MONITORING DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVED SLBMS

Created: 5/21/1976

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MonitoringiLBMs

Our capability to monitor Sovietf MIRVcd

SLBMs will depend on tbe characteristics^

and the submarines which carry then. In particular, our capability will depend on:

a HIRVed SLBM uses 'a launcher which

: " nonMIRVocunique operating procedures, equipment facilities will be associated with MIRVcd

the difficulties which the Soviets would face in. attempting to covertly deployM3 in launchers ostensibly configured forissiles.

If the launcherIRVed SLBM must be significantly modified in order to accomodate the MIRVed missile, and is therefore distinguishable frcm launchers for unMIRVed missiles, our uncertainty in monitoring deployment would be negligible. We would be-able to identifyaunchers during phese of the systemsprogramstruct ion or conversion program for the submarines. ould then be

WUHXisu rem

ALT TWO agreementrovision to count under tho HIRV limit all launchers on all submarineslass if one submarine of that class is equipped with MIRVs, then the monitoring .task would be eased from one of identifying specific units to one of identifying the classes of submarines which launch MIRVed SLRMs.

To convert these data into the number of launchers which could be equipped with MIRVs beforerogram to modify six submarines per year was assumed. This number was judged toeasonable upper limitrogram to convert submarine's as part of anor repair program. The number of launchers

converted would depend on the class of submarine in-

volved,ange of fromoaunchers per submarine was assumed. We estimate that.the number of launchers which could be converted for MIRVs before we would have

high confidence of identification would be, andor moderate confidence.

Once this initial association is obtained all launchers in the class would count and our uncertainty would be negligible.

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Monitoring Deployment* of MIRVcd ICBMs . ,

The table below gives CIA's estimates of uncertainty ;ihmonitoring MIRVed ICBM deploymentions of colateral constraints and counting rules, including the latest USMIRVed missile counting ruleauncher type counting rule. The table presents CIA's judgments of the value of the various combinations of counting rules and constraints in reducing uncertainty in monitoring several overt "and covert deployment problems. The monitoring problems considered are;

Casencertainty about.the mix of MIRVed and unMIRVed versions of thendssumes the Soviets complete development of MIRVed and un^lIRVed versions of each missile andilos house theouse theouse the Ke would then be faced with the problem of determining how many of thendilos contained the MIRVed version of each- Conversion of allaunchers ning in the force to theroupledoviet claim that some contain older, nonMIRVed missiles like the

mam mi

It should ba noted that the Soviets, haveilos which were completed well before theas ready for deployment" and we

house improved variants of the At Tyuratam, the Soviets apparently modify^anilo (Type IIIG) which had previously been.used only in.tests of the improvedefore the silo could be used in tests of the The modification tookonths to complete. imilar modification

may be necessary when the Soviets replace the-SS-lls in theilos "with"

Case overt deployment_pf__MiRVed.

inilos. In this case, it isilos are not converted to the

Case- Covert deployment ofissiles inilos ornilosardening program- This scheme assumes thatilos modernized for there available for covert deployment.Caseovert deployment of MIRvednilos. Assumes the SovietsIRVed version of thesingilos in

Original document.

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