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0
XHTELIICSIES *EHBAK>UM
SUBJECT* Tho Probability of Local Interference aith tho Prodoctloa and Uovoaont of Certain Stratogio tlatertals in tho Event of War*
Tho attached estimates (Fjxilosuroahrough aV) relate only to the probability of local intorfcronco, by Ccimriuniflts or othoro (such ao dioaffectcd nationalists in colonialrith tho production and noTonont of the strategic materials Indioatod in each case, in tho event of oar betwon the IE and tbe tESa
Significant Intorferenoo io dofinad ac at laaotoMontin availabilityeriod of at least one month.
order of the Enoloouree ia as follons:
Ba
c.
D. E. F.. I.
I).
Uoat Coast
rt
General Considerations Canadaxodooho Caribbeanouth Anerioo! South Arjoriaai East Coast Southern Afrloaho lladlterranean and Ifear East (p. India .and tho Far East.
oigrdfiesut possibility of local intorforcnoo trlth thoor movement of listedot neceBsarily rosultlng in ong-tern denial) Id ooasidarod to eoast|in tho follovrfngeaaost
ji. OoHADAt Iron ore, lead, lumbar, PULHTOOD, sino.
b.. EETKOi antimony, cadmium, oopper, fluorspar, graphite,angonose, SEFCOaX, mioa, pstroloua, dno,w
fi. OtBAt BDIASSSS and sugar, chroBrito, niokol oxide.
S gs id. Class. lj-|CLASS1FJ
changes to: ts DDApAuthlate:
Bote: This menoroadun has not been coordinated Tilth tba intolligonoo organisations of tho Depariaaanto of State, Amy, Hsvy, and the
Air Force.
gaiTaT'
I
PETROIEUIL
BALSA, cocoa beans.
lead, ffanadlon.
AfiTIirJHI, load, TIR, tungsten.
COPPER,UE, sodicn nitrates, iron ore.
BEHSL, castor beans, coffee, emetine, Iron era,
KiflCASESE, QUARTZ CRIST AL, aloal. ARGEiTTIHAi boof, bides, skins* Uaoarai, grease, tool.
talc.
pateoleun.
'and XflST PAEJSTAHj taHQARSSS, BICA, jute, toe.
ALAXAi rubber, teak, tin.
' CDOHBSIAi pain oil, pepper, quinine and qulnldino, petroleum, rubbera and tin.
a,. CHdAi antlnony, dunk feathers, hog bristles, tin, and
tungsteain-
With rospect to other Hated conBodltlas, no significantis likely, although spcradic strikes and sabotage are probable.
OEIERAL COHSIDERATIOHS
The USSR, through the apparatus of International Communism, haa made and io Baking extensive preparations to Interfere aith tha production and covenant of strategic note rials required by tha IB* In tho event of war, the USSR oust be expected.to exert to the full its capabilities in this regard*
2. Absolute denial of newly produced strategic taaterialaCdnKunist seizure of control over the means of productionxport, as has occurred in China* Temporary or partial lntorforanceB of greater or leas duration and isagnituoe, can be accomplished if public disorder, work stoppage a, slowdowns, or sabotage are instigated*
CccTRiniot capabilities in these respects very with local clrcunstances not necessarily related to local Ccnnunist strength or to the vulnerability of the Industry concerned. It must bo recognised that disorders, strikes, and even sabotago affecting the availability of strategic materials can occur for strictly local reasons without Communist instigation, andartime daraand for etrategia materials presents an inviting opportunity for exacting the redress Of local grievances. It is to be expected, however, that the USSR and local Ccexaunlets will take every advantage of .'such local disaatis-factions to accomplish their com ulterioro causa any systematic and sustained interference with USaccesa.tostratogic materials normally praauppoees at least covert' Cbnsidriist direction or influanoa, Communist party strength and. labor .Influence have boon, ta':on as the point of departure of country estanates In most cases*
h* Control of or dominant Influence in organised labor isprincipal weapon for the acoompllshsient of this sdoaion. Coaouniat penetration of organized labor has been significantly selective, with concentration on mining, fuel and poser, electrical coranunlcations, overland transport, waterfront, and maritime workers9 unions. In many casss it will be found that the Communists, lacking control of basic production, nevertheless control availability through their control of essential fuel and power, trarioportation, or port facilities*
Tn addition to Coznunlat capabilities for tha localof disorder, work stoppage, orccount nruat be taken of tbe possibility of planned sabotage by trained Soviot agents introduced free tb* outside on specific mission. This factor, although relatively difficult to estimate, is especially inpertsnt with respect to highly remunerative targwta such as Venesuelan oil. Whatever tho security precautions In each case, the possibility,uccessful and severely damaging attack can never be entirely excluded.
