Evolving Soviet Strategy Towai*<Ij LRTNF Negotiations
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National
Intelligence
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Evolving Soviet Strategy Toward LRTNF Negotiations
National Intelligence Council Memorandum
Information available asI was used in the preparation of this Memorandum
This Memorandum has beeno alerl the intelligence and policymaking comtsertain significant new trends in current Soviet policy toward the LRTNK negotiationso lest some early propositions concerning this Soviet developmenl. Il has been discussed with the Offices of Strategic Research and Political Analysis, and has bceiiapproved by lhe National
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Evolving Soviet Strategy Toward LRTNF Negotiations
As NATO approaches LRTNF negotiations, note should be taken of what clearly appears to be an evolvins. conscious mu Iii faceted Soviet strategy towardpUce of earlier Soviet ambiguities and'uncertainiies on this issue. The evolving LRTNF strategy, moreover, soerns to be wellinto the broader Soviet propaganda and diplomatic campaigns aimed hi Western Europe. The key element of this strategy is the presentationata base designed toroad range of Soviet objectives:
On the immediate military level and as the highest priority, to prevent the modernization of NATO LRTNF.
On lhe negotiating level, to construct the data base to exclude Soviet nuclear systems that the Soviets do not wish to discuss (for example, the
On the strategic level, to undercut US efforts aimed at strengthening the links between various levels and theaters of war.
the political level, to foster the sentiment that (he security of Europe could be jeopardized by the United States for its own selfish enda and that the future of Europe should be decided by ths Europeans themselves.
Evolving Soviet Strategy Toward LRTNF Negotiations
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Earlier Soviet statements on the LRTNF data base did not teem well thought out and made inconsistent references loestern weapon systems. In laicublic and authoritativeeliminated that earlier vagueness. Writing in Pravda. Marshal Ustinov claimed that NATO and tbe USSR each hadedium-range nuclear weapons. For thethis number includedS aircraft carrying nuclear weapons (Fit Isi stalioned in Europe,edium-rangess on aircraft carriers) andther nuclear systems based in Europe f* land-based medium-range ballistic missiles, missile submarines and the bomb-cr force of USstinov gave no details about theof the Soviet medium-range force.
At about the same time that Ustinov's articlea Soviet Embassy official
^repeated
Ustinov's lining of US aiicraft and identified theuclear systems as encompassing theissiles, tbe British Polaris missiles, Ihe French. tbe British Vulcan and Buccaneer bombers, and the French Mirage bombers. He described the Soviet systems as encompassing ihcndissiles and the Backfire, Blinder, and Badger
Tbe Soviet Embassy official's list did not include the Pershing I. Ustinov's staicmcnl was open to different interpretations about whether the "land-bused medium range ballistic missiles" included the USr just those missiles belonging to US allies. The Embassy official's omission of both Ihc US and German Pershing Is from his otherwiselisting strongly suRgesis that the Soviets have decided to exclude these missiles from the
Both Ustinov and the Soviet Embassy officiallhe often-cited Soviet claims that lhe
are partormal moderni/ation program and do not affect Ihe existing balance Ustinov alio charged that tbe projected deployment in Europe ofS medium-range missiles would upset the existing regional balance in NATO's favor and woulda strategic threal to lhe USSR. Ustinov then referred lo Brezhnev's longstanding offerutual moratorium on new deployments and negotiations about existiag systems
Main Sot let Themes
These moat recent authoritative statements show thai the Soviets now have integrated their initial LRTNF strategy into their broader propaganda and diplomatic campaigns lo influence European opinion. The Soviets realize thai they have little or no chance of directly converting any Wesl European nation. They can iafluencc individual countries on some specific issues (for instance. Norway on the nuclear-free cone idea) and influential segments of the public insidecountries on other issues (for instance, anli-ERW groups) The accomplishment of either goal makes the accomplishment of the other easier. Accomplishing both together on the same issue (for example,Holland from Ihe NATO LRTNF decision and influencing West German groups in the samecould undermine NATO's decisionmakingand, in Ihe longer run, jeopardize the existence of the alliance.
In linking their LRTNF strategy to their broader campaign, (he Soviets use Ihree underlying themes, all of which can be employed singly or jointly,or cipS'ciiy, in lhe manner best suited to ihe
audience:
LRTNF siluation musl bo seen in lhe wider conlcxt of other US actions lhat arc intended in upset the balance andincrease international tensions. Some of lhe favorite Soviet examples are US inaction on thereaty. the MX missile, and nu* ihe "neutronhe US LRTNF
plans arc an atlcmplmbroil Europe in dangerous
US schemes.
NATO will upset the existing balance if it bows to US withes The Soviet Union is willing to negotiateowering of the existing balance but,irst step toward the negotiations. NATO should freeze its planned deployments.reeze, however, isrecondition for lalks.
