SOVIET THEATER FORCES IN 1991: THE IMPACT OF THE UNILATERAL WITH

Created: 11/1/1989

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

National Intelligence Council

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGfl RELEASE IN FULL

Soviet Theater Forces1

of the Unilateral Withdrawals on Structure and Capabilities

Sociot-

Soviet Theater Forces1 The Impact of the Unilateral Withdrawals on Structure and Capabilities

Information available as of9 wan usod in tho preparation of this Memorandum, which was prepared by ihr> Nauonal Intelligence Officer for Gene.-a! Purpose Forces. The Memorandum was coorrjinatod ihroughour (ho Intelligence Community by the Njt.on.il Intelligence Officer tor GcneraC Purpose Forces

Key Judgments

Implcmeniation of the two-year program of unilateral troop reductions announced by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in8 appears to be roughly on schedule. To date, the Soviets havenks from the German Democratic Republic; however, reorganization and modernization in the Western Group of Forces (WGF) will partially offset the resulting reduction in force capabilities.

At the endhe WGF will consist of five armies andivisions (seven tank and eight motorizedt appears lhat the divisions will consist of four maneuver regiments: tank divisions will have two tank and two motorized rifle regiments, while motorized rifle divisions will have four motorized rifle regiments. Regiments apparently will not have combined arms battalions. It is not yet clear whether motorized rifle regiments in lank divisions will have two or three motorized rifle battalions (along with one tank battalion).

Complete reorganization of units in thc WGF will require the Sovietsrmored troop carriersrtillerymm)ntitank guns. OnlyTCs.rtillery pieces, andntitank guns have been introduced. Therefore, although the reorganization could be completed by the end. the current pace of equipment introduction would need to be increased significantly.

Thc restructuring of WGF tank and moiorizcd rifle divisions will result in greater changes in Iheir capabilities than are apparenl from thc changes in their aggregate Com bal potential scores. The divisions -and thewill have substantially less armored striking power. Moreover, thc new division organization makes it more difficult to concentrate tank forces.

Manpower reductions, coupled wiih thc requirements of thewill noi allow division-level readiness io be increased in lhefuiure. Divisions will probably coniinue to be manned aipcrccm strength.

The unilateral air reductions and restructuring will, when completed, resultoviet aircraft mix weighted toward air-to-air fighters over ground attack aircraft in East Germany. The aircraft force mix in the Western Theater of Military Operationshole, however, will be weighted more heavily than before toward ground atuck aircraft. Tbe number of deep atuck aircraft remains unchanged. Although this new force structure will be more capable of defendingurprise NATO air offensive, it will not further impair the Soviets' ability to conduct offensive air operations.

The unilateral reductions are consistent with the announced Soviet shiftore defensive doctrine. Pursuant to the new doctrine's "War Prevention" tenet, the reductions will virtually eliminate tbe SovieU" already limited short warning attack capability. By lengthening Soviet timelines to transition to war, the reductions increase the prospects for successful crisis management.

Wc believe the General Staff would have mid-to-high-level confidence in iU ability to prosecute deep offensive operations against NATO forces in the Central Region, given sufficient time for force generation. However, thc need to draw substantially on forces in thc western USSR would severely constrain Soviet optionsultillieater war.

This infnr-maihrt is Sev*e4

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Original document.

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