Ths following estimates do not take into account tho possibility of Soviet resort to clandestine biological warfareorm of sabatogo, on the supposition that Soviet capabilities in tills regard will be covered elsewhere. This form of attack, if feasible, could obviouslyevere effoct on the production and exnort of strategic materials, directly in the onse of animal snd vegetable products, and indirectly
ln tern* of its effect on human resources.
SJCLOSURE "D" TIIK CARinSfiUI
ai
designated. The products listed with respect toarei.
ASSES end sugar, chronlte, nickel Oxide.
bauxite.
sisal.
HEPUBLIOi cocoa beans.
*.. UCA AIID PANA'JAi ABACA, balsa, mahogany, f. COLOUBlAx petroleua,aWSUELA: PETRUl.flJlf, dlanonds.
The Communist Party,ucleuseeistared voters and exerts influencencluding carry port and transport personnel and soae Significant intorfflronce through strikes end sloe-doma canas well as sens sabotag* probably by alien saboteurs. Sugarproduction ia relatively easy to sabotage through the firingfields.
3- Jamaica. There has boon eocial unrest ih Jamaica, but no sell-defined Oonnamlet movement. Inasmuch ao the. production; of bauxite is as yet undeveloped, no specific asaesaraont can be made with respect to that industry. Probably thero nould be no significant interference.
Ko significant Interoforenco is to be expected.
Domini can ft. public. Ho significant inte.-eferenc* is to be expected.
Central America and Panama. Bo significant interference Is to bo expected.
c
Colombia. Conreunlst influence haa baon important in the Colombian oil workers' unions, which In the peat have conductedatrlkes affecting petroleum production, processing, and The capabilities of those unions have decreased In the past fee months, while the government's ability to cops with then has incroeaed markedly. Consequently, although sporadic Interference ia likely, no significant into reference with petroleum production and movement is Indicated. Tho same is true of platinum.
Venezuela. Communist influence ia important ln the' labor unions concerned with petroleum production and transportation. There is eerlous danger of significant Interference through strikes and sabotage. The target, moreover, is one to attract trained Soviet saboteurs on spscifio mission. In the past, however, the Venezuelan Government has dealt firmly and effectively aith labor disturbances in the industry. Bith its cooperation in carrying out projected security measures, the danger of aerlous sabotage caused only by local elements con probably be controlled. Ho significant Interference Is Indicated with roepect to dlamondo.
'ml
ssTClOSUrE "E"
SOUTH AMBtlCii WEST COAST
Productsrea arei
i
Tho products Hated with reopoot to thta BALSA, cocoa beans.
Cblncbona bark, load. EBhonnny, vanadlroa.
UUUOBg lead. TJJ, tungsten.
COPPER, CHUTE IODTJE, sodlun nitratos, iron ore*
ouador. Corxsixloto control the Iraxrrtant port uorkero' unions. Security forces aro neither offoottvo nor reliable. Significant inter-foronce through etrikos and sabotage la to bo expeotod.
ConcMnintnoror strong, ia outlnuod andcrniunist influenco oxioto, however, assong nine, railroad, and port uorkora. Poruvian produotion and transportation of lead and vanadiurj ore notably vulnerable to striken and sabotage. Significant interference cast therefore bo expeotod, although it Io unlikely to be prolonged. Ito such Interforonoo ia indicated with respect to ohinohono bark and mahogany* i
A- Boll via. CorxBunlot lnfluenoo lo inalgnificont, but labor unrest exists* The nine and railroad workers1 unions aro vail organised sad have conducted prolonged strikes. Tho govornaenVa handling oi* these difficultios has been week and ineffective. Bolivian Dining andoperations are extremely vulnerable to sabotage. Significantthrough strikes and sabotage Is theroforo possible.
5* Chile. Tha Corssunlst Party, though outlawed, la estimated to0 rxabero. It rotains control of the Federation of Miners and haa Infiltrated railroad, port, and electrical workers' unions. Ibroover, existing conditions aro conduclvo to labor unrest. The security foroea, however, are vigilant and offootive. Ib prolonged work stoppage Is doomed likely. Significant, though lifted. Interference through sabotage io probablo, however.
SNCIOSUiuS WF"
SOUTH AMERICA: BAST COAST
Products doeinnated. area are:
The producta listed with respect to this
astor oil. cocoa beans, coffee,metine, iron ore, UANGANKSK, OCA, monaslte, platinum, QUARTZisal, tantalum..
grease wool, hides, and skins,
beef, corundum, hides and skins, quebracho extract, tungsten, grease nool, tung oil.
The Guiana3. No significant interference is indicated.