Questions affecting Europe can best be handledegional contcit; lhat is. Ihey can best be resolved by the Europeansthe USSR and West Europeans without US participation. While lhe US military presence in Europe makesan-European dialogue impossible in the short term. West European nations can stillseful role by inducing the United Siaies toore yielding position. In the long term, however. Europeanwould be strengthened by decoupling from lhe United Stales. This theme fits inlo the broader Soviet line that the US presence in Europe is only transitory whereas the inhabitants of that continent are theretay and should deierminc their own destiny
Soviet Tactics
The tactical elements of the Soviet LRTNF strategy
arc the following:
Argue that TNF parity already exists.
ata baseupport lhat argument by deluding from il all Soviet nuclear systems in Eastern Europe (even those clearly intended for missions beyond lhe ground battlefield such asndircraft and Scud missiles) and also lheissiles based in the L'SSR The Soviet omission of thean serve this Soviet purpose by encouraging 'he Allies nolring up these Soviet nuclear systems. Should lhe Wcsl refer to these systems anyway, the Soviets could bring up the Pershing I's and even generously offer to reduce some of Iheir own systems if lhe Pcrshinr I's were reduced and not replaced by any other system (that is. no Penning ll>
Maintain thai SS-_Os ate natural follow-ons lo older systems, arc replacing those systemsnd
sometimesasis, and do not upset the regional balance
lhat lhe Pershing It's and CLCMs are new systems, which upset the existing balance belween East and West-
ave it both ways, at least imlully, by describing them as upsetiing both the regionaland the cenlr.il balance (the latter beingas US and Soviel systems thai can hit ihe other country's territory)
By having it both waysetain flexibility about whether these systems belong in LRTNF or SAL negotiations Nevertheless, place greaton ibeir potential for upsetting the central balance.
Exclude from LRTNF' consideralion existingcounted under SALT- for example. Poseidon missiles even if they are comrnilled loSACEUR,
Implications of Sonet Strategy The consiste.it aim ol tbe Soviets since NATO began its LRTNF deliberations has been and remains to preve.it the introduction of longer range systems into Ihe NATO inventory. Moscow now realizes that it can further ihal aim best by supplementing its st.ir.it ard "detenic" arguments with al least the appearanceerious dialogue about LRTNF negotiations. Al the current stage Moscow is successfully creating lhat appearance by discussing lhe data base for theinay as simultaneously to further its broader strategic aims.
These slralegic aims may not be readily apparent since, at first glance, the Soviet approach to lhe dala base may seem acceptable. After all. it seems lo be based on iwo eminently reasonable principles: (I) only existing systems can be reduced and thusit subject for discussionystems should be assignedither the LRTNF or SAL negotiations Thcic might be some argument about which systems should be includedoat iheir true numbers but the principles seem unexceptionable.
These principles, however, are merelytrategy centered on the Pershing IPs and GUM. As noted ihe Soviet! are scoring debating poinu by charging lhat these missiles could upset both the regional and ihc cenira! balance. By excluding ihem from the LRTNF data base and by expressing fears about the danger they could presenl to the Soviet homeland, the Soviets are trying to create the impression that these missiles arc intended primarily for the prosecutionentral war. On the proptgan-da level, this approach allows Moscow to play on European fears that the United Slates is introducing these systems to confine any nuclear exchange to European territory and thus spare the United States from damage. On the importsnl stralegic level this approach is intended to shape both lhe inira-NATO and Ihc NATO-USSR dialogue around false notions of clearly defined independent theaters of war.
The premise of finite and praclically independent theaters of war contrasts sharply with the Soviets' own approach to war. Even though the Soviets do distinguish between strategic, operational, andactions, they have always recognized thebetween the three levels and Ihe effectealer operations on the stralegic position of the Soviet Union. Consequently (hey have consistentlyihe need to control and direct operations in all (beaters from Moscow, which could use all means al its disposal to gain (he desired obieciivcs. In Ihe last few years Ihe Soviets have laid particular stress on Ihe widened scope of theater operations and on (heof being able to conduct integrated theaterThey have increased their capabilities to do so not only through improvements in their LRTNF but also through changes in their command-for example, the re-creation of theatercommands and important modifications in the Air Force structure Their public espousal of iie.nl> delineated ccmral and regional balances docs not reflect actual Soviet thinking and planning
This declaratory approach to LRTNF, however, is particularly useful lo lhe Soviets because ii attemptsndercut US countervailing strategy, whichefforts to strengthen the links between various levels and iheatcis of war. By claiming thai (he United States intends to use European basing to further its own aggressive designs against the USSR. Moscow is trying to prevent the linkage thatwas demanded by the Europeans themselves and lhal is intended to protect Europe. As good Clausewitzians, the Soviets are opening the LRTNF campaign by trying to entice the opponent into battles over specifics while ihey attack the opponent'sby selling lhe conceptual framework.
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Original document.
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