoringpecial-weapons-related obligations under UNnd continues loweapons-related components andfor future use. The Iruqis. for example, removed nuclcar-rclaicd equipment andassociaicd with Iruq's gas centrifuge ura-nnin cnnchineni programajor engineering and design facility before it could be visited by UN teams. In our judgment, wilh concealed components of its special weapons programs in place, and the largest scientific and technical base in the Middle East (outside ofaghdad could revitalize iis WMD programs and even begin limited production of chemical and biological agents and perhaps short-range ballistic missiles almostafter UN sanctions, inspections, andefforts were ended. |
t
Missiles.
report (rial Iraqesidual inventory of Scud or Scud-variant missiles. Theselack specificity on the number andof Iraq's hidden Scuds, but, takenhole, they point to an Iraqi effort to conceal Scud missiles. We judge lhat Iraq has been able to hideperhaps severalScud-type ballistic missiles, alongmall number of homemade mobile launchers, some warheads, propellant slocks, andequipment. Iraq probably has some chemical warheads and may have biological warheads as well. Iraq could probablymall number of the concealedon short notice, but additional launches would be limited by the lack of availablelaunchers, propellant supplies, and other logistical constraints.
By the start of Desert Storm, Iraq had pu( in place much of the infrastructure required to begin the manufacture of Scud-type ballistic missiles, as well as components for longer range solid propellant missiles. Iraq has been able to conceal some of itsproduced and foreign-made missile components, as well as tooling andequipment. These remain unaccounted for despite several years of inspections. Moreover, Baghdad's missile design andengineering staffs, along with the expertise developed since the, remain present and available for future use. Finally, Baghdad is probably usingderived from the development ofmissiles allowed by the UN to advance manufacturing expertise for prohibitedprograms. I-
jbeforc or during the Gulf war Iraq dispersed nearlyerceni of Ihe reactor ves-sels used in its CW program, andi
[reports thai Iraq maybe concealing equipment usedroduce andgents for weapons use. Wc judge lhat Iraq is hiding unspecified amounts ofchemicals that could be used to resume CW agent production.
line Iraqis have
removed all of the equipment from the one undamaged large-scale chemical production building at the Samaria' CW complex and have never fully accounted for thisEquipment appears to be missing from several other partly damaged chemical production buildings]
Iraq could resume production of chemical weapons agents at known facilities within months of cessation of UN intrusiveand monitoring efforts. Our analysis of Iraq's chemical industry suggests tha(could make several hundred ions of mustard agent and, depending on (heof precursorimilar quantity of nerve agentear.l
Chemical weapons. Reconstituting itsweapons programigh priority for the current regime.!
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Iraqi Warfighling Capabilities
or Saudi Arabia. Die (nidi are very good that Iraq would launch conventionally armed Scud missiles against civilian ortargets. Iraq's Scutt missile attacksthe Persian Gulf war were atignificant distractiim to coalition forces, and the Iraqis would anticipate similar successuture war with US or GCC forces. InBaghdad might judge thai Iraqi aircraft would stand no better chance titan they did in Desert Storm of reaching high-value civilian or military targets in Saudi Arabia,the motivation to use Sauls.
J
tn Iraqi for Scud "attacks" against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during an Iraqinto Kuwait.
We cannot rule out Saddam's wUlingness to use some of Iraq's remaining chemical orweapons in an attack on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. He mighthemically armed Scud, for example,eans of at
importantfacility, such as IJIuilirun airbaseor the Al Jubayl port. Alternatively, he might see an anthrax strikeeans of scaringease fire. We can envision two key factors that would influence his decision:
The strength of US or coalitionWc believe Saddam was prepared to use chemical munitions during the Persian
Gulf war but opted not to in part because of warnings by the United States and others late overwhelmingly to Such warnings on Saddam in a
the event that Saddam saw very little risk of provokingretaliation, there would be at least an even chance lhat he would order the use of chemical or budogical weapons.
The likelihoodegime-threateningSaddam's willingness to riskwould increase if he calculatedor biological weaponsonly means to prevent aexam-
ple, thai Saddam cYJttUUTVtT brdering tlie use of chemical weapons during the late stages of ihe Persian Gulf war but chose not to because coalition ground forcesfar from Baghdad.
would have ordered the use oj chemical weapons if coalition forces liad moved inio central Iraq
It is unlikely thai Saddam would order the use of unconventional weapons lo attack Iraq's neighbors outsideeneral war scenario as long as UN weapons monitoring continued. Such attacks would expose Iraq'swith UN resolutions and would risk the reimposition of economic sanctions]
that will produce nutrients for animal food, could easily be converted to producewarfare agents. Elsewhere, UN inspectorsreviously undeclared facility lhat the Iraqis claim will be used to produce castor oil for brake fluid. UN inspectorshowever, that the plant can produce ricinotent BW agent.
Iraqis produced several thousand litersspores, botulinum toxin,perfringens spores thaito fill aerial bombs and missileIn
|rcpoit that Iraqrogram to produce stocks of plagueW agent.