3- Braail. The Coiaaunist Party, though outlawed, retains effective organization and leadership and has an0 members. Its strength is concentrated in tho capital and the states of Sao Paulo and Pernarabuco. Its influenoe is particularly strong arong port workers and Is also felt among railroad markers and jeahgenena rainers. Social and economic problems afford it opportunities for fomenting localiaordera, and sabotage. Securityowever, are actively engaged in ite suppression and are considered able to check any widespread and concerted interference with production and transportation. Nevertheless, Significant interference with the production of manganese and mith the-; hipment of beryl, castor beans, coffeo, emetine, iron ore,uarts crystal, and sisal must be considered nossiblo, though"suchorcoco is likely to be sporadic and brief in each ease*
*>, Uruguay. Ctonaamistedominate tho Lfontevldeo mobl workers' union, mhich has recently interfered with the export of aoollos-doun strike of the highly skilled workers who grade wool for export. Although the government can be expected to prevent violenttrike based ostensibly on labor demands is not likely to bo otopped immediately, ovon in war time. Therefore, significant interference in tha export of wool is to bo expected, but no significant interference is indicated in the production and export of hider and skins.
5" Argon tin a. The Cornainlst Party, although not largo numerically, has axneriencec leaders andfairly largo number of sympathisers, including0 Slave aho belong to the Sovleb-oponsorod Union(noa legally diesclved). Tha Party's strength la concontrated in the city and province of Buenoehile its atrwgth in the labor movement generally ia not great, the party haajong raileax port,at-packing corkers. Tho government can tipected to take forcaful aotlon to halt or prevent extensive Interference aith production and oxport through strikes and sabotage, nevertheless, significant interference aith the production and shipment of beef, hides, and skins must be considered likely.
KNCLOSURS "G"
S0UTH2RH AFRICA (South of tho Sahara)
roducta designated. Tho producta lieted uith respeot to this area are:
LIBERIA!
BRTTISII HEST AFRICA: cocoa beans, COLUUBIUU, diamonds,
mahogany, MANGANESE, palm oil, tantalum, ond TIN.
BELGIAN CO TOO:
d. SOUTH AFRICA:
a. RHODESIA:
columbiura, copper, DIAIONDS, palm oil, pyrothrum flosers,in, URANIUM.
ASBESTOS, CHEOUITE, CORUNDUM, diamonds, MANGANESE, uranium, vanadium, grease wool, skins and aattlo bark.
ASBESTOS, CHROUITE, .copper, platinum, end sine.
BRITISH EAST AFRICA: EfANITE, pyrethrura flomers, SISAL.
liADAGASCAR:
GRAPHITE, UICA.
Conniuniat capabilities. No eignificant Communist capability to'-jwith tha production or shipment of these commoditiesof the countries
ationalistic disturbances. There is some possibility that nationalistic disturbances might interfere mith production and shipment in BRITISHAFRICA and MADAGASCAR,, Given reasonable precautions, however, such disturbances could bo limited In duration and effect.
Planned sabotage. The possibility of planned sabotage by agenta'Aif dispatched on specific missions cannot bo excluded in the case of expeclally remunerative targets. Although tho BELGIAN CONGO is notably vulnerable ln this respect, since no effective border control exists between it and French Equatorial Africa, significant intorforonoe with production and transport of listed coorodities is cot indicated*
O
ENCLOSURE "H"
area aro:
THE fJEDITERIUHKAN AND NEAR EAST
tefegjl designated. Tho producta listed uith reopoct to thio
. 4. PORTUGAL, SPAIN, PRENCH NORTH APRICAl cork. SARDINIA: talc.
chroadte, gun opluu.
extra long staple cotton.
SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, BAHREIN, QATAR: petroleum.
f.
J. Portugal. Spain. Prench North Africa. Cork production iaImcune to interference. Sporadic cabotage in port areaa ia poasibloa
3. Sardinia. Communlet atrength In Sardinia io considerable, moreover, Sardinia haa knoen sustained strikes accompanied by sabotage. Significant interference aith talc production and shipment by those scans is possible
Communism isignificant force in Turkey. services are in offective control of such rdnoras do exist. No significant Interference is Indicated,sabotage io
5. Effvpt. There io social unrest in Egypt, but no significant Coamanist movement. Sporadic strikes and sabotage are possible, but no significant interference Is likely.
Saudi Arabia. Kuwait. Bahrein. Qatar. No significantie indicated.
7- IESSj ioaffootlon and Coenainiat influence exist in the petroleum producing area. Security forces are probably adequate to protect the main installations, but not field installations andwhich are vulnerable to sabotage. Significant interference Is therefore indicated.
f tho ussr were to Invade Iran, it would presumably wish to capture the oil facilities intaot. Its local fifth column, therefore, mould be employed, not to sabotage thoee facilltlea, but to prevent both production and sabotage*
If Iran mere not to be invaded, there mould be Conounlst-inatigated strikes end sabotage. Security forces, however, could probably prevent significant local interference.
