SOVIET CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN IN THE LIGHT OF US COMMITMENT IN KORE

Created: 7/10/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Soviet Cu|abilitiesfespeet touight of VS Coiuj.itas&nt in Korea

USSH has the rulitary capabilityransportinr, and

legisticallyaterborne attach on Japnnec to elevenn per division). There is in the Farufficient bomberarge-scale airtack on Jajxm. It is uncertain, however. Knottier the surface vessels of the Soviet naval forces in tha Far bast en rivo odeyaate naval supjort for an amphibious operation against Japan,

effort has been ra.de to csti-ate soviet intentions re-ardin'; the nanner

or extent of the enployiMsnt of those capabilities nor has consideration been riven to the reiuiror.ent3 of such other sovietht ucecrcpatiy aninst Japan, neither has consideration been *iven to the extent and effectivme of rrobablc US counteraction.

1. Soviet Forces in the Far ftaSV.

a. Ground Forces.

Theound forces in theen, organized inivisions, in addition, tt:ere ore0 WD troops, organised along military lines. The pa in troopo If divisiens) are near ports in theorthe Kuriles,oincliatka-Chukotski Peninsulas. The retrainingoivisionshe Trans-Siberiin railroad in garrison areas.

b. air Forces.

The Soviets are estimated to hove disposed in tho .Jarotalircraft, assigned to theh,h tactical air ar;ies legated in the Fararitime, ajid Trcnabcikdl iilitai* Divisions; the ;rd Ion-irlocated at Khabarovsk, and the 5th andicific Fleet loc&tud in the r'ar iast and "nritirc's. 'xc^kdcui of the oovict sir order of bottle in tho Far ^aat iu follows:

""ote: Ti ishasoordinatedhef ^tatif,. Navy, andBo.

S3. Q

Jtf mmmmmmmwTO: TS S

D"A4 Apruth: PL'* j ate: gflM-

Fighter

lioraber

(LRAF)

Although tha 3rd long-ranro air army contains anonber aircraft, no Soviets) have been reported operations! in any of the rerimunts. It is possible, however, thatrtion of the total number of TU-a's estiratedurrently operational in theaybo in theEast. It is lIso possible that all TU-4's available in the USSR could be moved on short notice to bases in the Par East.

The Soviet Air Forcesariety of bomber-type aircraft in the Par East union are currently operational. The irost current air order of battle lists ani, lirht bombers assigned to units in the Par East, not including the eighteen regiments of the tliird lon^-range air amp/. It is readily seen, therefore, that there exist in the Far East sufficient bomber aircraft of the Soviet nir Forces to provide the capability for air attack arainst Japanarge scale. '

c. Naval Forces.

Soviet Naval forces in the Par East are organized into trio fleets, the 5th based at Vladivostok and the 7th based at 3ovet3kaya Gavan. Ho information concerning the assignment of vessels to fleets in this area has been confirmed.

The ships assigned to the Far East Fleet are as follows:

Heavy Cruiser

Ll;ht Cruiser

Destroyer

Old Destroyer

Corvette

Destroyer fcscort

Submnrine

iJinor Combatant

Naval

2. ical Capabilities.

for .aterbornq Tr.insi.ort.

The USSK has sufficient loi-latical capabilities to initiate andcaterborne attack on Japan with IC toivisionsXX) nan per division,uipxorrt and aujplios. Ihe rajor Soviet-con trolled ports ir. "orth Korea, the laritirae Province, and Sakhalinorrtoincd daily loading capacity of at0 long tons, the ports of Manchuria and North China have an Approximately equal capacity. This la more than required toorce ofodivisions.

Japanese ports on tho island of Honshu facin- the Sea of Japan are of limited capacity, totalling0 tons per day. This is inadequate for tho initial attack byoivisions and would fbrce the utilization of ports on Hokaido and the Pacific Coast of Honshu, both of which havo umnla capacity.

for Land Transport.

The present stockpile of mitoriel in the Joviet Far East is estimated to be sufficient for the initial attack, and the capacity of the Trins-Siberinn railroads together aith this jtockpile, is su-'ficient to naintain an operation of tho magnitude previously noted.

for -ir Transport.

The total Joviet airliftmeaiatoly available is sufficient to move throe airborne brigadesransport planes. aximum of five airborne brigade a, if planned in advance, could be moved by .xeansO transport planes. Ibis vouldpossible without sliders but If glidersere used, the figures would be increased by ono airborne brigade in each case, without gliders the combat radiusautical-lldors it uould benautical miles. Each airborne brigade consists0 men with all equipment except li lit tanks. There are believed toransport plan*io in reserve in the USSR forcrews would liavc tt* be assembled and conditioning undertaken.

Original document.

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