Nuclear Weapons. The Gulf war andUN inspections have seriously damaged Iraq's nuclear weapons program. However, Iraq Ls determined to covertly reconstitute its nuclear program, evenong-term monitoring system will probably be in place. In addition lo retaining key nonfissiteand equipment thai could be used in Ihis rcconstitution, Iraq alsoargestaff with the documentation and expertise to resume its weapons effort. I-
The constraining element in Iraq's nuclear weapons program is probably theof fissile material. Iraq would mosl likely choose the gas centrifuge route tohighly enriched uraniumhat process would take live to sevenwith significant foreign technical assistance andproduce enough HEU for one bomb. Without foreign involvement, Iraq's technical personnel could ultimately succeed in this effort, but would need several additional years to accomplish the goal. However, we cannot rule out the possibility
that Iraq could purchase sufficient quantities of HEU, orinished weapon.either of these developments would shorten Iraq's acquisition timelineI"
Restoring the Defense Industrial Base.raq hadobust military industrial base capable ofide range of munitionsubstantial number of weapons types, (u) (See inset.)
During the war, Iraqi managers saved some production machinery by removing il fromfacilities. After hostilities, Saddam rebuilt damaged facilities, reinstalledand restartedat well below prewar levels, both in quantity andSince the end of Desert Slorm, theindustries have probablyew hundred artillery pieces and tanks. One notable accomplishment was ihe delivery2 tank battalion to the Republican Guard.
Overall, however, Iraq has probably reached the limit of its ability to return war-damaged weapons to the field. The amount of equipment in units has not increased markedly since the springpproximatelyercent of Iraq's aging tanks are inoperable. Most of these arc not even candidates for repair.produclion levels can meet only part of the military's needs, as evidenced by continued equipment cannibalization and Iraq's efforts lo procure spare parts from foreign suppliers.
For the near term, the depots will probably remain capable of repairing equipment already in units. However, items subject to heavy, daily use. such as tires and automotive
Iraq's Prewar Conventional I'rotluction Capability
Aircraft. Development of airborne early warning aircraft and airborne warning and control aircraft; planned production of jet trainer aircraft and helicopters.
Air defense radars. Production of French-designed tow-altitude surveillance radars.
Air-delivered weapons. Production of un-guided bombs and cluster munitions; development of precision-guided bombs, air-to-air missiles, and fuel-air explosives.
Artillery. Productionm towed howitzers; dexvlopment-m self-propelled howitzers and Brazilian -and Yugoslav-designed multiple rocket launchers.
Ballistic missiles. Conversion ofissiles for extended range; plannedproduction of Scud-type missiles and Condor II missiles.
' Electronics. Production of transistors,circuits, printed circuit hoards, and mobile and man-portable communica-tions equipment.
Explosives. Production of TNT, RDX,double -base propellents, andexplosives.
Mortars. Productionm mortars.
Naval weapons. Production of naval mines; modification of Chinese-built anti-ship missiles.
' Ordnance. Production of artillery and tank ordnance, mortar rounds, antipersonnel mines, grenades, and small arms
Small arms. Production of assault rifles, sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and pistols.
Super guns. Development-m long-range guns and associated projectiles.
Tanks. Assembly2 tanks fromkits: planned indigenous productionofAsad2 (anfa.P
arc running out. Moreover. Ihe loss of Western technical assistance has probably forced Iraq to suspend or curtail work on some of its most ambitious weaponsthe Al haw and Al Maj-noon long-range self-propel led guns.ockets, and Brazilian designed air-to-air mis-silev
Ground Forces. Ground force restructuring has been driven in part by Iraqi recognition that great numbers of infantry divisions, lightly equipped with older wcajHins systems,ilitary liability in the Gulf war. Thoseconsumed scarce resources, stretched Iraq's command and control unacceptably. and
could nolar of mobility.nfantry divisions were deactivated, including four Republican Guard andegular Army. An additional three infantry divisions were deactivated between January andy the time Iraq's postwar militarywas completed.ercent of the force structure was heavy, compared toercent before Desert Storm.l
Iraq maintainsivisions today0 fewer than inight of those divisions arc in the Republican Guard, which remains Saddam's most potent striking force. The Republican Guard draws iu uoops almost exclusively from tlie dominant and more trusted Sunni population, and is the only ground element except Saddam's largeforce permitted to garrison in theof Baghdad!
The regular Army consists ofivisions organized in five corps. Almost two-thirds of these divisions arc stationed in the norththe Kurds and the remainder against the Shias in the sooth. Irruncdiatcly after the war, reserveequippedwhich fought poorly against coalitiondeactivated Reserves, when mobilized, have been used almost exclusively to fill out under- strength regular Army units (see map).p
tanks, over half of Iraq's ground forcesconsists of older and badly worn Soviet and Chinese5 tanks.rmored personnel carriers, andm towed artillery systems. less thanercent of Iraqi artillery is self-propelled. While Saddam's artilleryange advantage over many regional and Western forces, Iraqi commanders have shown neither an ability to effectively integrate fire in support of maneuver operations nor to shift fire against rapidly attacking armored formations.
lhc losses of wheeled support vehicles during the war, and sltortagcs of spare parts for remaining vehicles have strained Iraq's ability to sustain its forces in the field. Regular Army units, hindered by logistical shortages and employed in field operations almostsince the end of lhc war. have not been able to accomplish effective combined arms training.