EHCIflSURB "I"
INDIA AND THB FAR EAST
roducts designated. Tho products listed with respect to this area orex
& EAST PAKISTAN: beryl, burlap, kyaoito, Juto,
KANOAHESE, MICA, monaslte, crude lac shellac, tea, and akins?
t rubber*
'
o. BuTOA, TH4IUND, UVIATAi rubber, teak, and tin.
d. INDOHESIA: palm oil, pepper, petroleum, quinine and quint dino, rubber, and tin.
o. CHIHAj antimony, dude feathers, hog bristles, tin and tungsten.
PHZLTPPDrES: chrcoite, coccanut oil, tnhogeny,and
unijojuF^: Ohrooo, nicksT7
2. bvna and Bast Pakistan. At present the Cocaraniata have no significant power to intorf ere" with tba production of tho conooditiee listed, but they nay be able to binder their shipment. Before9 tho Corraunlsts were able to diarupt railway and port operationseriod of weeks by means of unannounced strikes and sabotage. Since than, strong govemmant action has rendered then relatively Ineffective, and their inflnonce in organized labor has do alined*
Hcewvsr, production and shipment fron this area ara constantly ln danger of interruption by econcede warfare between India end Pakistan and by communal disturbances in both countries, kbreovor, the probable growth of Conanunlat power and influence) ln Southeast Asds may boto produce an increase In Conmurase activity and Influence) In eastern India snd East Pakistan which would jeopardise the production and shipment of Jute products, manganese, ndca,and tea.
3. Ceylon. The Coirmmiata* oapobilltioe for Interference are limited to the Colombo port area, where they control approximatelyercent of organised labor. Itlieved, however, that this danger could bo contioUed except for the possibility of sporadic sabotage.
4* Burma. Prodi ct Ion and shipment are now effectively disrupted by the arrted insurrection of Corxminists and other elements. Present conditions, approaohlng anarchy, are llkoly to continue indefinitely.
Ualaya. Although Communist terrorists have been active in lalaya sincehe output of rubber and tin have not thus far been affected. Production of both these caterials, however, has beenonly at considerably cost. Prospecting for new eouroes of tin in Ualaya has virtually been haltodesult of terrorist activities. Terrorism in Ifalaya, although presently under control, may veil In or easeesult of developments in China and Indochina. In tho event of mar, Co muni st terrorists would intensify their activities ajainst such primary objectives as rubber estates and tin mines, significantlywith production and shipment.
ThajiJ jtpd. If the Communists should gain the sscondancy inand Burma, which nowefinite possibility, the shipment of strategic materials from Thailand might be prevented by external andCcezBunist pressure on the Thai Government. If euoh pressure failed to produce that result, the Oofmminista would nevertheless beof significant interference with production and shipmentampaign of terrorise! similar to that in
ather precarious situation exists IneaH..'government ie attempting to establish its' authority: after, a, long period
of conflict wit I; the Dutch. The situation Is susceptible'to Comuni.-it exploitation, although present threats to production and' movement of conrjodities arise principally from other elements and over, local issues.
Numerous atrikes occurred duringotably ofworkers and dockaorkers. There haa boon some evidence of Communist aotlvlty Inh these strikes, particularly those occurringumatra. Indonesian labor, however, lo not well organized or disciplined, and the fluidity of the present eituation permits no valid assessment of the likelihood of future sabotage. The output of those productsizable, disciplined labor forceetroleum pi-oduets, tin, and estate agricultural products) la, of course, more vulnerable to work stoppages than ia the output from native agriculture. Export of any Indonesian products, moreover, could be effectively hindered by strikes at the ports. Therefore, significant interference, for at least limited
jpTiT
o
periodo, ia to he anticipated in tha production and/or shipment' of all Indonesian products listed.
China. The production and marketing of strategic commoditiesonopoly of the Chinese Communist government, and tho capability of denial to the US ia absolute, jr. the event of war, it raustbe presumed that Chinese policy would conform to Soviet requirements and therefore that the OS would be unable to acquire Chinese strategic commodities.
The Philippines. Ho significant Interference is Indicated, although thereossibility of sporadio sabotage.
Communist capabilities are limited primarilyaith tho operation of railways and ports throughcoal laining, transportation, and dockworkers* labor unions. Nointerference with production io indicated except in the case
of the principal lead-aino properties, at Broken Hill, where tho union da also Communist-doninated. Rank-and-file membership of these unions is overwhoX-rdngly nor^araunist, licwevar, so that any work stoppages or slowdowns would have to be justified in terns of legitimate grievances in order to be sustained.
Caledonia. Local interference Is not indicated. of nickel matte, however, is dependent on coal suppliesreceived from Australia, which might be interfered uith.
. taJfisSflOa. The only significant Coasainist capability la for intorforence with shipment through domination of the Waterside Workers' Union. a doubtful, however, that extended Interference would bo supported by the non-CoCTrunlat rank-and-fUe membership of the union.
Original document.
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