The Republican Guard, on the other hand, has conducted more sophisticated operations and training than the regular Army. For example. Ihe Republican Guard staged an apparent rapid deployment exercise in the fall3 that incorporaied corps fire support and heli-bornc assault elements. This was designed to improve the Guard's ability lo quickly respond to an external threat,
most modem equipment in Baghdad's inventory goes to the Republican Guard. Eor instance, all of2 tanks are deployed with Guard divisions, and Guard armored and mechanized divisions arealpercent wartime equipment authorizations (comparedercent for mosl regular Armyhe regular Army is significantly undcrcquipped. Into being shortperational
Air Force. Three years after lite Gulf war the Iraqi Air Force (IZAF) is still trying to recover its prewar capabilities. The current force is less than half its prewar size; the inventory consists ofrimarily older, less capable Soviet planes. More than
seVret
f the most modern Iraqi aircraft remain in Iran, where they flew to escape destruction during Desert Storm.
IZAF remained grounded untilince then, it has been able to gradually increase sortie levels to an averageer day. Aboutercent of those flights areto tactical training which, although intense, has not significantly improved overall air warfare capabilities. Iraqi air operations remain inflexible and subject to extremelycontrol. Nevertheless, the constant level of daily flying probably has allowed some Iraqi pilots to reestablish prewar levels of prolicicncy.f-
ability to sustain high levels of flight activity depends on the large quantities of parts bought before and during the war.smuggling, and ongoing domesticWnh bis fleet halvedesult of the Gulf war. additional spare parts arc available for the remaining aircraft. However. Iraqistill face problems in their efforts lo keep the current force flying.^
quickly if no-fly restrictions were lifted. Three hundred and seventy-five ofaircraft shelters were cither damaged or destroyed during the Gulf war. Although most have been repaired, these shelters remainto the same weapons that were employed against them during the Gulf war.
technicians arc capable of conducting routine maintenance, but have limited skills and facilities for more complex operations. The Taji engine overhaul facility, for iristancc. Ls capable of performing some refurbishment of olderndngines, but not the engines ofor Mirage aircraft. Iraq has also repaired the major aircraft maintenanceat Kushccd airfield.
The IZAF operates from nine main airbascs and maintainsecondary airfields andispersal fields. Anotherields are located in the no-fly zones. Those bases arc being repaired and could be made fully operational
Iraqi Air Defenses. Iraq has probably restored enough of its prewar air defenseto provide early warning and monitoring of aircraft al medium-io-high altitude over most of the country. Thousands of antiaircraft guns and point-defense surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems wouldignificant threat to aircraft operating at low altitudesdaylight over cities and military targets. However. Iraqi air defenses would still have great difficulty engaging modem Western air forces hacked by comprehensive counicrmca-sures support.
id
Reconstruction of tbc Iraqi air defense system has proceededairly fast pace: all four of the pre-Desert Storm Sector Operationsare now operational;frewarOperations Centers have been restored; and Iraq currently liasadar sites operational (comparedeployed during theraq has also rebuilt much of its automated air defense command and control system and is trying to address the issue of detection of low-observable, or stealth, aircraft by modifying its SPOON REST and FAN SONG radars wilh French-built components!
Since the Gulf war, Iraq has beenumber of other measures to improve the survivability and effectiveness of its air defense force. For instance:
The Iraqis may have been emphasizingtracking of aircraft as anlo radar tracking for SAM engagements. This has two potential advantages: it delays the warning pilots receiveAM has been fired, and it minimizes the time Iraqiare emitting, thereby limiting chances for effective use of antiradialion missiles.
units have prepared alternate positions and have practiced rapid redeployment totheir survivabilityodem air force. However, strategic SAMs likendere not designed to be movedand will suffer numerous mechanical problems if this practice continues.
Iraqis are adding armor to radar vans at missile sites io improve their protection against an ti radar missiles and bombs.
Despite these sustained efforts aithe Iraqi air defense system remains plagued with problems. It could not downaircraft in the southern no-fly zone in3 and could not effectively defend against coalition attacks on air defense sites.
Navy. Iraq's Navy was devastated during the war approximatelyercent of the naval inventory was damaged or destroyed, and only one of itsissile boats survived. What remains consists primarilyadre of small patrol boats whose primary mission is law enforcement. The Navy has been (and will remain) the lowest priority in Iraqi postwar reconstitution efforts.!
The loss of its mosl capable minelayers reduces Iraq's ability to lay large fields of mines. However, since mines can be deployedide variety of surface platforms, Iraq can still sow mines in small numbers to disrupt shipping lanes or hinder enemy naval action in the northern Gulf. Iraq's SEERSUCKER antiship cruise missiles and its ihree-to-five associated launchers provide an additional threat to ships withinautical miles of Iraq's coast.
Enduring Weaknesses. Overall, despite some areas of improvement, Iraq's militarycontinues to suffer from systemic weaknesses that would far outweigh its strengthsignificant conflict with Western forces. Although these shortfalls vary from service to service, in general all of Iraq's armed forces retain certain common
Poor morale and desertions. One of the most acute problems facing the Iraqi military,in the regular Army, is poor morale
cope
ami Ihe high desertion rale lhal il generates. Morale problems have turned one of thestrengths of diewar weariness. Many conscripts have been in ihc military much longer than the compulsory two-to-lhrce year stint, with no idea when they will be released. Soldiers have been deployed, many in .semipermanentfor three years fighting insurgents, while receiving substandard rations, medical care, and uniforms, and employing fragile vehicles and faulty ammunition. Meanwhile, their families struggle to cope in the collapsing economy-
Resentment among conscripts over these conditions. Saddam's disastrous adventures, jealousy among regular Army soldiers about the special ncatment accorded members of the Republican Guard, and continuingbetween Shia and Sunni personnelundermine morale. In some poorer infantry units as many as two-thirds of the soldiers have deserted, though ihc norm is probably not as severe. In lateII Corps reported that morenlisted men, the equivalent of more than two full-strength infantry brigades, were missing from Ihe corps sector,ho had deserted (wo or more limes. In an extreme case. 2S9ersonnel assignedommando battalion inIraq had dcscrtcd.|
Thes not oblivious io Ihe problem and has taken various measures to stein the desertions. For instance. Baghdad hasincreased some salaries, vowed to release conscripts at the end of iheir terms of service, and regularly sends "moralofficers" to visit Iraqi units to bolster morale. However, these efforts have hud only mixed results. P
1'olilicizalion of the officer corps.
reporls that loyalty to Saddam ratner than military competence continues to be the yardstick by which senior officers areSaddam's heavy-handed efforts lothe videotaping of officer executions and die replaying of those tapesntimidateaof fear, which stifles independenl action, risk taking, and candor.
Intelligence. The inability of Iraq'ssystem to provide timely, reliableon threat force status, options, and intentionsajor shortfall during the Gulf war. We have virtually no evidence of Iraqi efforts lo improve inlelligenceanalysis, and reporting capabilities and believe this willajor weakness in future operations.
Transportation. One of ihe areas hit hardest by the UN sanctions is the transportation fleet. Combat vehicles suffer little wear and tear in their current sialic posture. However, the daily use of other wheeled vehicles haseavy toll. Automotive parts wiih civilianalready in short supply, aresiphoned off lo be sold on Ihc black market. Judging primarily from Ihe number of missing tires, onlyf ther so heavy equipment iransports areto be operational. Units often musttrucks from higher headquarters lo move armored vehicles and large shipments of anununiiion. The military has turnedto ihc nalional railroads which are now also showing ihe impact of sanctions. One positive result is lhat ground forces haveol of practice in rail loading.
reliable source of supply. In ourIraq's inability to deliver supplies wouldajor operational constraint in large or intensive operations lasting longer than three days. Economic sanctions and the arms embargo have cut Iraq off from itsarms suppliers, creating widespread shortages of many classes of supplies. WeBaghdad smugglesimited amount of critical parts and equipment inof UN sanctions, but such deliveries are not sufficient to meet military needs. Even in their relatively static configuration, units arc apparently having tumble providingtheil soldiers. Deployed border forces and infantry' units frequently run out of rations.
doctrine and operationalIn addition to the systemic shortfalls outlined above, Iraq still lacks both theand operational capability to control and execute maneuver warfare at the scale, pace, and intensity demonstrated by US and allied foaxs during the Gulf war.this three year process is still potentocal and regional context:
armedthethe central guarantor of regime security. They arc capable ofthe Shia in the south, could retake the north from Kurdish elements, and could probably defend Iraq from any neighborTurkey. Iraq could also probablyivision-sized forcehort-duration,raid to destroy or damugcoil and water facilities in Kuwait.
Iraqi military remains one of the region's largest (see tablend most capable, despite its relative declineesult of the Gulf war. poslwar sanctions.]
Force Capabilities Assessment The Gulf war and the postwar array of UN sanctions have severely diminished, but have not completely destroyed Iraq's militarySaddam's nulitary reconslitution has made significant progress under difficultIn that regard, the armed forces arc probably well positioned for expansion and improvement if the UN sanctions are lifted. In the meantime, die military's ability to weather tbe Desert Storm defeat, put down die Shia and Kurdish rebellions, and survive UNbeing reorganized anda testimony to its resiliency as an institution. The force that has emerged from
On balance, however, Iraqi military shortfalls are severe. The current force comprises fewer units, personnel, and equipment, and hasolder and more badly worn weapons systems thant also is less able to sustain itself, and is more limited in its ability to redeploy large numbers of divisionsMoreover, Iraq's armed forces continue to sufferumber of otherin logistics, leadership, doctrine, flexibility, and command and control. These enduring
weaknesses would limit Iraq's warfighting effectiveness in operations outside Iraq, against stronger regional opponents, or against Western forces;
If the Western forces present in the regionwere involved from the outset, Iraq could retake Kuwait only if Iraqi forces were ready to absorb losses inflicted by Western airwhile maintaining the attack. Based onprecedent, as long as the current low state of morale in the Iraqi military remains unchanged, an Iraqi offensive is likely to grindalt when serious opposition is
We judge lhat Iraq is incapable today of quicklyorps-level operationKuwait deep enough to Uireaten most Saudi Arabian oil facilities. As partarger operation involving the invasion andoccupation of Kuwait, we believe Iraq would have tlic capacity to undertake ashort-duration punitive raid into northeastern Saudi Arabia with the objective of destroying oil facilities. It is conceivable, bul highly unlikely, that Saddam would order
such an attack without first securing Kuwait. Such an operation would be generallyto Iraqi practice and would likely fail. The attacking force and scarce heavy-liftwould be significantly attritcd by aof maintenance problems and GCC and Western resistance before reaching Saudi Arabia.!
Overall, in our judgment, Iraq will beand probably unable to engage inmilitary operations outside the country as long as:
UN sanctions remain in place and working (see inset).
Baghdadtrong US mililaryand commitment to maintainingstability.
Iraqi forces are occupied wilh internal securitycountering the Kurds,the Shia, and protecting Saddam's regime.
The Effectiveness of UN Sanctions
UN sanctions. Despite some leaks, UN sanctions have been very effective atIraq's military reconstitution lolevels. Sanctions Iturt Iraq in three critical ways:
Trade sanctions5 bilti'm in oil revenue each year. The lack ofdemoralizes the population and the military, breeds disconteiu with Saddams rule, constrains military spending, and requires Baghdad to spend other scarce resources reinforcing internal security.
The UN arms embargo virtuallyIraq from importing theand equipment essential to fully rebuild the current force, or toand expand the force in the future. As Iraq's prewar supply of spare partsto dwindle, the impact of the arms embargo bectmtes more acute.
UN WMD sanctions have forcedto destroy most, but not all of Its WMDl to agree, at least temporarily, to an intrusive long-term monitoring system. As long as these sanctions are in place, the production of major weapons and missile programs will languish.
looking to the Future
A Constrained Force DevelopmentThe minimum essential requirement Tor any real improvement in Iraqi military capability tor the rest of this dccarJc is the modification or removal of the ban on Iraqi
imports andexports of oil. The analysts that follows projects Iraqi military developments under the following conditions:
UN Irade sanctions are lifted inith minimal restrictions placed on Iraqi use of the revenue generated by renewed oil sales.
The UN arms embargo and (lie WMDand inspection regime remain in place and effective.
From Iraq's rwrspective, these conditionsa relatively constrained limeenvironment!
lifting Trade Sanctions. The lifting of UN sanctions on all Iraqi civilian imports and exports would affect Iraq's armed forces in three ways:
Defense spending would increase. Oil sales would increase Iraq's overall revenuesThe Intelligence Community has projected future Iraqi oil revenues and defense resources under several different production capacity and world oil price scenarios (This analysis is summarized invenour most restrictive budget scenario, once trade sanctions were lifted. Iraq would have significantly more money to spend onMoreover,epending on the world oil market. Iraq may be able to afford defense budgets that approaelicd prewar spending levels.
force readiness and sustainment wouldquickly. The resumption of noninilitary trade would make it veiy difficult for thecommunity to control andall trade wiih Iraq. Under these conditions, Baghdad almost certainly would
Secret
able loovertly ormilitary spare [tarts and other dual-use technologies critical to restoring the sustain-ment base. Also,arger defense budget, lhc Iraqi mililary should be able to increase operational tempo (training, exercises, field deployments) and afford hotter pay. housing, and benefits for military personnel.
The stage would be set for furtherIncreases in Iraq's defensenonmilitary irade would nol greallyBaghdad's military manufacturingor its capacity lo acquireend items in the short term.developments would allow Iraq tothe materials, equipment, andrequired for the king-term expansion ofproduction industry. Moreover,oil revenues increased, and Usarms network expanded, soiis ability lo acquire dual-useand technology, pure mililarytechnologies, and other equipment
currently prohibited by UN sanctions-!
But there would be no significantor force expansion. As long as the arms embargo held, however. Iraq's force structure and equipment holdings could not be modernized or expanded significantly. In fact, as operational wear and tear took their toll, it would be more likely thai Iraq's equipment inventory, especially aircraft, would actually decline,
The Bottom IJne: Marginal Improvement Only. The removal of UN irade sanctions would allow Iraq lo make modestin its mililary capability between nowany of (he supply, maintenance, transportation, and morale problems lhal under mine the readiness and effectiveness of tbeforce could be overcome. In addition, Iraq would be able to lure more foreign technicians to work in its defense industries and military maintenance facilities. These improvements would bolster Baghdad's already adequate capabilities for internal securily and defensive operations and would marginally increase Iraq's offensive
Overall, however, even this improved force would continue to suffer from many criticalair warfare (particularly aireadership, doctrine, flexibility, and command andwould diminish iis effectiveness in operations outside Iraq or against Western forces. i
An Unconstrainedentral point in the analysis summarized above is thai, even wiih trade sanctions removed, the international arms embargo would prevent Iraq from significanily improving its military capability for the rest of this decade. Thesection challenges that premise by assuming that Iraq is able to circumvent Ihc UN arms embargo and acquire conventional weaponsarge scale. From Iraq'sthiselatively unconstrained conventional force development environment. However, even in this scenario, we slill assume that the UN monitoring and inspection of Iraq's special weapons programs continues and precludes significant Iraqi improvement in WMD.
Ihe Anns Embargo. Most analysts agree dial ihe removal ol trade sanctions would be the first step toward de factoof the arms embargo. Clearly, if trade sanctions were lifted and Iraqi oil revenues increased, Baghdad's potential for securing major covert arms deals would riseInternational amis producers would be keen loump on the lucrative Iraqi arms market and the temptation (and opportunity) to violate the embargo would be great
Also, as time went on, many countriesin arms sanctions monitoring would likely grow weary of continued vigilance and become less diligent toward enforcement. Iraq would encourage that trend and push thecommunity io relax the arms embargo. Baghdad has already argued that the expanding military capabilities of itsIsrael andgrowing threats, and has demanded more flexibility in the trade and import of defense manufacturingand military technology.
Thereumber of states-/
in this unconstrained case, we have assumed Iraq is able to circumvent the arms embargo beginning
The Iraqi Shopping IJsL Baghdad's recent war experiencesIran, coalition forces, and internalgiven the Iraqiood sense of ils most important conventional forceAlthough wc have very little directwc believe Iraq probably prioritizes ihosc shortcomings as follows: ground based air defenses, ground forces armor and firemodem (third and fourth generation) air craft, and naval aniiship capabilities.
In our judgment, however, Iraq would not feel compelled to address each priorityRather, it would try to overcome its most glaring deficiencies in each force area.Iraq would probably not be able to both afford and acquire everything ii wanted, at least in the early years of its rebuildingand would be forced to decide how best to spread limited resources among competing priorities, while taking advantage of Ihe best opportunities available in die arms market.
have been huit by the arms embargo against Iraq and would be anxious lo revive Iraqi arms sales.l
In our judgment, once trade sanctions were lifted, the arms embargo would unraveland would probably become completely ineffective for conventional weaponry no laterowever, for analytical purposes
If Iraq were able to acquire additional arms in large quantities, it would also have to decide whether it wanted lo simply modernize itsforce structure, or expand it as well. Although wc have some inkling of Iraqiin thisinstance, officialand several other sources suggesting that Iraq would rather maintain smaller, bul more modernlack of definitive evidence leads us to analyze both options.
s.
defense. In an unconstrained acquisition environment. Iraq would probably seek up to two battalionsoAMs per battalion) of strategicthe Russianith its sophisticated electronic warfare and anti-ballistic missilesix to eight battalions of tactical SAMs like the Russianheattalions, and at least two of the tactical battalions, would be
deployed to protect key strategic sites inIraq. The remaining tactical SAMs would probably be deployed with the groundper corps. Iraq could also be expected to acquire hundreds of modem man portable SAMs (like the Russiano upgrade its current force of mosdy older SA-7s. Finally. Iraq would also be likely to upgrade its aircommand network, and to acquire or
produce radars with better low-level, long-range detection capabilities, in an effort to provide Baghdad with more effectiveness against stealth aircraft.
Ground forces. Iraq would want to upgrade its current fleet of5 tanks andpersonnel carriers with the acquisition2 tanks and BMP infantry fightingAlthough not state-of-the-art systems, these are available in large quantities,and are potent by regional standards. Iraq also may seek small numbers0 tanks for the Presidential Guard. Beyond that, Iraq would likeodernize fire supportby acquiring self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers. If Iraq chose to expand, it could probably add two heavyto its current force structurehe arms embargo was ineffective beginning.
Air forces. Iraq learned during the Gulf war that it had no hope of matching Western air forces. Hence, the relative priority Iraqupgrading its ground-based airAlso, Iraqimited capacity to organize, train, and integrate large numbers of new aircraft and squadrons into the current force. It took Baghdad several years to fully integrate thenduring theeven then, the aircraft were not used to their fullest capacity. Theseand the high unit purchase and operating costs of modem aircraft, will likely limit total purchases, even in an unconstrained armsenvironment. Nevertheless, in order toapability to meet regional threats. Iraq would want to replace some of thelost during the Gulf war, including the aircraft flown to Iran, by purchasing at least
two additionalircraft each) of modern aircraft. This acquisition objectiveow Iraqi estimate of futureforce levels and capabilities. As Iraq acquired these additional aircraft, it would have to decide whether it wanted to simplyolder airframesnc-for-onc basis, or use the new acquisitions to form new squadrons.
Naval forces. The Navy will remain Iraq's lowest military priority. However, if Iraq did seek to upgrade its naval capabilities, it would probably opt for longer range antiship cruise missiles (most likely of Chinesemall number of coastal patrol boats. It would also take measures to improve the size andof its mine inventory, which it could do at relatively little cost-!-
The Bottomuch Improved Force. If Iraq were able to acquire in quantity thediscussed above it could significantly improve its military capabilityased on our perception of Iraq's military priorities, and the oil revenue and defense budgetsummarized in annex B, wc projected9 force structure and equipment holdings under two unconstrainedone we have termed "modernized only" and the other "modernized andhe table compares those projections with theIraqi military, and with9 force wc projected Iraq would have in our constrained force development scenario in which onlysanctions were removed.1
Baghdad probably would not be able to afford to both modernize and expand ils force to the maximum extent shown in tablexcept
our most optimistic (for Iraq)However, under our midpointprojections. Baghdad couldIhe force depicted in Ihecolumn. Given Baghdad'sprobably lend loward ihcin the air defense category, bul as awould purchase somewhat lessmaximum in the ground, air. and naval
The Future Threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
Through the rest of the decade, Iraq willa number of options for striking Kuwail and Saudi Arabia. These range in scale and complexity from limited missile and air-strikes against selected targets (seeo limited-objective raids and full invasion.
A IJmited Attack. In our judgment, the worst Iraq could doimited attack would be torief division level raid to damage or destroy selected oil and water facilities in Kuwait. This, however, wouldigh-risk operation that is generally contrary to Iraqi doctrine. I
The only significant opposition Iraqi forces would likely encounteraid of this type would be US air forces deployed in theater. Under the rightspeed, and shortIraqi raid could indict considerable damage on selected oil and water facilities in Kuwaiti
has several options forimited division-sized raid into Kuwait Baghdad couldaid with little or no warning, using the 6th Armored Division, which is already deployed near the Kuwaiti border. Oilier options, which would give Western forces varying degrees of warning, include using Regular Army or Republican Guard forces garrisoned farther noiih near Qal'ai Salih, or Republican Guard forces garrisoned in the Baghdad area.!-
If armored forces were used, combat vehicles only wilh their basic loads of supplies could be moved by heavy equipment transports under cover of darkness into positions along the Kuwaiti border. There they would form into battle groups and launch the raid duringhours. Alternately, the heavy brigade of the Republican Guard Infantry Division at Qal at Salih could moveimilar fashion. The infantry brigades of this division could be employed as saboteurs of Kuwaiti oilfield equipment.
If, on the other hand, one of the heavyGuard divisions near Baghdad were used, it would probably deploy months prior to the raid, ostensibly for lines of communication security or countcrinsurgency operations, in order to reduce suspicion. The division could then move to the Ar Rcmaylah oilfield area to conduct "exercises"relude to the raid.
A Representative Invasion Scenario.order another full invasionWestern opposition, Iraq wouldcommit at leastoivisions inseize and hold Kuwait, and at leastdivisions if it planned to extendinto Saudi Arabia. However, in linedesire to minimize Westernattack on Kuwait could begin as soonmain strikeGuard armored divisionsBaghdad, and perhaps the infantryand one or two regular Army heavyfrom the Al Basrahinadditional preparations, such asof follow-on forces, couldwith the offensive (as was the
We see three situations which could lead Baghdad to conclude that its forces were ready to cany out operations of this scale and complexity:
Iraq substantially improves its logisticswhich currently would be hard pressed to support even eight divisions inbeyond its borders.
Baghdad convinces itself that only token Western opposition would be mounted, so that much of its force would avoid heavy(and the heavy logistics drain such combat entails).
Saddam is willing to move much of his force with (idle beyond die supplies lhal maneuver unils can ihemselves carry. This wouldombat gamble unprecedented for him.
Force Preparation and Movementrail capacity isajor force movement constraint for Iraq because lite line from Baghdad to the Al Basrah area is single track with bypasses. If divisions moved entirely byas is their practice, with full logisticsestimate i( would take each one approximately nine days. Since only one division could moveime, (lie three Republican Guard divisions would requireays to move from Baghdad lo Al Basrah. However, in the likely event lhal heavy equipment transports were used (toingleovement time would be reduced byhird, toays.Army units in the Al Basrah area would have io move to assembly areas under iheir own power, increasing the rate of
For an invasion of Saudi Arabia, Iraq would also want to add at least the Republican Guard division task force and the lOlh Armoredfrom the Al' Amarah area. Assuming heavy equipment transports were used to move these divisions, force preparation and movement timelines could increase by as much as five io seven days.
extremely difficult to overcome in just five years. In addiiion, key materiel shortfalls would include:
The logistics system, though improved, would be strained to support an offensive far from Iraqi territory. Iraq would still lack theassets, mobility, and the battlefield repair capabilities required to replenish losses and sustain combatigh-intensity
Iraq's Capabilities To Carry Out the Invasion Threat
The Constrained Force. If economicwere liftednd Iraq wereovercome some of its shortfalls inand morale, theselikely offset planned GCC forcea result,by GCC forces alone, anforce would still be able toand could probably extend thefardier south, perhaps enough tonorthern Saudi oil ports andcritical variables in this assessmentdegree of GCC resistance, particularlyto interdict Iraqi logisticsforces with air power, and theIraq's logistics reconstitutionJ
However, even with the improvements Iraq could make after economic sanctions were lifted. Iraq's military would continue to suffer from critical shortcomings that would limit its effectiveness against Western forces. Keyleadership, doctrine,and command andbe
* Iraqi air defense forces would remainbecause they would have few modern, mobile SAMs andtroops, lines of communication, and key strategic and supply facilities fromattacks by Western air forces. Losses would be devastating particularly to die thin-skinned vehicles critical to Iraqi sustain-ment
Iraqi ground forces would still be about half their prewar size and would retain primarily older, less-effective Soviet arrnot lyatNDS, They would be overmatched if confronted by Western ground and air forccs.j-
?7tf Unconstrained Force. Assuming Iraq was able toorce similar to that depicted in our "unconstrained-modernized-only" force development scenario, itsfor seizing and holding Kuwait,against GCC forces alone, would improve. Moreover, in our judgment, Iraq wouldair chance of extending the attack to critical Saudi oil and water facilities in the Eastern Province if opposed only by the GCC. However, even in this scenario, we judge Iraq's prospects for success in the face of Western opposition to be poorJ
Although the lidding of more advancedair defenses, both wiih maneuver forces and along lines of communication, would increase Iraq's capabilities to move andlarge forces deep into Saudi Arabia, these developments would notecisive impacl on the effectiveness of Ihe Western air campaign because Iraq would still haveand command and control problems. Also, based on past experience,raq would probably not have had sufficient lime lo acquire and assimilate large quantities of sophisticated new equipment into its armed forces. Other areas of concern for Iraq would include;
An unproven ability toorward logistics staging area to moveiles beyond the Kuwaiti border.
An inability to provide comprehensive aircow of maneuver forces and logistics elements over extended lines of
Inadequate training, doctrine, and leadership necessary to conduct deep mobile warfare.
The US Central Command (USCEN.TCOM) View
In contrast to the US Intelligence Comma nity, USC'ENTCOM believei that Iraq cur rently has Ihe potential capability toorps-sizedoffensive intonorth-eastern Saudi Arabia to threaten the major Saudi oilfields, despite in limitations. Once the arms embargo and tradewere lifted, Iraq woulduch better than fair chance of seizing Saudi oii-fielas,
(his latter point, wc have no indications, and find it improbable, that Iraq will have improved its tactics, doctrine, command and control, and weapons crew skills to the point where they could successfully engage in an intense, extended, highly mobile campaign against Western forces. For Iraq's politicized mililary leadership to transform the country's military forcesrofessional lighting machine (by Western standards) in just five years would be unprecedented. The training wc have observed in the lasi year provides no hint thatransformation has begun.
,1
Conclusion
Despite an impressive reconstitution effort under difficult circumstances, Iraq's current military force retains critical weaknesses in readiness, sustainment, morale, leadership, command and control, doctrine, andcapability. These shortfalls reduce but do not eliminate its potentialegional threat Without significant and timelyfrom Western forces, Iraq still has the capability to overwhelm Kuwait. However, we judge Iraqi ground forces to be incapable today, even if opposed only by GCC forces, of quickly extending corps-level operations beyond Kuwait into Saudi Arabia deep enough to threaten most Saudi oil facilities.
For the future, Iraq's overall militarywill nol improve, and likely will decline, as long as the present array of UN sanctions
remains in place and effective. If economic sanctions were removed. Iraq could makeimprovements in the sustainability and morale of its forces, but is not likely toits systemic and doctrinal weaknesses for the rest of this decade. Even if Iraq is able
to circumvent (he UN amis embargo,newer equipment in significantits current military weaknesses arc
unlikely to be fully rectified by
United States and Saudie is unlikely toesert Storm scenariouch less capable force lhan he had
In our judgment, Iraq is not likely to attempt to occupy Kuwait and seize the Saudi oilfields as long as Baghdadleartrong militarydefend the Gulf slates. While Saddam is looking for opportunities to exact revenge on Kuwait and principal members of the Desert Storm coalition (for example, (lie
The dynamics Uia( Saddam would consider beforeuture invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia include:
The size and visibility of US military forces in the region. While Baghdad would evaluate the size of US forces in the region beforeany GCC states, more important than US force numbers would be (he perceived
commitment of the United States to moveforces, quickly to the area to ensure the Gulf states* sovereignty.
status of the UN sanctions and armsSaddam is unlikely to embark on any external military campaigns as long as he isoncUiatory policy in an attempt to get UN restrictions lifted. If sanctions areor Saddam gives up hope lhat sanctions will be lifted, there is an increased chance of mililary initiatives.
of the Kurdish situation. Al present almost two-thirds of the Iraqi military is deployed in the north. Baghdad couldto withdraw much of this force during the next five years if the Kurdish provinces were
returned io its control or if Baghdad changed ils strategy [here to one that only protects northern Iraqi cities from the perceivedthreat. Either siluation would allowto deploy these forces lo its southern border.
The status of Iraq's military forces. Iraqiof newer generation equipment would increase Iraq's potential military capability; however, ils current mililary shortfalls are not likely to be fully overcome. Accordingly Iraq's military would still not match ilspre Desert Storm capabilities.^
Annex C
Limited Iraqi Threats to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
Missile or Airstrikes Iraq will maintain the capability In conduct air or missile strikes in an effort to damage or destroy keyoil relatedKuwait and Saudi Arabia'
Airstrikes. Iraq's air force couldmall punitive airstrike with little preparation.
high, particularly against targets lhat were well defended hy surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery, since the Iraqi air force does not routinely practice air defenseOverall, given Saddam's penchant for employing his air force conservatively, he would probably conclude that Ihc risk ofon coalition air and air defense forces was not worth the potential gainifficult strike against point targets in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.
* Missileissile attack against point targets in cither Kuwait or Saudi Arabia would be problematic for Iraq. Oil facilities in both countries arc unlikely to sufferand longlasting damage from Iraqi Scuds, primarily because the missiles have such poor accuracy
Assessment. As long as Western aircraft are enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq, the Iraqi air force has little chance ofattacking targets in Kuwait or SaudiEven if Ihe no-fly zone is eliminated, Iraq's prospects would improve only slightly. In cither case, attrition would probably be
Any of these options could be tuken by the regular Army alone, although ihe Republican Guard would be the preferred strike element in the limited-objective invasion scenario. Force requirements would range from as little as athe objective were simply to challenge andas many as eight divisions if Iraq planned to seize and occupy tcrriiory in the face of Western opposition.
Ground Operations Iraq will remain capable of conducting aof limited ground operations against Kuwait. For instance, Iraq could:
Challenge the Demilitarized Zone on the Iraqi side of Ihe border by moving forces into the zone.
unitive raid into Kuwait with the goal of destroying or damaging an objective or carrying off property. Such in-and-out raids would likely focus on the northern oilfields, and Kuwaiti border posts and defense
imited-objective invasion ofdesigned to seize and hold selected areas or facilities adjacent to the border.!
Assessment. Iraq could easily move forces into the demilitarized zone and keep them there indefinitely, or until they were driven out by Western forces. Iraq couldunitive raid under the rightlimited objectives, and short duration. However, the Iraqi military wouldifficult time taking and holding Kuwaiti territory in the face of concerted Western opposition. Moreover, Iraq probably perceives that it would suffer large losses from Western air strikes in each of these
Warning Notice
National Security Informal inn
Information available as alsed in (be preparation of thiseener Estimate.
Theintelligence orgaiilraisons participated In the preparation of (his Estimate:
The Ccnlrul Intelligence Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency The Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Depanmeni of Stale
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of .Staff for Intelligence.
Department of Ihe Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence.
Department nf (he Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel ligeace.
Det-jximeni'1 orce
This Estimateapproved tor publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Original document.
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